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Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 ( 1988) and Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969 ( 1989) 
theoretically established the age limit at 16-years-old. In reality, the imposition of 
sentences remains open to much judicial discretion in process and application. The crux 
of the problem is the great divide that continues to exist between the legal definition of 
juvenile and the biopsychosocial research. This paper argues that the legal definition fails 
to consider the biophysical and socioscientific evidence which is clearly supportive of a 
bright constitutional line being drawn at 18 years of age. 
There are currently a confirmed 71 subjects on death rows throughout the United 
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Kentucky and ·wilkins v. Missouri. Upon analysis of these cases, it appears that the 
young offenders have more than their age in common. Such factors as emotional and 
psychological disturbance, psychiatric diagnoses, troubled family history, documented 
history of head trauma and subnormal intelligence levels all put these juveniles at risk for 
so-called dissocial behavior. This risk factor is supported by a wide range of scientific 
data which is reviewed in this paper. 
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There is a disturbing degree of ambivalence and conflict reflected in the diverse 
and sometimes contradictory social policies and criminal laws which are focused on the 
management of violent juvenile offenders. A critical aspect of this debate is the 
difference in the legal construction of juvenile and the biopsychosocial research which 
defines their behavior in terms of physical, emotional, social and cognitive 
development. Although this may constitute an interesting heuristic debate, its practical 
application has deadly consequences. A disturbing example is how the narrow legal 
construction of a juvenile' s criminal responsibility is used as justification for imposition 
of our most severe sanction the death penalty on individuals under 18 years of age. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore how the legal definition of juvenile 
fails to comport with the prevailing biophysical and socioscientific evidence. The 
evidence presented supports an argument for a bright constitutional age limit being 
drawn at 18 years of age; the established age of majority. Such a change would reduce 
the arbitrariness that goes into the existing mitigating factor approach in our criminal 
law. In order to fully and fairly present such an argument, there are a multitude of 
issues which need to be addressed. 
An overview of the history of our juvenile justice system describes the special, 
albeit different, treatment afforded minors throughout our system. This is just one 
example of how our society distinguishes the actions of children from the actions of 
adults. A host of rights and privileges are vested at the commonly described age of 
majority. As such, a minor ( defined as a person under age 18) cannot vote; sit on a jury; 
marry in most jurisdictions without permission of a parent or guardian; possess alcohol; 
purchase cigarettes, patronize bingo parlors or pool halls; cannot pawn property; cannot 
consent to services by health professionals for most medical care; donate blood without 
parental permission; join the armed services without parental consent; and may not 
operate or work at a shooting gallery; and may disaffirm any contract except for 
"necessaries." Internationally, age 18 is the age chosen by many countries that prohibit 
the death penalty for juveniles. In the United States, the current death penalty statutes 
(Appendix A, Chart 1.1) demonstrate the age distribution within the constitutional 
limits established by the Supreme Court in Thompson v. Oklahoma and Stanford v. 
Kentucky. Even the demarcation of 16 established by the Supreme Court's decisions on 
capital punishment has not gone unchallenged. As recently as 1990 Alabama sentenced 
a 15-year-old to death. An overview of existing case law interpreting state statutes 
reflects the vast differences and significant discretion in the use of nonstatutory and 
statutory mitigating factors. This will be demonstrated in an analysis of available cases 
on the 71 subjects currently on death rows throughout the United States during 
1997-1998. 
Chapters 2 and 3 will provide the theoretical foundations for this dissertation. 
The biopsychosocial, moral and cognitive research provide crucial evidence of how a 
juvenile is developmentally defined. A juvenile's development is influenced by many 
different factors. As such, examination of several theories will be categorized as 
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follows: psychobiologic issues will include a discussion of family history along with the 
cycle of violence and other forms of child maltreatment, neglect, parental discord, 
maladaptive attachment process; problematic personality traits including emotional 
vulnerabilities, psychiatric decompensation; pathologic interpersonal behavior; gene-
environment correlations and interactions; interaction of family, environment and 
conscience including a review of neurophysiologic, psychophysiologic and 
neuropsychologic studies. Sociomoral issues will be defined in terms of Lawrence 
Kohl berg's theory of sociocognitive moral development. The importance of age as it 
relates to moral development and the qualitative difference in a child's perception of 
reality are important concepts in Kohlberg's theory as well as in this document. This 
discussion will evolve around Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental structuralism in the 
context of his stage theory of moral development. 
Chapter 4 and 5 will provide an analysis of available cases currently on death 
rows or sentenced to death rows throughout the United States for crimes committed as 
juveniles during 1997-1998. A descriptive cohort design along with a substantive case 
review of statutorily identified mitigating factors is presented with particular emphasis 
on the recently argued Supreme Court cases of Thompson v. Oklahoma, Stanford v. 
Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri. An offender profile1 will become apparent with 
characteristics such as troubled family history, emotional and psychological disturbance, 
psychiatric diagnoses, documented history of head trauma and subnormal intelligence 
levels. In spite of similarities in offender profile, great dissimilarities become apparent 
regarding the relative weight and consideration which are attributed to the mitigators at 
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sentencing. As such, there appears to be no consensus concerning what specific 
mitigators would be sufficient to bar the death penalty. In fact, different state statutes 
stipulate different requirements and some are not stipulated statutorily but are simply 
figured into the 'legal equation' before sentencing. Moreover, similar cases with similar 
mitigators within the same jurisdiction may be given different weight. Equally 
disturbing, four jurisdictions (Alabama, Delaware, Florida and Indiana) have a judicial 
override system which allows the judge to override a jury's decision at sentencing. 
Chapter 6 reviews and updates the constitutional issues regarding the execution 
of juveniles. This includes a discussion of relevant case law and the corresponding 
justification ( or lack of justification) regarding the penological goals of retribution and 
deterrence. The three major international agreements to which the United States is a 
signatory, condemning execution of persons under 18, are reviewed along with the 
abolitionist nations. 
Although of the death penalty has been hotly debated for years with some degree 
of resolution for adults; there is no such resolution for juveniles. Our criminal justice 
system has recognized the necessity of considering age when dealing with juvenile 
offenders and allows for individualized treatment using the 'mitigating factor' approach 
in death sentencing. Unfortunately, individualized treatment has not provided a fair and 
equitable legal process for the youthful super-predator. This paper will address these 
inconsistencies to provide further evidence of the need for a procedural and substantive 
change in the form of a ban on the use of capital punishment for those under 18 years of 
age. This age is well-established as the age of majority in our society and supported as 
4 
such by the scientific data. 
B. Juvenile Justice 
The child is singled out by law for special attention as a consequence of the 
traditional distinction made between adults and children in physical, psychological and 
societal terms (Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, 1973). Children are presumed to be 
incomplete beings who are not competent to determine and safeguard their interests 
(Id. at 9). Each child's development unfolds in response to environmental influences so 
that emotional, intellectual and moral capacities prosper within the context of family 
relationships which determine his/her social reactions. Without knowledge of the 
family influences, neither the child's developmental successes and failures nor his/her 
social adjustments can become apparent. 
Children are not adults but beings per se; different in their mental nature, in their 
functional status and in their comprehension of events (Id. at 13). They are governed in 
much of their functioning by the irrational parts of their minds (impulses and wishes). 
Accordingly, they respond to any threat to their emotional security with anxieties, 
denial, distortion of reality and displacement of feelings reactions which provides little 
help with the ability to cope. Children experience life events in a highly egocentric 
manner. The mere move from one house to another can be perceived as a grievous loss 
imposed on them; the birth of a sibling as an act of parental hostility; the death of a 
parent as intentional abandonment (Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, 1973). They consider 
themselves and their own feelings as special and unique which becomes a conviction of 
his/her immortality (Bender, 1959). It is the juvenile's egocentrism which results in 
5 
his/her general impairment of judgment. 
The manner in which children are seen, their role in the family, in the workplace 
and in society are reflective of historical and cultural perspectives (Schetky and 
Benedek, 1985). The perception of children has varied significantly across time and 
societies. They have been seen as chattel and cheap labor as well as a protected class of 
citizens. In our history, children worked long hours in mines, in factories and on farms 
as they were "hired out" for economic gain by their parents. Today children are 
described as a precious "commodity" and are protected by an array of social values, 
special laws and economic benefits. Recent innovations reflective of the changing role 
of children include public education, child labor laws, public health laws and child 
protection legislation. The root of concern for children is the idea that they are 
particularly helpless and vulnerable, less capable and less responsible and so deserve 
special protection from a variety of dangers including themselves, their parents and 
exploitive social and economic interests. The belief is that immediate intervention will 
result in amelioration of later difficulties. 
Throughout American history, children and adolescents accused in capital 
crimes could be and were tried, convicted and sentenced. Although there was a 
tendency to overturn or commute the sentences of young children at least two minors 
aged 12 and under were put to death between 1806 and 1820 (Streib, 1983 ). In the 
1820's a fundamental change in the treatment of young offenders began to develop in 
the United States and the seeds of a juvenile justice system known today were planted 
(Stapleton, Aday and Ito, 1982). During the creation of juvenile courts, emphasis was 
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placed on the rehabilitative ideal (White, 1987). Theoretically, " [ t ]he 'rehabilitative 
ideal' presupposed that crime was a symptom of 'pathology' and that criminals should be 
treated like irresponsible patients" (Platt, 1969, p. 45). 
The basis for an elaborate juvenile justice system, is not solely due to concern 
for children. Rather, it derives from the parens patriae doctrine which articulates the 
state owes a special duty to those who are not fully able to protect themselves (Maynes, 
1983). The insane, the mentally impaired and juveniles were recognized as possessing 
diminished capacity under the law. As such, they receive protection not only because 
they deserve it but because an implied contract exists that stipulates it is the right and 
duty of the states to protect them under this doctrine. This doctrine regards children 
within an empathetic context (Braithwaite and Shore, 1981; Parker, 1976). 
Prior to the 1967 Supreme Court decision under In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), a 
juvenile court adjudication hearing (juvenile court trial) was quite informal. The 
Supreme Court imposed requirements of constitutional due process upon the juvenile 
court's adjudication hearing. Such constitutional guarantees included the right to 
counsel for the juvenile, the right to notice of the charges and hearings, the right to 
confront and cross-examine, and the right against self-incrimination. In re Winship, 
397 U.S. 358 (1970) provided even more procedural safeguards with the Supreme Court 
decision that delinquency cases must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt; the same 
level of proof required by adult criminal cases. The justification for intervening in the 
lives of young offenders, retribution, deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation, 
suggest contradictory social policies. Critical to the decision-making process regarding 
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what becomes of a child who is delivered from the arms of his/her parents to the arms of 
the law is the child's moral development. 
Although younger children may understand the difference between right and 
wrong, it is not until they become able to process the information that they become 
capable of abstract thought and (as the legal theory goes) criminally liable. To say that 
persons are "legally responsible" for their actions is to say that they are liable for the 
normal legal consequences of them. To say that they are morally "responsible" is to say 
that they may be legitimately blamed. In other words, an assumption of moral 
responsibility for the harmful outcome of one's own or another's conduct implies moral 
blameworthiness or moral obligation to make amends insofar as one could have 
maintained control or some degree of control over one's actions (Id. at 41 ). 
Philosophers, psychologists, developmental and legal experts argue and defend a 
different chronological age as the magical mark2 for criminal culpability. Even different 
time periods can provide a different definition of liability as pertains to age. In fact, the 
problem of line-drawing among minors is a dilemma all its own. A dilemma which the 
Supreme Court has been faced with on several occasions. In numerous factual contexts 
this Court has concluded that children simply by virtue of their status as minors can be 
deprived of the rights and privileges of adults. As noted in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 
No. 86-6169 ( 1986), "This Court's decisions sanctioning legal disabilities for minors 
treat juveniles as a coherent class, and establish the age of majority as the demarcation 
between the period of childhood and the period of adulthood" (p. 18). 
There has been a change in attitude toward the juvenile murderer as reflected by 
8 
.... 
an upward shift in age of incapacity (Frey, 1970). The United States, during the late 
eighteenth to mid-nineteenth century, applied the English common law rules concerning 
the criminal liability of children and older adolescents. Under these rules, there was an 
irrebuttable presumption that children below the age of seven were incapable of forming 
criminal intent (Id. at 113). As such, minors were never liable for their felonious acts. 
This was the result of the common law view that these children were never capable of 
forming criminal intent. Capability, of course, is a prerequisite to criminal liability. 
Children between 7 and 14 were presumed to be incapable of entertaining criminal 
intent. The presumption could be rebutted by showing that the child was able to 
distinguish between right and wrong and understood the wrongful nature of his or her 
act [State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2dl (Fla. 1973); Commonwealth v. Green, 151 A. 23 246 
(Pa 1959)]. Children 14 years and older were deemed fully capable of forming criminal 
intent and therefore always were liable for their criminal offenses (Radzinowicz, 1948). 
Most statutes, however, fix the maximum jurisdictional age at 18 and the minimum at 
seven. The age of culpability is defined as the jurisdictional age at which a child is 
deemed capable ofreceiving a death penalty. No child below the minimum age of 
culpability can be held criminally liable and a youth at the maximum age must be tried 
as an adult (Appendix A, Chart 1.2). 
All juveniles must endure the burdens of the state or as Justice Rehnquist put it, 
a critical legal difference between minors and adults is that " ... [freedom] [is] qualified 
by the recognition that juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody" 
[Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403, 81 L.Ed. 2d 207(1984)]. A problem of due process 
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and equal protection exist as a result of the restraints imposed on juveniles while at the 
same time being subjected to an adult penalty. Some legal analysts have even argued 
that the restrictions the states impose amount to a constructive form of discrimination 
against juveniles as a class (White, 1983 ). The necessity for parental consent, the denial 
of the right to drink or buy liquor, vote and compulsory school attendance laws are all 
justified on the basis of being in the best interest of the child [farham v. J.R, 442 U.S. 
584 ( 1979)]. The execution of a minor, however, can in no way be justified on the basis 
of being in the child's best interest. 1n fact, the inequity of the death penalty for minors is 
best captured by the mother of a condemned 15-year-old who was asked by prison 
officials for parental consent to emergency treatment for her son. The mother 
responded: "Now isn't that ironic .. . He's old enough to be put to death but he's not old 
enough to get an aspirin without our consent" (Streib, 1996). 
Prohibition of the death penalty for juveniles would be consistent with the actions 
of state governments around the country in the protection of juvenile welfare and 
promotion of juvenile guidance. Our society recognizes that minors are less mature, less 
experienced, less able to exercise good judgment, self-restraint, and more susceptible to 
environmental influences. As a result, juveniles are less responsible and less culpable in a 
moral sense than adults. Minors are neither privy to all the rights and privileges of 
adulthood nor are they given the full obligation of adulthood until they reach their 
eighteenth birthdays (U.S. Constitution amend. XXVI 1). As stated in Eddings v. 
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. at 116 n.12 [quoting Mayv. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953), 
"children have a very special place in life which law should reflect"]. "During 
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the formative years of childhood adolescence, minors often lack the experience, 
perspective and judgement to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to 
them" [Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. at 635 (1979); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 409-
11 (1981)]. As Justice Stewart stated in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-
50(1968), "a child is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is 
the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees." In Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 
(1979), the court even rejected a claim that an involuntary civil commitment statute 
unconstitutionally discriminated against persons on the basis of their youthfulness. 
Parham v. J.R. observed that "most children, even in adolescence, simply are not able to 
make social judgments concerning many decisions" (Id. at 603). 
Special treatment of juvenile offenders is a reflection of the fundamental belief 
that the young must have time and opportunity to grow and to escape from the 
disadvantages, deprivations and abuse that may account for their behavior [Thompson v. 
Oklahoma, 56 L W 4892 ( 1988)]. This special treatment derives from a prevalent 
compassionate and decent sense that government must be restrained from adding undue 
punishment to whatever pain and handicaps have been inflicted by fate and 
circumstance. Again, this sense of restraint parallels the "belief, long held by this 
society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a 
disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less culpable 
than defendants who have no such excuse" [California v. Brown, 107 S. Ct. 837, 841 
( 1987)]. As Herbert Humphrey once said, "The moral test of government is how it 
treats those who are in the dawn of life, the children; those who are in the shadows of 
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life, the sick, the needy, and the handicapped" (Krisberg and Schwartz, 1983). 
The amici argue that the law and policies regarding juveniles reflect an almost 
universal judgment that adolescents ought to be treated differently than adults. That 
juveniles as a class have yet to reach a level of maturation and responsibility that is 
presumed in adults and considered desirable for full participation in the rights and duties 
of our life experiences. As stated in Thompson v. Oklahoma, "the reasons why 
juveniles are not trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also explains 
why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult." 
There is consistent evidence, 3 that minors "are more vulnerable, more impulsive and 
less self-disciplined than adults," and are without the same "capacity to control their 
conduct and to think in long-range terms." As such, they are prone to "experiment, risk-
taking and bravado," and lack "experience, perspective, and judgment" [Bellotti v. 
Baird, 443 U.S. 622,635 (1979)]. 
Our criminal justice system is based on concepts of individual responsibility. 
The differences between minors and adults in their capacities to assume such 
responsibility has been reflected in our response to crimes committed by minors. The 
clearest indication of society's commitment to this concept of separate treatment is the 
development of the juvenile justice system [Brief of Amicus Curiae, American Bar 
Association, Thompson v. Oklahoma, No. 86-6169 (1986)]. 
There have been approximately 350 offenders executed in the past 30 years 
including over 90 between 15 and 1 7 years of age sentenced to death in the United 
States since the death penalty was reinstated in 1970's (Amnesty International, 1991 ). 
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Several of the 90 had their sentences reversed on appeal. Although they represent only a 
small portion of the approximately 3,316 males and 49 females under sentence of death 
(Justice Department, personal communication, June, 1998) in the United States; there 
are more juvenile offenders on death row in the United States than in any other country 
[Brief of Amicus Curiae, Office of the Capital Collateral Representative for the State of 
Florida, Stanford v. Kentucky, No. 87-5765 (1989)]. 
The United States is one of only eight countries worldwide known to have 
executed juvenile offenders in the last decade. Confirmed juvenile executions in the 
seven other countries are as follows: Bangladesh (1 in 1986), Iran (unknown number in 
the early l 980's ), Iraq ( 13 in 1987), Nigeria ( 1 in 1997), Pakistan (3 since 1985), Saudi 
Arabia (1 in 1992), and Yemen (1 in 1993) (Amnesty International, 1998). Barbados 
abolished the juvenile death penalty in 1989. The majority of United Nations member 
states report no death sentences imposed on juveniles. In fact, International standards 
prohibiting the execution of juveniles were developed in recognition of the fact that the 
death penalty, uniquely cruel and irreversible in character, is a wholly inappropriate 
penalty for individuals who have not attained full physical or emotional maturity at the 
time of their actions. 
Despite such standards, 24 of the 38 U.S. states (as of 1998) with the death 
penalty have statutes allowing for the imposition of death sentences on juveniles 
(Appendix A, Chart 1.3). In other words only 13 jurisdictions have no death penalty: 
Alaska, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin (NAACP 
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Legal Defense Fund, 1998). That means, of course, only 13 states prohibit imposition 
of the death penalty on juvenile offenders. This is an irony in a country which places 
such emphasis on human rights. Seventeen states have established a minimum age for 
execution ranging from 12 to 17 years ( at the time of the crime) 7 other states have no 
minimum age (Amnesty International, 1998). The Supreme Court ruled in 1989 that the 
execution of someone as young as 15 years of age constituted "cruel and unusual 
punishment," in direct violation of the Constitution. 
As mentioned, there exists a presumption in law that as juveniles grow older, 
they become more culpable. For atrocious crimes, the juvenile's intent is presumed 
despite the lack of support for the hypothesis that all older juveniles have achieved 
judgmental maturity (Maynes, 1983). As such, intent substitutes for immaturity. This 
provided the rationale which allowed New Jersey to hang a boy of 12 for murder in 
1828 [State v. Guild, 10 NJL 163 ( 1828)] and which set precedent for Alabama to hang 
an 11- year-old in 1858 [Godfrey v. State, 31 Ala. 323 (1858)]. In 1944 such a premise 
justified South Carolina's electrocution of a seventh grader named George Stinney. 
Although this may constitute the basis for a logical legal argument, a child's 
capacity to control aggressive impulses must be established ( along with a consensus of 
opinion) before a convincing sociomoral argument can be sustained. In other words, the 
age of demarcation should correlate to the level of criminal responsibility. In order for 
criminal responsibility (culpability) to be proven, one must establish the existence of 
moral responsibility. The ability to assume moral responsibility is linked to a multitude 
of psychosocial and biophysical variables. 
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The following chapters will provide a review of the literature on genetic 
correlates, family-environmental effects, emotional effects and the ethological 
correlation in the development of dissocial behavior in the juvenile' s progression to 
adult criminality. Such a discussion will provide a better understanding of the extent of 
capability (culpability) of the juvenile. The issue of capability is a critical element in 
proof of the existence of mens rea as a justification for the use of capital punishment. In 
order to establish culpability one must be able to fully appreciate the wrongfulness of 
the behavior. As revealed in the literature and data collected on juveniles, there appears 
to be uncertainty regarding this issue. 
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II: Psychobiologic Variables 
A. Family History 
Juvenile crime is widespread, growing and more times than not violent. It has 
been documented that since 1960 arrests of those under 18 years of age have risen 254 
percent for murder, rape, robbery and aggravated assault. According to the FBI's 
Uniform Crime Reports, the number of young people under 18 who were arrested for 
murder jumped 128 percent from 1983 to 1992. In 1994, the national juvenile violent 
crime rate increased steadily starting in the late l 980's, with 514 violent crime arrests 
per 100,000 juveniles between the ages of 1 O and 17 as compared to 317 per l 00,000 
juveniles in 1988 (U.S. Department of Justice, 1998). While the overall crime rate has 
leveled off, the number of juveniles arrested for violent crimes rose over 47 percent 
from 1988 to the present. The annual number of juvenile homicides nationwide has 
tripled to 3,100 since 1984, with 125,000 youths charged each year with a serious 
violent crime, according to the Criminal Justice Center at the National Center for Policy 
Analysis. In fact , persons under 18 years of age account for nearly half of all serious 
crimes, although they constitute only 30 percent of the nation's population (Id. at 1). 
One out of every five people arrested for a violent crime is 17 years of age or younger. 
Although serious violent juvenile offenders represent only a small portion of the 
juvenile population it accounts for a disproportionate amount of violent crime. 
The wave of criminal horror cases by children has baffied officials. Many of the 
crimes committed by minors are gruesome beyond description. It is precisely the 
viciousness of these crimes that indicates the extent of disturbance among such young 
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people. From across the country, headlines in newspapers have read: 
"Teenage boy in Colorado waits patiently while two young friends hack 
and hammer his mother to death" 
"Florida police try to determine if 5-year-old knew consequences when 
he threw 3-year-old off fifth floor stairwell" 
"Kansas City police are baffled by jealous 12-year-old who kills 
younger sister, mother over birthday party plans" 
"Eleven year-old from affluent St. Louis neighborhood orders 10-year-
old out of her yard; when he doesn't leave she shoots him with parents 
gun. Playmate dies after surgery" 
"Girl, 4, kills twin baby brothers by throwing them to the floor after one 
of the 3 week-old infants accidentally scratches her during play" 
"San Francisco police don't know what to do about 18 month-old who 
kills playmate with toy truck" (Magid and McKelvey, 1987). 
Equally as horrifying are the offenses listed in the Brief of Amici Curiae, 
American Society for Adolescent Psychiatry and American Orthopsychiatric 
Association, Thompson v. Oklahoma, No. 86-6169 (1986) from a sample of 14 of the 
juveniles currently on death row: 4 
1. "Raped and murdered young woman. 
2. Shot and killed subjects attorney's sister, then attempted to rape her. 
3. In the company of a 14-year-old accomplice, shot and killed man in the 
course of burglary. 
4. In course of a robbery of a convenience store, shot and killed female 
clerk. 
5. During a robbery with one other person, shot and killed clerk. 
6. Raped, stabbed and strangled 76-year-old nun. 
7. During a spree of six robberies in one week, shot and killed male grocery 
store customer. 
8. In the company of others, bludgeoned male victim with the tire jack 
while stealing car. 
9. Shot and killed female convenience store clerk in the course of a robbery. 
10. Abducted, raped, then shot and killed female convenience store clerk. 
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11. Stabbed female victim 60 times, bit her breast and pushed his hand in her 
vagma. 
12. Participated with a gang in the robbery and murder of a business man. 
13. In the company of others shot and killed relative. 
14. Shot and killed mother and stepfather." 
As reported by the Children's Defense Fund, the reality is that homicide is 
currently the country's third leading cause of death for elementary and middle-school 
children. Marian Wright Edelman, president of the Children's Defense Fund, explains 
that between 1979 and 1991 nearly 50,000 children were killed by guns which is 
equivalent to the number of Americans killed in the Vietnam War. She adds, "The 
crisis of children having children has been eclipsed by the greater crisis of children 
killing children" (Shulins, 1986). 
Clearly, nothing so violated the natural order of things as a child turned killer 
(Shulins, 1986). Experts from around the country have found evidence that the violent 
behavior of children and adults which erupts in murder is rooted in dysfunctional family 
relationships (Lefkowitz, Eron, Walder and Huesmann, 1977; Linn, 1987). The breaks 
that cause unattachment include domestic violence, divorce, parental mismanagement 
(including overly harsh and inconsistent discipline), physical, sexual, and psychological 
abuse and neglect. Arguably, neglectful and abusive parents are the most dramatic 
precursors of attachment5 problems. There are, however, endless theories on the source 
of violence in childhood ranging from genetic influences to environmental stressors 
(poverty and social disadvantage) to the child's individual temperament. Although 
several of these theories will be discussed, none will be presented as the answer to the 
problem. 
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Overwhelming evidence indicates that the family is a major probably the major 
social unit within which the meaning and uses of violence are learned (Gelles and 
Straus, 1975; Straus, Gelles and Steinmetz, 1980). The family is the most frequent 
locus of all types of violence ranging from slaps to beatings to torture to murder. From 
earliest childhood until death a person is more likely to observe, to commit and to be the 
victim of violence within the family than in any other setting. Unlike violence in other 
situations, the family provides a model for violence that cuts across age and sex taboos. 
Gelles and Straus (1975) reported that from 20 percent to 50 percent of murders take 
place within the family. Research on child abuse suggests that as many as two million 
children per year in the United States are victims of the form of violence called child 
abuse. Available evidence supports the theory that child maltreatment (particularly 
when construed broadly) is associated with juvenile delinquency (when construed 
narrowly). The links may be causal in both directions as well as being the result of 
common etiology in disrupted, ineffectual families. 
Importantly, intrafamilial violence involves those who are closest to each other 
in a social-psychological sense. The observation and experience of such violence by a 
child carries the message that violence between intimates is both possible and 
legitimate. "Parents are the vehicle for transmission of the cultural constraints," 
explains Dr. Murray Miron, professor of psychology at Syracuse University. Parents 
who use physical punishment provide their children with an aggressive model for 
imitation and teach children patterns of counter-aggression. Ironically, such violence is 
usually employed for moral training and character development. The family not only 
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trains its members to accept violence but also to accept particular modes of violence. 
Dr. Murray Straus, co-director of the Family Research Laboratory at the 
University of New Hampshire has done extensive research on family violence. In one 
study, Gelles and Straus (1975) distinguish between "direct training" and "indirect 
training" in violence. The indirect training, they argue, is more important than the 
direct training because it begins before speech, and is learned in such a diffuse and 
vague manner as to become an unconscious motive. Researchers have found that 
children learn violence through several mechanisms: identifying with the aggressor; 
turning passive into active (as with the victim who later becomes the abuser); imitating 
behavior that is rewarded; and desensitizating inhibitions against violence (Schetky and 
Benedek, 1985). Experience with violence as a child (as observer, aggressor or victim) 
is correlated with subsequent approval of violence as an adult, especially when violence 
is used as a means of control. From these experiences the child learns that violence is 
the most effective means of dealing with others (Id at 596). 
Psychologists and psychiatrists have long known that brutal treatment can breed 
brutal behavior. It has been repeatedly found that childhood abuse increased the odds of 
future delinquency. In fact, previously abused or neglected persons were found at 
higher risk of beginning a life of crime at a younger age with more significant and 
repeated criminal involvement. The physically abused (as opposed to the neglected or 
sexually abused) were the most likely to be arrested later for a violent crime (Widom, 
1989). These findings should in no way be construed as diminishing the significance of 
damage done by childhood neglect. In reality, physical abuse isn't the most prevalent 
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child maltreatment problem. The majority of reported cases involve a primary 
allegation of neglect or emotional maltreatment. Nationwide, the incidence of neglect is 
almost three times that of physical abuse (15.9 per 1,000 children in 1986, compared to 
5.7 per 1,000 for physical abuse, and 2.5 per 1,000 for sexual abuse) (U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services, 1995). 
Maltreated children are victims of profound changes in our society including 
social isolation, economic pressures and lack of traditional support mechanisms readily 
available to other generations. 6 Families are increasingly living in a state of social 
isolation which appears to be a major contributor of child maltreatment. It appears that 
the migration to the suburbs has resulted in decreasing population, decreasing home 
ownership and increasing family and community violence. Traditional neighborhood 
social networks are now being disrupted and isolation is becoming an everyday reality. 
Even after controlling for age, race and sex, a relationship between childhood 
neglect and subsequent violence is evident. Birth complications in combination with 
early child rejection predispose one to violent crime (Raine, Brennan and Mednick, 
1994 ). Other studies have found a vast array of developmental differences associated 
with childhood neglect (Kazdin, Siegel and Bass, 1992). The premise that severe 
physical punishment is significantly correlated with later delinquent behavior 7 has been 
supported by research. Case in point, a British longitudinal study of 411 boys initiated 
when the boys were age 8 years of age reported startling results in support of the link 
between severe punishment and juvenile violence. Of the group, 27 (7 percent) had 
been convicted of a nonviolent offense. Parents of 62 percent of the violent boys had 
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been judged to use harsh discipline and have a harsh attitude toward their children while 
parents of 33 percent of the nonviolent delinquents and 27 percent of the 286 
nondelinquents were identified in this category (supra, p. 12). Similarly, case files of 
863 delinquent male adolescents incarcerated in Ohio showed that 26 percent had been 
physically abused and 85 percent had been abused more than once (Kratcoski, 1982). 
Evidence of child abuse was found in the medical records of 15 percent of 81 
delinquents incarcerated in a Connecticut correctional school (Shanok and Lewis, 
l 981 ). A group of 80 incarcerated delinquents in the same correctional school were 
found to be significantly more violent than a matched group of 77 nonincarcerated 
delinquents, 50 percent of the former and 27 percent of the latter had been involved in 
violent acts (Lewis, Shanok and Balla, 1979). Researchers found that 10 percent of the 
incarcerated (more violent) groups compared to 4 percent of the nonincarcerated (less 
violent) groups had histories of child abuse documented in their medical records 
(supra, p. 13). 
Overall, statistics of juveniles involved in delinquent acts have consistently 
found that these juveniles have endured child abuse and neglect at far greater rates than 
the estimates for the general population. Some researchers have even argued that more 
common and more damaging than physical beatings are the psychological assaults 
which violent juveniles in particular have suffered (Granat, 1987). There is no question 
that poor bonding results in subsequent maladjusted behavior (Raine, Brennan and 
Mednick, 1994 ). Families of killers are quite different in their social structure which 
usually consists of pervasive violence, inconsistency, neglect and abuse with little 
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likelihood of bonding. In fact , it appears that middle-class kids who commit murder 
come from even more pathological families. According to Jon Hull (1987), over 90 
percent of children who commit parricide have suffered mental abuse. 
The "cycle of violence" hypothesis indicates a childhood history of physical 
abuse predisposes the survivor to violence in later years. An interesting finding from a 
supporting study 8 involved a comparison group of 667 children who were not officially 
recorded as abused or neglected but matched to the study groups according to sex, age, 
race and family socioeconomic status. Irrespective of a lack of juvenile or adult 
criminal record, for most members, being abused or neglected as a child increased the 
likelihood of arrest as a juvenile by 53 percent, as an adult by 38 percent and for a 
violent crime by 38 percent (Id. at 1). However, findings reported by Widom (1989) in 
a study completed in the midwest found abused children were no more likely than their 
nonabused match to continue with a career in crime. These findings suggest that 
childhood abuse can clearly encourage criminal or violent activity but it does not cause 
the individual to maintain such a lifestyle. 
Substantive research argues the existence of a strong association between an 
individual's experiences with his/her parents and subsequent capacity to make 
affectional bonds. The significance of this association will become even more evident 
in the next chapter which examines mitigators in the backgrounds of those on death row 
for crimes committed as juveniles. Overall, there appears to be a causal link between 
inability to form affectional bonds and corresponding behavior (Karen, 1994 ). 
Even the strongest defenders of the powerful influence of parents by no means 
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allege such influence is decisive. This recognition prevents the assumption that 
familialistic determination exists. It also allows for recognition of the reality that the so-
called cycle of violence is virtually impossible to prove. The most reliable experiment 
is disallowed due to existing legal as well as ethical standards researchers are expected 
to maintain. This would involve regularly abusing one group of children and comparing 
to a group of nonabused children. Although frequently used, retrospective studies 
present many problems that make results difficult to validate or generalize (Id. at 32). 
Regardless of the powerful extra-familial influences, parental conflict 
has been found to be highly criminogenic, accounting for the relationship between 
broken homes and crime (Emery, Weintraub and Neale 1982; Loeber and Stouthamer-
Loeber, 1986; Call, 1984 ). One study allowed for an examination of research where low 
identification with both parents was found to be one of the most potent predictors of 
aggression irrespective of the subject's sex .9 
Substantial evidence has been found to support the correlation between parental 
rejection and inattention with crime (McCord, 1990; Kazdin, Siegel and Bass, 1992; 
Loeber and Stouthamer-Loeber, 1986; Wells and Rankin, 1988). Dr. Rolf Loeber of the 
University of Pittsburgh explains how researchers distinguish families with delinquent 
children from families in which children are not delinquent. The parents of delinquent 
children often lack involvement with their children, provide poor supervision and 
administer inadequate or erratic discipline. Some parents of delinquent children are not 
law-abiding, thus providing examples of deviant behavior and values that their offspring 
may imitate. Many delinquent youth grow up in families that experience adversities 
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such as family conflict, divorce, parental illness, poverty and low socioeconomic 
status. 10 
Before exploring the correlates of delinquency further, Eysenck and Gudjonsson 
( 1988) summarized several traits of persons with histories of serious 
delinquency/criminality compared with the general population: 
1. "Shorter gestation periods (more premature births). 
2. More rapid development to sexual functioning. 
3. Greater copulatory frequency outside of bonded relationships (or at least 
a preference for such). 
4. Less stable bonding. 
5. Lower parental investment in offspring (as evidenced by higher rates of 
child abandonment, neglect and abuse). 
6. Shorter life expectancy." 
A study of juvenile murderers by Russell (l 983) found several common 
denominators of character structures which also demonstrated problematic emotional 
development. Pervasive evidence of a pathologic maternal relationship will be explored 
throughout this section. The findings from Russell's work indicate: 
1. "The personality is inadequately socialized in a dependent maternal 
relationship of strong ambivalence, and comes to adolescence with 
severe unresolved conflicts over aggression and passivity, which are 
precariously defended by poorly developed mechanisms for stability and 
maturity. 
2. An intense intra-psychic struggle is engendered as the boy strives for 
identity and self-expression, against strong regressive forces. 
3. The struggle is intensified and his defenses are further threatened by the 
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mother's continual insistence on her controlling and severely ambivalent 
orientation towards the boy, coupled with a complete lack of countering 
support from the father. 
4. [There] .. . [exists] a threat of imminent personality disintegration ... the 
ultimate defense of this brings projective mechanisms into 
operation, that he may attribute to someone else the 
unacceptable feelings rampant within himself. 
5. The intra-psychic struggle continues now on a very primitive 
level, seeking outlet and self-justification through paranoid 
construction, and on the conscious level with mounting feelings 
of tension and frustration. 
6. Then there may develop a fixation upon an intense hostile interpersonal 
relationship - with the mother directly or another close figure - with 
paranoid build-up to a particular incident, the circumstances and 
implications of which cannot be denied; or, the struggle and paranoid 
development may remain largely internalized until an acute special 
circumstance of great threat occurs; in either case the paranoid projection 
and breakthrough of murderous impulses is called for and the act 
justified" (Russell, 1983, p. 191 ). 
This study demonstrates the prevalence of personality decompensation and pathologic 
familial interpersonal relationships in homicidal juveniles. 
By contrast, Werner ( 1987) reported that certain personality traits and 
environmental factors were identified with the resilience needed to survive 
dysfunctional childhoods: 
"Intelligence and high IQ. Ability to focus attention; self control. 
Being the first born. 
An affectionate nature, social awareness, responsiveness to people, good 
disposition. 
Self-esteem and sense of humor. 
26 
Good relationship with a parent or substitute parent such as an aunt, 
godfather, grandparent, caretaker or teacher. 
A lot of attention during the first years of life. 
Close peer friends. 
Hobbies or special interests. 
Required responsibilities in the household." 
Werner ( 1987) found that a critical component of effective coping is a sense of 
coherence. That is, a feeling of confidence that one's internal and external environment 
is predictable; that life has meaning and that life events will work out reasonably well. 
Juveniles maintain a small number of relationships that provide feedback which will 
shape their sense of coherence. Even under adverse circumstances, constructive change 
is possible when adolescents interact with people who give them positive reinforcement 
and a reason for commitment and caring. The reverse is also the case: destructive 
relationships with significant others can promote maladaptive behavior. 
The "intergenerational links," so-called by Dr. Joan McCord of Temple 
University, have been well-established between criminality and aggression (Glueck and 
Glueck, 1950, 1970; Gelles and Straus, 1975; Lewis, Pincus, Lovely, Spitzer and Moy, 
1987; McCord, 1983; Olweus, 1979; Raine, Brennan, Mednick and Mednick, 1996; 
Robins, 1966; Widom, 1989). Among single factors, the greatest direct influence on 
antisocial aggression for male offspring appears to be determined by the nature of the 
paternal model. McCord and others (1963) note that a significantly higher proportion of 
the aggressive-antisocial men than of the aggressive-socialized men had been reared by 
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deviant and aggressive fathers. It appears that extreme neglect and punitiveness in 
conjunction with a deviant-aggressive paternal model produces antisocial 
aggressiveness. Malmquist ( 1971) delineated some clinical characteristics in homicidal 
juveniles in "Premonitory Signs of Homicidal Aggression in Juveniles." These include 
use of drugs, significant "object losses (such as mothers, lovers, friends), threats to 
manhood in the form of provocation to fight, emotional crescendo (increasing build-up 
of agitation and energy accompanied by motor restlessness), disturbed sleeping and 
eating and "homosexual" threats along with depersonalization. Wenk, Robinson and 
Smith (1972) provide additional evidence of the manifestation of such symptomatology 
in "murderous minors." 
Lewis, Moy, Jackson, Aaronson, Restifo, Serra and Simos (1985), list the 
childhood neuropsychiatric and family characteristics of 9 male subjects who were 
clinically evaluated as adolescents and were later arrested for murder. A comparison 
was made with 24 incarcerated delinquents who did not go on to commit violent 
offenses. The future murderers were found to display a constellation of biopsychosocial 
characteristics that included psychotic symptoms, major neurologic impairment, a 
psychotic first-degree relative, violent acts committed during childhood and severe 
physical abuse. 
The authors argue that if there was an inherited predisposition to maladaptive 
antisocial behavior in the 9 subjects, the inheritance most likely was a predisposition to 
psychosis and/or neurologic dysfunction (supra, p. 1166). This vulnerability manifested 
itself through uncontrolled violence in the context of violent households. The issue 
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raised is whether or not a finding of the aforementioned constellation of factors in a 
given child justifies a prediction of future violence. The findings from this particular 
study, as well as others, suggest that violence alone is not as good a predictor of future 
aggression as is violence coupled with neuropsychiatric vulnerabilities, parental 
brutality and parental psychosis. 
The adolescents on death row appear to share a battery of psychological, 
emotional, familial and other problems. An extensive study of 14 juveniles on death 
row in four states (constituting 40 percent of the total juvenile death row population) 
during 1986-1987 provides an excellent case in point. Dr. Dorothy Otnow Lewis, a 
professor of psychiatry at New York University School of Medicine, and several 
colleagues found that when juveniles had suffered head and/or nervous system injury or 
demonstrated a history of psychiatric illness coupled with growing up in a family in 
which he or she experienced or witnessed abuse and extreme violence, it was highly 
predictable that he/she would become very violent. 
The team of psychiatrists and neurologists who performed detailed examination 
of the 14 youths found disturbingly consistent symptomatology. Specifically, all 14 
inmates had sustained head injuries as children, 8 of which were serious enough to 
require hospitalization; 9 of the 14 were found to have serious neurologic abnormalities 
including but not limited to brain injury; 7 suffered from serious psychiatric 
disturbances exhibited during early childhood and while 4 others had histories 
consistent with severe mood disorders; seven were psychotic at the time of evaluation or 
had been diagnosed as such during early childhood (Lewis, Pincus, Bard, Richardson, 
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Prichep, Feldman and Yeager, 1988). Only 2 of the entire sample had full-scale IQ 
scores above 90; only 3 were literate enough to read; 3 had learned to read since arriving 
on death row (Amnesty International, 1991 ). All but 2 had suffered serious physical 
abuse in childhood and 5 had been sodomized by older male relatives (Lewis, Pincus, 
Bard, Richardson, Princhep, Feldman and Yeager, 1988). Within the families of the 
children, violence, alcoholism, drug abuse and psychiatric disorders were common. 
The researchers found strong evidence that the off enders in the study were 
"multiply handicapped" by their natural immaturity as well as brain damage and abusive 
family backgrounds. Based on this research, Lewis and her colleagues formulated a 
new psychiatric classification: the "limbic-psychotic-aggressive syndrome" (Raebum, 
1989). This concept, explains Dr. Lewis, identifies the combination of neurologic 
disorders, periodic psychotic symptoms and severe physical or sexual abuse that creates 
a violent person (Id. at 28; Shanok and Lewis, 1981 ). 
Wayne Thompson and Heath Wilkins provide excellent examples. Like many of 
the other juveniles on death row, Thompson had witnessed his share of violence, much 
of which was committed by the brother-in-law he was convicted of killing at age fifteen. 
Thompson explained to the police, "I'd seen him pull a gun on my sister and beat her up 
... I'd seen him take my nephew to the roof of his trailer and hold him upside down and 
threaten to drop him off ... " [Thompson v. State, 724 P. 2d 780 (Okla. Cr. 1986)]. 
Similar to the other juveniles on death row, Thompson had a history of extensive 
physical abuse. In fact, he suffered from a habit of paint sniffing induced by the man 
Thompson later killed, from beatings at the hands of this man, and from the emotional 
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turmoil of violent family conflict caused in part by the same man [Thompson v. 
Oklahoma, No. 86-6169 (1986)]. Thompson exhibited emotional alienation, poor social 
judgment, hostility and nonresponsivity to the external world. Thompson, it is believed, 
acted out the explicit or implicit desires of his family. This is not uncommon for kids 
who kill relatives. 
Even more poignant is the background of Heath Wilkins. Wilkins suffered from 
serious and profound psychiatric and emotional disorders since childhood [Wilkins v. 
Missouri, No. 87-6026 (1988); W.J.A. at 68, W.Tr. at 272]. 11 The record establishes 
that he exhibited psychotic symptoms and bizarre behaviors throughout his adolescence 
and childhood (W.J.A. at 43, 68; W.Tr. at 235). Wilkins has been labeled as 
"borderline" and "schizotypal" as well as "diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia" 
(W.J.A. at 40, 43, 50, 67-68). He has suffered from severe depression since nine years 
of age resulting in innumerable suicide attempts (W.J.A. at 46, 60; W.Tr. at 265). 
While he was in kindergarten, his uncle introduced him to drugs (W.J.A. at 29, 57; 
W.Tr. at 261). Since age five he has abused alcohol and a multitude of drugs, including 
"gasoline, glue, pot, uppers and downers" (W.J.A. at 67). Since age ten he used LSD 
extensively (W.J.A. at 67). This extensive drug use resulted in serious neurologic and 
psychologic damage (W.J.A. at 29). 
The extent of such damage is apparent from the Menninger Clinic report in 
Topeka, Kansas, filed as part of the petitioner's case in Wilkins v. Missouri, No. 87-
6026 ( 1988). The following information was documented in a psychological report 
analyzing the WAIS-R, Animal Choice Test, TAT and Rorschach from Dr. Melvin Berg 
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to the Supreme Court. Dr. Steven Mandracchia of the Department of Forensic 
Psychiatry at the Western Missouri Mental Health Center, Dr. S. D. Parwatikar, 12 a 
forensic psychiatrist at the Malcolm Bliss Mental Health Center in Missouri and Dr. 
William Logan from the Menninger Foundation also completed assessments of Heath 
Wilkins filed on behalf of petitioner which were consistent with Dr. Berg's report. 
Dr. Berg reported the patient (referring to Heath Wilkins) had an extensive 
history of serious antisocial maladjustment throughout his childhood. He provided 
evidence of a rather morbid preoccupation with death expressed through poems and 
through his explicit desire to accept the penalty of death. Intellectually, he tested barely 
approximate to the norm (95) and demonstrated a pattern of abilities and deficits 
indicative of an impulsive cognitive style opting for immediate action over careful 
reflection. He demonstrated a blatant disinterest and/or inability to sustain logic 
problem-solving efforts in situations where deliberation is necessary. "His thinking 
impulsively starts toward glib and facile solutions as he avoids channeling effort into a 
deliberative process of systematic thought" (supra, p. 19). 
Regarding social mores and the manner in which people typically manage and 
conform to the customs of society, Dr. Berg notes that Wilkins "leaps" toward impulsive 
easy solutions. As a consequence, his ability to apply common sense is moderately 
impaired. Dr. Berg explains that, "[T]his cognitive approach to problems and style of 
understanding the environment reflects as inaccurate, vague and mildly distorted 
understanding of social conventions and the rationale for how and why social mores and 
customs are established" (supra, p. 20). 
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When stirred by feelings , Wilkins' thinking allegedly becomes disorganized and 
permeated by highly personalized fantasies which push him toward the "outer limits of 
what is commonly accepted as reality and good sense" (Id. at 20). Even more 
significantly, "when depressive or angry affects are aroused, his thinking deteriorates, 
becomes diffuse, and so dominated by feeling that his thoughts then function more as a 
form of emotional discharge than as a rational means of understanding reality ... " (Id. at 
20). Consistent with this process, " [ u ]nder the sway of intense feelings ... his thinking 
becomes subject to illogical reasoning, and his ties to reality are strained by odd ideas 
and perceptions of the environment and people which are vulnerable to distortion. At 
such times, the examiner speculates that he and the environment take on a quality of 
being strange, unreal, and redolent with peculiar and uncanny feelings like those which 
most people experience only in nightmares" (supra, p. 21). Most disturbingly, he is out 
of touch with these emotional stirrings and then discovers a "sudden, intense and 
eruptive discharge sweeping him along like a feather in a hurricane" (Id. at 21 ). His 
inadequate defense mechanisms leave him with a feeling of overwhelming anxiety and 
depression. "More ominously, anger can reach explosive intensity and seek discharge 
through sudden spasms of destructive action .. . It is likely that his rage and morbid 
despair combine, shade into, and trigger each other, and when overcome by these 
feelings, his thinking is immobilized and a pawn of his uncontrolled affects" (Id. at 22). 
In efforts to contain his rage and alleviate his anguish and alienation, Wilkins is 
likely to turn towards gratifications which provide temporary relief from despair. As 
such, he is likely to find pleasure in indulging himself in stimulating activities and thrill 
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inducing sensations which provide immediate gratification and distraction from the 
torment of his inner world (Id. at 23). When these indulgences fail, death provides a 
potentially welcome escape and insignificant loss since he feels not quite alive. 
Diagnostic reports list the disturbing background of maladaptive behavior 
including emotional emptiness to icy indifference to omnipotent rage. "Despite his rage 
and rejection of social obligation and ties to others, he demonstrates an incipient 
potential for attachment and concern which leaves him vulnerable to feelings of loss and 
longing" (Id. at 22). "His depression derives primarily from a sense of utter isolation 
and aloneness that cause him to feel as though he were living in a world barren of life ... 
His fantasy life is haunted by images of death, shadows and preoccupations with 
emptiness ... The environment is devoid of anything to which he could warm up to and 
feel the rewards of a relationship. He is left with an excruciating sense of emptiness, 
deadness and longing for something to fill up the barren place in his life, although he 
does not know what that might be. Just as he has tried to deny his rage, he likewise tries 
to seal off his depressive experience which intermittently breaks through his defenses 
and is expressed in poetry or profoundly disturbing emotional states leading him to 
dwell on death and morbid themes ... Obviously this young man is exquisitely 
vulnerable as he tries to contain rage, and feelings of complete isolation ... " (Id. at 23). 
Regardless of the "massive impairments" in Heath Wilkins' development which 
probably contributed to his inadequate impulse controls; Dr. Berg concluded that he 
cannot be regarded as "suffering from a psychotic condition which grossly impairs his 
attunement and reality ... " (Id. at 24). Dr. William Logan described his cognitive 
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capacity as intact yet behaving as if governed by emotions. "In conclusion, while the 
patient has an adequate factual understanding of his situation and his ability to cooperate 
with his attorney, emotional issues may prevent him from acting in his own best 
interests. The weighing of these two factors, the cognitive versus the emotional, is the 
essence of the decision before the court" (Id. at 39). 
Dr. Parwatikar found Wilkins' behavior consistent with "Conduct Disorder, 
Undersocialized Type" under Axis I (Id. at 52). Under Axis II, "Borderline Personality 
Disorder" accurately depicts his pattern of vacillating between aggression towards 
others and self-destructiveness under stress (Id. at 52, 53). DSM-N (Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual by The American Psychiatric Association) precludes a diagnosis of 
antisocial personality for those persons under 18 years of age. 13 Finally, Parwatikar 
found that Wilkins' irrational thinking was partly due to his age and partly due to his 
lack of growth in an emotionally secure environment and lack of parental supervision 
(Id. at 57). 
His mother and her boyfriend beat Wilkins continuously and a babysitter used 
drugs and sexually abused him and his brother. His closest relationship was with a 
maternal uncle who taught him to shoot guns and who used drugs. While in a youth 
home he cut his wrist, put a net over his head, overdosed using alcohol and drugs and 
again using antipsychotic medication he had been prescribed and jumped off a bridge all 
in an attempt to commit suicide. At one point a psychiatrist prescribed Mellaril (an 
antipsychotic agent) for Wilkin's high anxiety and disoriented thinking; diagnosed as a 
possible schizotypal personality or schizophrenic. 
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Wilkins was a product of a profoundly chaotic home with a lack of supervision 
and encouragement of drug use on the part of parental figures. Professionals who 
examined him found a consistent lack of affection and nurturance resulting a in 
developmental arrest. His ability to connect or receive affection is lacking as he views 
others as demanding and exploitive. The resulting lack of human connectiveness 
produces emptiness, loneliness and vulnerability to the disruptive emotions of anger, 
anxiety and depression. Wilkins uses alcohol and drugs to blot out emotions and "when 
his defenses fail his thinking becomes muddled and poorly organized with no 
conception of the rationale or consequences of his conduct" (Id. at 38). 
Both Wilkins' brother and father have extensive histories of psychiatric illness 
and hospitalizations (W.J.A. at 41, 61). This is significant as there is evidence that 
severe mental illness (such as schizophrenia) in first degree relatives is inherited. The 
father abandoned the family when Wilkins was very young, but not before he left his 
imprint of violent abuse. Similarly, Heath's mother had violent outbursts that led her to 
beat him for up to two hours at a time (W.J.A. at 28, 57; W.Tr. at 261). His family was 
so lacking in support that in the weeks preceding the crime for which he was sentenced 
to death he was barred from the house by his mother and left living homeless in a park 
(W.Tr. at 272). 
There is no denying the seriousness of the harm which resulted from Wilkin's 
anger. On the contrary, the intensity and severity of the harm are symptomatic of the 
extent of his psychopathology. He was on death row for fatally stabbing a female clerk 
of a delicatessen shop during the course of a robbery as a 15-year-old. At age 7 he was 
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burglarizing houses for knives and money; at age 8 he tried to burn down houses and on 
one occasion an entire apartment complex [Wilkins v. Missouri, No. 87-6026 (1988)]. 
For entertainment, he would shoot at passenger cars with an AR-15 semiautomatic 
(supra, p. 28). He succeeded in poisoning several neighborhood pets, attempted to 
poison his mother and forced a bag of pennies (which he stole) down a dog's throat 
resulting in an excruciating death for the animal (Id. at 28). After several placements in 
a foster home, residential treatment facilities, job corps and the like he ended up on the 
street. 
Heath Wilkins had exposure to a constellation of psychological, physical and 
environmental disturbances which disrupted his natural growth and development. In 
conjunction with the profound psychiatric, emotional and social limitations, Heath is 
disturbingly typical in every aspect to the adolescents on death row (Lewis, Pincus, 
Bard, Richardson, Prichep, Feldman and Yeager, 1988). Lewis and her colleagues 
conclude that " ... juveniles accused of a capital offense are uniquely vulnerable; they 
lack the maturity or insight to recognize the importance of psychiatric or neurological 
symptoms to their defense; and they are dependent on family for assistance in a way that 
adult offenders are not .. . " As Linda Reyes, a psychologist in charge of the Capital 
Offender Program in Giddings, Texas, points out: teen killers overwhelmingly come 
from dysfunctional families. Reyes noted that 3 out of 4 "students" she has seen in this 
progressive program have come from dysfunctional families. In fact, out of 45 teen 
killers who have been through the program, only one came from a relatively stable 
background (Id. at 60). 
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Equally disturbing is the review of 23 juvenile offenders sentenced to death in 
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas and Washington (Amnesty International, 
1991 ). The cases include three prisoners executed between 1985 and 1991 , four whose 
death sentences were vacated on appeal and who were subsequently resentenced to life 
imprisonment, 14 who were still on death row as of July 1, 1991. Again, the majority of 
those juveniles come from particularly deprived and unstable family backgrounds. 
Many of them were brought up in the absence of one or both parents. Many of the 
parents themselves had histories of alcoholism, mental illness and the like. More than 
half of the juveniles had been physically or sexually abused in childhood; 10 were 
known to have been regularly abusing alcohol and drugs (like their parents) from as 
early as 6 years of age; others were under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time 
of their crime. There is documented evidence of mental illness or brain damage in at 
least 14 cases; extensive histories of psychiatric illness or mental disorders dating from 
early childhood in at least six cases; I Q's of eleven prisoners were below ninety 
(Amnesty International, 1991 ). 
Excluding the aforementioned, Amnesty International found a substantial lack of 
available information on the background of these juveniles. In one case, for example, 
Amnesty International reported that absolutely no information was presented about the 
prisoner's deprived and unstable childhood. In several other cases, lawyers were unable 
to obtain independent psychiatric examinations. A particularly shocking demonstration 
involved a 17-year-old offender with a mental age of twelve. Defense requests for funds 
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to hire a psychiatrist were repeatedly denied by the trial court 1·rre t' f th f: spec 1ve o e act that 
a psychologist for the prosecution labeled the defendant a "sexual sadist" without any 
one-on-one examination. In a recent case, the request for a reevaluation by a 
psychologist/psychiatrist was denied in spite of the fact that the examiner fraudulently 
represented himself as a psychologist. 
Extensive research in the United States and overseas supports the contention that 
there exists a high risk factor of criminality for children of parents who manifest an 
array of psychiatric dysfunction and criminogenic conduct (U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services, 1990). The discussion will provide an overview and analysis of 
the existing research. 
B. Psychiatric Factors 
Much of the research on the risks to children of parents with mental disorders 
has been based on the premise that the risk is genetically determined. That premise 
derives from empirical evidence that genetic factors play a significant role in the 
determination of antisocial disorders and criminality, 14 schizophrenia, major affective 
disorders, and some varieties of alcoholism. Similarly, conduct disorder has been found 
to be highly familial with the parents of youths with conduct disorder exhibiting 
antisocial personality, substance abuse as well as criminality (Lahey, Piacentini, 
McBurnett, Stone Hartdagen and Hynd, 1987). Although evidence on the mechanism(s) 
of this pattern of cross-generational transmission is weak there is evidence suggesting 
heredity plays a role. Some evidence, indicates that genetic factors play a significant 
role in many psychiatric disorders arising specifically in childhood. 
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Experts have argued that even if the parental condition is in part genetically 
determined it does not necessarily follow that the risk to the children is genetically 
mediated (Rutter and Quinton, 1984 ). This argument is based on the following issues: 
a) in all adult mental disorders there is a major nongenetic component; b) the continuity 
between mental disorders and antisocial behaviors in children and in adults is far from 
complete, even when there is continuity, the genetic component may be greater for 
disorders that persist into adulthood than for those confined to the childhood years 
(Rutter and Giller, 1983); and c) importantly, parental mental disorder is frequently 
accompanied by major environmental disturbance (Feldman, Stiffman and Jung, 1987; 
Jacob and Seilhamer, 1987). 
Clearly, parental symptomatology directly impinge on or involve their children 
to some degree (Radke-Yarrow, Richters and Wilson, 1988; Jouriles, Barling and 
O'Leary, 1987). For example, parental illness may interfere with parenting functions 
(Bettes, 1988; Field, Healy, Goldstein and Guthertz, in press; Susman, Trickett, 
Lannotti, Hollenbeck and Zahn-Waxler, 1985; Weissman and Paykel, 1974) or impair 
parent-child relationships and interactions (Cox, Puckering, Pound and Mills, 1987; 
Davenport, Zahn-Waxler, Adland and Mayfield, 1984; Feldman, Stiffman and Jung, 
1987; Zahn-Waxler, Kochansha, Krupnic and McKnew, in press). It is not uncommon 
for such parental dysfunction to result in the necessity for children to go into foster care 
(Rice, Ekdahl and Miller, 1971) or it may be accompanied by marked marital discord 
and disharmony (Birtchnell and Kennard, 1983; Gotlib and Hooley, 1988; Rutter and 
Quinton, 1984). This discord is associated with increased conflict over child-rearing, 
40 
greater segregation in decision-making, reduced affection and altered patterns of 
dominance (Kreitman, Collins, Nelson and Troop, 1971 ). 
There are additional issues regarding the specificity of the genetic effects of 
transmission. For example, parental schizophrenia is manifested in children through: a) 
abnormalities in interpersonal relationships demonstrated by odd, unpredictable 
behavior, as well as by social isolation and rejection by peers in conjunction with 
solitary antisocial behavior in the home by males; b) neurodevelopmental immaturities 
in the form of clumsiness, visuospatial difficulties, verbal impairment; and c) attention 
deficits. Of equal importance is the tendency for parental personality disorder to be 
associated with conduct disturbance in the sons (Rutter and Quinton, 1984) and for 
parental alcoholism to be linked with both alcoholism and antisocial disorders in the 
male offspring (Rydelius, 1981) but especially with disorders that combine both 
emotional and conduct disturbances (Earls, Reich, Jung and Cloninger, 1988). 
C. Emotional Effects 
One test of the genetic hypothesis involves studies that determine whether the 
association between disorders in parents and those in their children can be accounted for 
by environmental variables (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1990). 
Rutter and Quinton ( 1984) completed a study of a heterogeneous group of mentally ill 
parents using a range of well-tested discriminating measures of family environment 
( supra, p. 161 ). The results indicated that risk to children is largely a function of family 
discord and hostility related to the parental mental disorder. Thus, the criminality of 
children which is strongly correlated with the father-son relationship and the psychiatric 
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disorder which is strongly correlated with the discordant mother-child relationship may 
be less reflective of the parental diagnosis per se and more reflective of the familial 
stress symptomatic of that condition. It is critical to note some exceptions to this 
finding before making generalizations. 
Where discord constituted the primary factor in the conduct disturbances 
displayed in the children of parents with depression or personality disorder, it did not 
account for the increased rate of disorders in the children of schizophrenics (Emery, 
Weintraub and Neale, 1982). Folstein, Franz, Jensen, Chase and Folstein (1983) noted 
similar findings where discord accounted for conduct disturbances in children of parents 
with Huntington's disease but not depression. Family discord, divorce and lack of 
cohesion were discovered to be important risk factors for antisocial conduct disorder 
irrespective of the presence or absence of parental depression. 
Radke-Yarrow, Cummings, Kuczynski and Chapman (1985) found that an 
abnormal maternal attachment was significantly correlated with offspring maladaptive 
behavior. This was intensified by the absence of a father in the household although it 
was unaffected by psychiatric disturbance in a present father. The lack of effect noted 
here, in conjunction with the effect of discord, suggests that genetic factors do not 
constitute a sufficient explanation. 
Multivariate analysis has shown that parental personality disorder ( of both the 
antisocial type and other types) is significantly associated with dysfunction in children 
as a consequence of their exposure to hostility and aggression (Rutter and Quinton, 
1984 ). Even though the effect fell short of statistical significance, it appears that 
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personality disorder puts the children at an additional risk beyond that accounted for by 
exposure to hostile behavior. Even after controlling for disrupted parenting in 
childhood, parental deviance (the majority of which involved criminality or personality 
disorders) was a good predictor of the development of personality disorder in adult life 
in institution-reared children (Quinton and Rutter, 1984). 
D. Adoption-Twin Studies 
The strongest test for the genetic hypothesis consists of determining rates of 
disorder (criminality) in the children of maladaptive parents who are adopted in infancy 
and reared by non-ill parents to whom they are not biologically related. The evidence 
consistently supports a genetic mode of transmission in a vast array of symptomatology 
(Tienari, Lahti, Sorri, Naarala, Moring, Kaleva, Wahlberg and Wynne, in press). 
Steward and de Blois (1 983) found that the association between antisocial behavior in 
fathers and sons was more significant when the fathers were in the home. 
Eysenck and Gudjonsson ( 1988) conclude from twin and adoptive studies that 
"both genetic and environmental factors are implicated in the genesis of criminal, 
antisocial and psychopathic behavior" (p. 105). Their general finding is that genetic 
factors provide a significant influence for prosocial behavior, which explained 60 
percent of the total variance (supra, p. 108). This section will explore the prevailing 
biomedical literature which is supportive of the theoretical foundations presented in this 
paper. 
A well-known comparison study of heredity as a factor in criminality was 
published by Johannes Lange in 1929. Lange's conclusion was that "Monozygotic twins 
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showed quite considerable concordance with reference to crime; dizygotes, however, 
quite considerable discordance. According to the twin method, we must conclude from 
this that heredity is a very important cause of crime" (p. 14). The several replications of 
Lange's study determined that of 135 MZ twins, 67 percent were concordant, whereas of 
135 DZ twins only 30 percent are concordant (Eysenck and Gudjonsson, 1989). Though 
significant, these studies have been criticized due to degrees of criminality, sample 
selection, operationalization of the concordance (Dalgard and Kringlen, 1976) and 
alleged similarities in treatment of MZ twins by parents. 
The argument to this "similarity of treatment" theory is based on the fact that it is 
unlikely that superficial parental treatment would lead to greater congruence in 
constructs such as intelligence, personal ity and criminality (supra, p. 98). The issue of 
selectivity was resolved by Christiansen ( 1977), who completed an extensive study on 
the criminality of a total population of 3,586 twins from a defined region in Denmark. 
The results indicated 50 percent concordance for criminal behavior for MZ and 21 
percent concordance for DZ twin pairs. 
Relying on self-report data versus official statistics, Rowe ( 1986) found that 
concordance for self-reporting delinquent behavior was greater for MZ than for DZ 
twins ( for both males and females). He also found that twins who reported more shared 
activities were no more similar with regards to delinquency than those who reported 
fewer shared activities. Rowe concluded that shared genes versus shared environment 
was the critical source of concordance. 
Another indication of the significance of genetic factors in criminality appears in 
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the studies of social attitudes. These involve an analysis of religious values which favor 
altruism instead of antisocial conduct (Wilson and Herrnstein, 1985). Although there is 
evidence that such variables involve a degree of dependence on environmental factors , 
genetic influences have been proven to be critical. Martin, Eaves, Heath, Jardine 
Feingold and Eysenck (1986) found that data collected in Australia and England on the 
social attitudes of spouses and twins are consistent with the genetic model regarding 
family resemblance and social attitudes. 
Adoption studies differ in their logic from twin studies (Eysenck and 
Gudjonsson, 1989). Adopted children derive their genetic material from biologic 
parents and environment from adoptive parents (Id. at 103). Hutchings and Mednick 
( 1977) completed a significant adoption study which was published in the Biosocial 
Basis of Criminal Behavior. Out of a sample of 662 adoptive sons in which both the 
biologic and adoptive father is criminal, 36 percent of the sons are criminal (Id. at 104). 
When neither the biologic nor adoptive father was criminal, only l O percent of the 
adoptive sons were criminal (Id. at l 04 ). Among biologic, but not adoptive, fathers who 
were criminal, 22 percent of their sons were criminal; when the biologic father was not 
a criminal, but the adoptive father was, only 12 percent of the sons were criminal (Id. at 
104 ). These findings favor the strength of the influence of the biologic father's 
criminality (supra, p. 137). 
Cloninger, Sigvardsson, Bohman and von Knorring (1982) investigated the 
interaction of genetic and environmental antecedents of criminality. It was found that 
862 Swedish males adopted by a nonrelative were studied and criminality was found in 
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12 percent of adopted males, 26 percent of their biologic fathers and none of their 
adoptive fathers. In those adopted sons with "poor post-natal background," the rate of 
petty criminality was approximately twice that of the control population of adoptees 
(Eysenck and Gudjonsson, 1988). Significantly, when both congenital and post-natal 
factors were present, the risk was almost 14 times that of the control population 
(supra, p. 105). 
The significance of the twin-adoption studies for the homicidal juveniles at issue 
lies in this interaction effect. Overall, the studies significantly support the view that 
genetic factors play a role in the causation of criminal behavior with the recognition that 
failure of MZ concordance suggests environmental influences. 
E. Gene-Environment Correlations and Interactions 
Due to the seriously unstable and disorganized environments as well as the 
extensive histories of familial psychopathology in the lives of those juveniles on death 
row, this critical link must be explored. 
Gene-environment correlations and interactions are influential through their 
effects on environmental risk mechanisms (Plomin, 1986; Pogue-Geile and Rose, 1987). 
Although the evidence demonstrating the operation of such mechanisms is minimal, a 
few findings suggest that they do occur. Such mechanisms occur in the context of the 
following two processes. First, there appears to be evidence that empirical studies have 
proven that people, to some extent, create their own environments. McGuffm, Katz and 
Bebbington ( 1988) established in "The Camberwell Collaborative Depression Study" 
that psychosocial stressors load in families. Individuals who display deviancy in 
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childhood are likely to lead disruptive lives in adulthood. That is, the "adult careers" of 
explosive children are characterized by significant disorganization and instability. 
Robins ( 1986) used retrospective data from the Epidemiologic Catchment Area Study 
and found that adverse life experiences in adulthood were linked with previous 
psychopathology in childhood. Although none of the studies tested the hypothesis that 
links over time were genetically mediated, it is possible that genetic factors played a part 
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1990). 
Second, genetic factors are thought to increase people's vulnerability to 
environmental hazards. Several studies have demonstrated that the risk of antisocial 
behavior is greatest when there is criminality in both the biological and adoptive 
parents. The increase in risk is greater than would be expected on the basis of a simple 
additive effect (Cadoret, 1985; Cadoret, Cain and Crowe, 1983). Interestingly, studies 
of twins have shown that even if they are separated from their antisocial parents at birth 
they are still at high risk for developing antisocial tendencies. It was found if one (twin) 
shows the behavior, so will the other. 
The available evidence on gene-environment correlations and interactions is 
minimal in quantity but profound in meaning. It appears there are a variety of 
mechanisms by which a genetic predisposition may increase environmental links for 
child psychiatric disorder and criminality. The main point regarding gene-environment 
interactions is that a genetic predisposition may create a greater vulnerability to 
environmental adversities. 
F. Family Environmental Effects 
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As mentioned, children's exposure to hostile or aggressive behavior by the 
parents has been strongly associated with an increased risk of maladaptive behavior 
regardless of the parental diagnosis. The child's maladjustment correlates with the 
quality of family emotional resources. Rutter and Quinton ( 1989) found that marital 
discord constituted a critical source of hostile behavior within a family. Significantly, 
sons develop disturbances earlier than daughters in the presence of family discord; 
however, if the discord persists, the females suffer more over the long-term. Other 
studies which have included systematic discriminating measures of parent-child and 
marital relationships produced similar findings on the risks associated with family 
discord (Cox, Puckering, Pound and Mills, 1987; Feldman, Stiffman and Jung, 1987; 
Radke-Yarrow, Cummings, Kuczynski and Chapman, 1985; J ouriles, Barling and 
O'Leary, 1987). Discord plays a crucial role in the risks associated with parental mental 
disorder. Such a role is a consequence of the strength of the discord effect and 
frequency with which the mental discord is associated with marital discord. Although 
the effect is substantial when discord is associated with family adversities, the risks are 
greatest when the discord results in parental criticism or hostility that is focused on one 
or more child but the risk is still evident when tension and disharmony are present 
between the two parents. The nature of the connections are complex; however, there is 
evidence of causal influences in both directions. In any event, discord constitutes an 
important risk mechanism for children. 
The discord may be derived from the reality that parental mental disorder 
(particularly when associated with psychosocial hazards) frequently leads to family 
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breakup (Rice, Ekdahl and Miller, 1971 ). There are a few studies which involve a 
syStematic psychiatric assessment of the parents in families from which children in 
foster or institutional care (including criminal facilities) are raised. The evidence 
indicates the main adversity is not the child's separation from parents but rather the 
multiple stressors with which it is associated (St. Claire and Osborn, 1987). 
Another line of research involves dysfunctional parenting and the subsequent 
effect on offspring. It is obvious that parental mental disorders significantly 
disorganize, distort and impair parenting. Only recently has there been systematic, 
observational studies of the parenting of mentally disordered mothers. Unfortunately, 
tbe paternal model has been neglected with the exception of one study examining its 
correlation with antisocial aggression (Bernard, 1990). 
These studies seem to find that risk to children of dysfunctional mothering is a 
consequence of psychopathologic attachment. That is, mothers who are mentally 
disordered consistently fail to respond to their child's overtures, fail to facilitate social 
interactions and are less adept in responding to their child's cues (Cox, Puckering, 
Pound and Mills, 1987). In general, pathological mothers are more disorganized, 
unhappy, tense, inconsistent and ineffective with their children (Davenport, Zahn-
Waxler, Adland and Mayfield, 1984; Carlson, Cicchetti, Barnett and Braunwald, 1989). 
Several support the finding regarding mother-infant interaction and maternal depression 
(Bettes, 1988; Field, 1984; Field, Healy, Goldstein and Guthertz, in press) . 
. ffi · 1 · t of child maltreatment in the 
The next section will explore the d1 erent1a 1mpac 
fo f4 269 1· male births found that rm of maternal rejection. One recent study o , ive 
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maternal rejection of the child in the first year statistically (p < .001) interacted with 
birth complications in predicting criminal violence at 18 years of age (Raine, Brennan 
and Mednick, 1994 ). In support of the attachment theory, subjects with both birth 
complications and maternal rejection made up only 4.4 percent of the sample but 
accounted for a shocking 18 percent of violent crimes committed by the entire sample of 
4,269. Raine, Brennan, Mednick and Mednick (1996) reexamined a random selection 
of this population of 4,269 males and found that overall rates of crime are particularly 
high in the subgroup of subjects who possess both biological ( construed herein as 
neuromotor deficits) and psychological (construed as unstable family environments) risk 
factors for crime. The biosocial cluster was operationalized in part as maternal 
rejection. In this study, early maternal rejection was rated based the public institutional 
care of infant, attempt to abort fetus, and unwanted pregnancy (Id. at 545). These 
findings demonstrate the importance of early childhood intervention with particular 
emphasis on early attachment formation. Before discussing the impact of maladaptive 
attachment on a child the relatively complex ethological components of 
bonding/attachment 15 will be reviewed. 
1. Attachment 
Attachment is the most critical aspect of infancy besides meeting a baby's 
physiological needs. Vera Fahlberg, pediatrician and director of the Forest Heights 
Lodge in Evergreen, Colorado (treatment center for emotionally disturbed children) 
explains, "the bond that a child develops to the person who cares for him in his early 
years is the foundation for this future psychological development and for his future 
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relationships with others" (p. 5). The affectional bond or attachment is a fwiction of 
much more than assurance of the child's physical survival. Fahlberg explains, " ... it 
allows him to develop both trust in others and reliance on himself" (p. 5). As Bowlby 
( 1979) states " ... during early years of childhood the relationship between emotional 
state and current or recent experience is often crystal clear." 
The development of attachment is at the core of meeting basic social and 
personality needs, such as maintaining self-esteem and being affectionate toward others. 
Basically, "[attachment helps the child to: 
-attain his full intellectual capacity; 
-sort out what he perceives; 
-think logically; 
-develop a conscience; 
-become self-reliant; 
-cope with stress and frustration; 
-handle fear and worry; 
-develop future relationships; 
-reduce jealousy" (Fahlberg, 1979, p. 5). 
There is evidence of" .. . a strong causal relationship between an individual's 
experiences with his parents and his later capacity to make affectional bonds" (Bowlby, 
1979, p. 135). Although the primary caregiver is traditionally and typically the 
biological mother, research indicates that it doesn't matter whether or not there are blood 
ties to the baby. The primary caregiver could be the birth mother, foster mother, 
adoptive mother, father or other " ... primary person to whom the child can become 
attached, who responds to the child's needs and who initiates positive activities with the 
child seems to be indispensable" (Fahlberg, 1979, p. 7). It appears that one of the 
primary causes of increasing crime is unattachment (Magid and McKelvey, 1987). As 
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Selma Fraiberg states ( 1977): 
"The distinguishing characteristic of the disease of nonattachment is the 
incapacity of the person to form human bonds. In personal encounters with such 
an individual there is an almost perceptible feeling of intervening space, of 
remoteness, of 'no connection'" (p. 47). 
She explains: 
"The life histories of people with such a disease reveal no single significant 
human relationship. The narrative of their lives reads like a vagrant's journey 
with chance encounters and transient partnerships. Since no partner is valued, 
any one partner can be exchanged for any other; in the absence of love, there it 
is no pain in loss" (p. 47). 
The disease of unattachment is thought to give rise to a broad range of 
dysfunction, including psychopathy and personality disorders. As is expressed 
repeatedly in the petitioner's briefs and supporting amici briefs for the juveniles on death 
row; these individuals live in the ultimate terror of not being. They are people who do 
not have a sense of their own existence (Magid and McKelvey, 1987). To feel alive, or 
to get a "kick," many resort to drugs and an endless array of brutality. In the horrifying 
acts that result, the victims are frequently chosen indiscriminately and anonymously 
with little motive or remorse (supra, p. 64). As was described by one of the killers in 
Truman Capote's In Cold Blood, " ... he was a very nice gentleman ... I thought so right 
up to the minute I slit his throat" ( 1966, p. 302). 
More often than not the early childhood experience of such persons includes 
broken connections with frequent changes of addresses. Several studies have even 
discovered that an unattached child as young as three or four cannot easily attach 
himself irrespective of being exposed to the most favorable conditions from the 
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fom1ation of a human bond (supra, p. 66). Many researchers agree that the earlier the 
break in the attachment process the more damaging the results. 
Studies of institutionalized infants and children found that the age at which the 
child suffered deprivation of human ties is closely correlated to certain effects in adult 
personality and the capacity to sustain human ties (Id. at 67). In fact, it appears that 
most significant impact occurred at 2 years of age. Dr. Fraiberg concluded: "When for 
any reason a child has spent the whole of a large part of his infancy in an environment 
that could not provide him with human partners or the conditions for sustained human 
attachments, the later development of the child demonstrates measurable effects" (1977, 
p. 51 ). In addition to Bowlby's work supporting this conclusion, it has been 
demonstrated that when a mother or father was absent from their child 6 months of 
more before the child reached 10 years of age the rate of the diagnosis of sociopath was 
significantly increased. 
The character disturbed children constitute the largest single category of 
emotionally disturbed youth (Robins, 1970). Robins found that there is a relatively high 
prevalence of antisocial children and adolescents" .. . (and) this group also has a poor 
adult prognosis ... the poorest of any children psychiatric illness" (p. 262). Magid and 
McKelvey ( 1987) agree that most delinquents are unattached children who have not had 
nurturing environments: 
"Unattached children, like the unattached psychopathic adults they become, have 
an uncanny ability to appear attractive, bright, loving ... helpless, hopeless, 
lost. .. or promising, creative and intelligent, as may suit their needs at the time. 
Therefore, strangers, helpful neighbors, even therapists, often see the parents as 
the problem and believe the winsome child is 'beautiful.' This can, of course, 
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cause the parents great consternation and frustration and - when police and other 
childcare agencies intervene - anguish. For these manipulative, intelligent 
children twist things so that the parent may even be accused of child abuse" 
(p. 35). 
Drs. Fritsch and Goodrich (I 990) extend the issue of attachment to the adolescent 
mpatient psychiatric setting in "Adolescent Attachment as Treatment Process" (1990). 
It was found that a powerful prognostic sign regarding discharge outcome was not 
simply the severity and chronicity of the patient's symptoms at admission. Rather, high 
IQ ( construed as a locus of control score reflecting a sense of ego autonomy) and the 
post-hospital continuation of psychotherapy predicted good outcome. By contrast, 
severe family pathology 16 ( construed as lack of attachments or more accurately, 
attachments to maladaptive parental figures) is associated with poor outcome. 
Although the research supporting the theory of unattachment is clear, the degree 
of maternal deprivation which causes such "detachment" is not clear. Before discussing 
this correlation, it is important to recognize contributions children make to their own 
socialization. Even the neonate's behavior has consequences for the infant-mother 
interaction. The so-called "ethological attachment" theory was examined as part of a 
complexity of the theoretical traditions of psychoanalysis and learning theory. There are 
replicated findings which support this theory. 
With the brain's rapid growth during infancy, the first year oflife is a ripe time 
for learning, scientists have established there are key mother-child interactions in 
infancy that lay the groundwork for a child's personality and intellect. Dr. Stanley 
Greenspan, a child psychiatrist on the faculty of the George Washington University 
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Medical School in Washington, D.C., says that the simple impact of overstressed 
mothers can result in toddlers who are aggressive and impulsive. Later difficulties 
present in the form of trouble with language, difficulty knowing what is real, controlling 
moods and concentrating on learning. A child's most critical development is alleged to 
be determined from birth to age three where so many patterns are established for life 
(Granat, 1987). 
One of the few long-term studies exploring the connection between attachment 
behavior and abusive parents has been underway for many years at the Minnesota 
Mother-Child Project. The 200 children in the study were the result of a random 
selection who were followed from prenatal to two years. Abuse and neglect were 
detected after observation began. The mothers were divided into five groups: physically 
abusive, verbally abusive, neglectful or uncaring, psychologically unavailable 
(withdrawn, unemotional or unresponsive) and normal. One shocking outcome of the 
study: the children of the psychologically unavailable mothers formed even weaker 
attachments than did those of the abusive ones. Even worse, by 18 months none of the 
infants with unresponsive mothers had developed an attachment. Similar findings have 
been reported in other studies (Wilson and Herrnstein, 1985). Overall, maltreated 
children tend to display more aggression in both psychological tests and play situations 
(Id. at 254 ). 
2. Ethological Correlation 
The significant correlation between maternal depression and child abuse cannot 
be ignored as the stage setting for development of the violent youth. For example, 
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Hawton, Roberts and Goodwin ( 1985) found a significantly increased risk of child 
abuse in mothers who attempted suicide. Unfortunately, parental suicide attempts failed 
to constitute a useful alerting mechanism for possible child abuse; the abuse, for the 
most part, precedes the suicide attempt. The significance of the child abuse and 
delinquency causal connection has already been discussed. 
Most forms of serious mental disorder are associated with difficulties and 
distortions of parenting. The evidence supports the consequential abnormalities in the 
dyadic relationship between mother and child. As mentioned, this association plays a 
significant role in leading to the development of pathology in the child. To compound 
the consequences from maternal depression, young infants are also vulnerable to 
cognitive ill effects. Cogill, Caplan, Alexandra, Robson and Kumar ( 1986) provide 
evidence of cognitive deficits correlated specifically with maternal depression during 
the first year of motherhood. Unfortunately, this finding has yet to be replicated. 
In conclusion, family background is a powerful force which shapes an 
individual's capacities and accomplishments throughout his/her lifetime. The 
educational and occupational attainments of parents, the physical resources of the home, 
the personal relationships between parents and children and many more factors 
constitute the family background. The impact of his/her background is apparent early in 
life; his/her intelligence and ability to perform in school are in part predictable from 
knowledge of this background. Not only are his/her attainments influenced by family 
background but the presence or absence of values, attitudes and mental health are all 
subject to the pervasive and continuing effects of the family. A child's inheritance is 
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both biological and social and such basic background facts as the parents educational 
attainment or lack thereof are likely to involve both aspects of that inheritance. 
The evidence supports the finding that psychiatric disorder in parents constitutes 
a serious risk factor for offspring. The mechanisms include: genetic transmission as a 
contributory factor to vulnerability versus a direct inheritance of the psychiatric disorder 
per se; parental damage to the fetus secondary to substance abuse; and a diverse scope 
of family environmental effects with particular emphasis on discord and impaired 
parenting. These mechanisms are demonstrated in the case presentation of the young 
offenders on death row. As Walt Schriebman noted, "the frightening thing about 
heredity and environment is that parents provide both" (Magid and McKelvey, 1987). 
G. Interaction of Family, Environment and Conscience 
There exists little reason to doubt that family interaction influences what 
children interpret as proper behavior (McCord, 1991 ). The intergenerational links 
between criminality and aggression have been discussed as has the highly criminogenic 
nature of parental conflict. Families that are dysfunctional in terms of conflict tend also 
to be families in which a parent is rejecting and aggressive which provides a model of 
egocentrism (supra, p. 3). 
Socialization practices that increase altruism, similar to those that increase 
aggression, include imitation of the behavior they observe (Eron and Huesmann, 1986; 
Farrington, 1978; White, 1983). Unfortunately, the majority of socialization theories 
presuppose that a given practice will have similar effects on all children (supra, p. 7). 
Such a view fails to consider that mood, temperament and other highly idiosyncratic 
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personality factors affect responses. It has been demonstrated that socialization 
practices vary in effect for different children and the characteristics of children, in tum, 
affect the socialization practices of parents. As McCord ( 1991) points out, "Differences 
in size, health, attractiveness, intelligence, responsiveness, sex and temperament affect 
how adults respond to children" (p. 8). Clinical studies have provided support for this 
theory; for example, Dion ( 1972) found that attractive children were judged to be more 
honest and less likely to misbehave. 
McCord ( 1991) points out that multiple studies of infants indicate children have 
inherent social interests. Children's level of altruistic behavior stabilizes between 12 
and 18 months (Cummings, Hollenback, Iannotti, Radke-Yarrow and Zahn-Waxler, 
1986). Interestingly, correlations of measures of altruism between monozygotic twins 
are twice those of dizygotic twins (Rushton, Fulker, Neale, Nias and Eysenck, 1986) 
suggesting an element of genetic transmission for altruism (McCord, 1991 ). 
The possible genetic origins of differential behavior as well as the directionality 
of influence between children and parents has already been mentioned ( Lytton, 1990; 
Reid, Patterson and Loeber, 1982; Rutter, Bolton, Harrington, Conteur, MacDonald and 
Simonoff, 1990; Call, 1984 ). For example, poor socialization could be caused by 
hyperactivity, impulsivity and aggression. Many studies provide evidence of heritability 
for activity level, impulsivity, aggression and desire for excitement as well as 
hyperactivity (Eron, Huesmann, Dubow, Romanoff, and Yarmel, 1987; Goldsmith and 
Gottesman, 1981; Huesmann and Eron, 1984; Pederson, Plomin, McCleam and 
Fraiberg, 1988; Goodman and Stevenson, 1989). Goodman and Stevenson (1989) 
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found substantial heritability for twins and concluded that genetically determined 
hyperactivity might, in tum, cause poor socialization practices. Similarly, a literature 
review by Lahey, McBurnett, Loeber and Hart (1991) present convincing evidence of 
the biologic correlates of homogeneous subtypes of conduct disorder causing concerns 
for the underlying neurobiologic mechanisms and etiology of the disorder. 
Lahey, Mc Burnett, Loeber and Hart ( 1991) critique biological studies of conduct 
disorder and suggest that subgroups of youths with conduct disorder can be 
distinguished from one another and from controls on a wide range of physiological 
measures such as skin conductance, heart rate, cortisol and several indicators of 
catecholaminergic activity (Id. at 13 ). It appears that biologic studies of conduct 
disorder are relatively consistent for psychophysiological measures of skin conductance 
and heart indicators but less so for neurochemical variables ((Id. at 14). For example, 
serum and urinary catecholamine levels are frequently abnormal in a subgroup of youths 
with conduct disorder. Importantly, research has shown that abnormal infant caretaker 
interactions are associated with similar catecholamine abnormalities in the developing 
infant (Reite and Field, 1985). 
Studies of the brains of adults diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder 
indicate they have low levels of the mood-altering chemical called serotonin. It is 
possible that this partially explains their ongoing need and/or desire for stimulation 
often criminal in nature. Several studies have provided dramatic demonstrations of the 
effect of severe attenuations of sensory stimulation on humans (Zubek, Pushkar, 
Samson and Gowing, 1961 ). Such experimental studies provide support for the theory 
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that the lack of variability in stimulation and absence of stimulation are subjectively 
unpleasant and highly motivating (Id. at 180, 181 ). The result is an increased desire, 
need, for excitement and inability to tolerate routine and boredom. This inordinate need 
for increases or changes in the pattern of stimulation suggests the antisocial personality 
experiences a sense of dysphoria under ordinary life conditions. 
There are many theories regarding the origin of such a pathologic need for 
sensory input. As with the documented difference in serotonin level, these theories 
involve cortical functioning. One argument is that basal reactivity to stimulation is 
lowered such that more sensory input is needed to produce stable subjectively 
pleasurable cortical functioning (Id. at 181 ). The second hypothesis is that there is more 
rapid adjustment to stimulation which causes the need for stimulation variation to occur 
more rapidly and with greater intensity (Id. at 181 ). 
One interesting study indicated that psychopaths learned best when reward 
remained uncertain. If one construes this reward condition as leading to an enhanced 
arousal state due to the variability of stimulation induced by the uncertainty, then the 
results can be seen as supportive of the basic hypothesis (supra, p. 181). Fox and 
Lippert ( 1963) completed a study with 10 male juvenile offenders who had been 
diagnosed as psychopathic comparing the amount of spontaneous changes in galvanic 
skin response (GSR) with 10 offenders who had been diagnosed with inadequate 
personality. This study demonstrated that the psychopathic group exhibited less 
spontaneous activity. It appears that the problem is one of rapid adaptation rather than 
diminished basal activity. 
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Although the evidence for lowered basal activity is inconclusive, the GSR 
studies demonstrate more rapid adaptation process (supra, p. 182). In fact, Petrie, 
McCulloch and Kazdin ( 1962) identified this phenomenon as "reduction" a study they 
conducted with juvenile delinquents. The conclusion is that the absence of sensation 
experienced by the reducing individual is unpleasant such that he is motivated to change 
his perceived reality by seeking increased sensory input. 
Overall, the evidence is supportive of a correlation between physiologic deficits 
and the subsequent development of criminal behavior. Raine, Venables and Williams 
( 1990) extended an analysis of skin conductance to include heart rate measures of 
orienting. The relationships between skin conductance and heart rate measures of 
orienting were analyzed in a noninstitutionalized sample of 101 15-year-old male 
subjects along with subsequent criminal behavior status at 24 years of age. The primary 
goal of this study was to conduct a nine year follow-up of the sample originally tested 
by Raine and Venables ( 1984 ). They found lack of any skin conductance response was 
significantly more prevalent in subjects with a criminal record (31 percent) than in the 
control subjects ( l O percent). Previous research found that measures of a number of 
skin conductance responses produced stronger effects than measures of amplitude of 
skin conductance responses (Raine and Venables, 1984 ). This was attributed to the 
higher reliability of the former and the reduced affectivity by the thickness and 
hydration of the stratum comeum and number of sweat glands relative to amplitude data 
(supra, p. 936) 
Additionally, smaller orienting activity in the subjects with criminal records in 
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the passive attention task is consistent with the theory that individuals with antisocial 
personality disorder and individuals with criminal records have a deficit in the 
allocation of attentional resources to external stimuli (Raine and Venables, 1984 ). Such 
a deficit is thought to explain some early social and cognitive impairments in antisocial 
individuals; for example, poor academic work, antisocial school behavior, and 
difficulties in sustaining training courses and jobs (Ashmore and Jarvis, 1987). In fact, 
"it appears that only children with conduct disorder have both lower autonomic arousal 
and cognitive attention deficits while children with conduct disorder and hyperactivity 
disorder have impairments in attention (Raine and Jones, 1987). The existence of both 
disorders appears to significantly predispose an individual to subsequent criminal 
behavior. An adequate model of biological correlates may involve complex relations 
between aggression, motor hyperactivity, bizarre/psychotic behavior and comorbidities 
such as anxiety and depression (supra, p. 15). 
Needleman and colleagues ( 1996) demonstrated a direct correlation between 
lead exposure and increased risk for antisocial and delinquent behavior via a progressive 
developmental course. This research provides support for an earlier study by Denno 
(1990) who examined 987 African-American youths (487 males, 500 females) from 
birth through 22 years of age. She found lead poisoning in male subjects only to be the 
most significant predictor of disciplinary problems and among the most significant 
predictors of delinquency and adult criminality. 
It is known that attentional impairment is a strong risk factor for delinquent 
behavior and that lead exposure has been shown to affect attention, reduced verbal 
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competence, increased rates of reading disabilities, frustration and increased academic 
failure. Another intervening variable in the causal chain between lead and delinquency 
is academic failure which is a documented consequence of lead exposure (Id. at 386). It 
has already been demonstrated that subjects with elevated tooth lead levels in childhood 
followed into adulthood had a seven fold increase in the rate of high school failure 
(Needleman, Shell, Bellinger, Leviton and Allred, 1990). 
There is a significant amount of medical research which supports the long-
standing view that impulsive and violent behavior may stem from brain dysfunction or 
damage secondary to head injury, disease or toxic chemical substances (Gottschalk, 
Rebello, Buchsbaum, Tucker and Hodges, 1991 ). Another case involves the 
relationship between potentially toxic metals and aberrant behavior ( especially violent 
activity) via nonintrusive analysis of hair for trace elements. As discussed, in animal 
models, impulsivity and violent behavior have been reported to be the result of brain 
dysfunction or damage particularly in the cortical and limbic areas. There is substantial 
evidence that at least some of the most violent offenders have extensive histories of 
head trauma, learning disabilities and neurologic dysfunction. This observation has 
been corroborated by neuropsychological testing which shows evidence of brain 
function impairment which is well documented in the petitioner's briefs and amici briefs 
as well as in the presentation of the current cases from the youthful offenders on death. 
Admittedly, the actual mechanism by which some brain lesions contribute to 
violent behavior is still not well understood. What is known is that toxic metals (such 
as lead) are correlated with brain lesions and/or dysfunction in humans and rats. 
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Similarly, elevated tissue and dentine levels of toxic metals have been correlated with 
learning disability and intellectual impairment. Although many researchers argue that 
learning disability may predispose an individual to emotional outbursts and disruptive 
behavior; a significant relationship between intellectual impairment, learning disability, 
delinquency and criminality has not been absolutely determined. 
Drs. Gottschalk, Rebello, Buchsbaum, Tucker and Hodges (1991) found a higher 
level of manganese in prison versus control groups. It appears that manganese can 
operate as a neurotoxin even if there is no conclusive evidence that directly links 
manganese toxicity to violence. The conclusion which Gottschalk, et al. ( 1991) reach 
regarding the role of manganese in the pathogenesis of aggressive behavior is as 
follows: A combination of cofactors including but not limited to the abuse of alcohol 
and drugs in conjunction with psychosocial factors operates with mild manganese 
toxicity to promote violent behavior. This type of indirect, multifactorial link is the one 
common denominator present throughout the scientific literature regarding the 
correlation to criminality. 
The following is a brief overview of several studies which correlate 
physiological, psychophysiological and neurophysiological characteristics to criminal 
behavior. 
1. Neurophysiological Studies 
Most neurophysiological studies which examine the central nervous system 
functioning of criminals use the EEG (electroencephalographic) scalp recordings. The 
primary finding herefrom is that EEGs of criminals are more often classified as 
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abnormal as compared to controls with a demonstrated slowing of the EEG frequency. 
In extremely violent offenders, Mednick, Pollock, Volavka and Gabrielli ( 1982) report 
on other types of EEG abnormalities (i.e., patterns associated with temporal lobe 
epilepsy and the 14-6 EEG pattern). Gabrielli and Mednick ( 1983) emphasize that the 
evidence supporting a case for abnormal brain activity in criminals does not in and of 
itself support the theory that brain characteristics are related to the etiology of criminal 
behavior. In fact, some argue that EEG differences between criminals and controls 
could be attributed to brain injury, drugs and the antisocial conduct itself. 
There have been attempts to correct for some of the limitations herein by using 
prospective studies. There are at least three such well-known EEG studies. The first 
involved a group of subjects drawn from a Danish birth cohort consisting of all children 
born between 1959 and 1961 in Rigshospitalet in Copenhagen, Denmark (Mednick, 
Volavka, Gabrielli and Itil, 1981). The second involved examination of EEG measures 
in 265 children aged 11 to 13 between 1971-1972 (Gabrielli and Mednick, 1983). 
Herein, EEG measures obtained in 1972 were examined along with criminality 
information in 1978. The 1972 EEG measures on the subjects convicted of multiple 
offenses by 1978 exhibited significant slowing in comparison to the one-time offenders 
and the nonoffenders (Id. at 66). 
A second study was completed on the same subjects in 1981. Again, it found 
that the percentage of slowed alpha activity in the 1972 EEGs still discriminated the 
recidivistic offenders with the greatest increase in percentage of slow alpha power in 
chronic offenders (Id. at 66). lrt the third prospective study, Petersen, Matousek, 
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Volavka, Mednick and Pollack (1983) replicated Mednick, Volavka, Gabrielli and Itil's 
( 1981 ) findings with an independent sample in Sweden. 
2. Psychophysiological Studies 
Psychophysiological studies regarding criminality have examined the autonomic 
nervous system (ANS) measuring changes in skin conductance. ANS responses are 
monitored to "test whether or not antisocial individuals respond to normal apprehension 
in anticipation of an event which would be construed as painful or undesirable" 
(Gabrielli and Mednick, 1983, p. 67). Mednick and Yolavka ( 1980) review the 
innumerable studies which report on the different patterns of ANS activity with 
criminals. There are only a few, mostly dated studies, which are of particular 
significance. Case in point, Lykken ( 1957) reported that psychopaths exhibit small skin 
conductance responses in anticipation of electric shock. Hare (1965) completed a 
renowned experiment which involved the presentation of numbers (I to 12) in serial 
order and instruction that at number eight an electric shock would be experienced. The 
more psychopathic criminals exhibited less of an electrodermal response than the less 
psychopathic prisoners who demonstrated a significant increase in skin conductance 
early in the experiment (consistent with the well-known anticipatory anxiety). Other 
ANS research has examined responsiveness, ability to learn from punishment and other 
ANS parameters. 
Overall, the results appear to be the same: the antisocial individual across many 
laboratory and natural settings and even differing constructions of antisocial behavior 
per se consistently provide a reduced ANS response (Mednick and Volavka, 1980) 
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3. Neuropsychological Studies 
The findings from neuropsychological research have particularly interesting 
implications. Chronic criminality and persistent delinquency correlate with 
neuropsychologic dysfunction and impainnent. Some researchers have even interpreted 
data as evidence that delinquents may have problems planning their actions and 
perceiving the consequences of such actions. 
In one study, Gabrielli and Mednick ( 1980) found that individuals who tested 
neurologically left-side dominant were at significant risk for increased arrest for 
delinquency. In this paiiicular study involving high-risk males it was found that 64.7 
percent of left-handed individuals were subsequently arrested for delinquency. Flor-
Henry ( 1979) has suggested that psychopathology is, in fact, related to dominant left 
hemisphere deficit. Interestingly enough, when subjects from the previous study were 
reassessed it was found that left-hemisphere dominance is consistent in adult criminality 
as well as juvenile delinquency (Gabrielli and Mednick, 1983). 
Among the biological factors, it is well-accepted that traumatic injury to the 
brain is thought to impair social adjustment and in some cases lead to violence and 
criminality (Denno, 1990; Moffitt, 1990). However, the causal connection between the 
neurotoxins ( excluding alcohol) and brain damage has been neglected. As has been 
demonstrated, the study on bone lead levels and delinquent behavior suggest that altered 
social behavior may provide the earliest expression of lead toxicity (supra, p. 369). 
In summary, the predisposition of aggression has been an issue of great debate. 
Differences in temperament, physical stature, sex and other characteristics distinguish 
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offenders from nonoffenders (Gabrielli and Mednick, 1983). As mentioned, sons and 
daughters of criminal parents appear at higher risk for developing criminal behavior (Id. 
at 59) . More current data from twin and adoption studies support earlier studies that 
genetic factors appear to play a role in the increased risk of criminality. Recently has 
there been substantive biomedical evidence to support the premise that heredity may 
foster aggression. 
In one case report, Dutch researchers linked a profoundly disturbed family's 
problems to a single aberrant gene. The Dutch researchers had been pursuing the gene 
since 1978 when one of the men's sisters sought advice about having children at the 
University Hospital in Nijmegen (Cowley and Hall, 1993). When geneticist Han 
Brunner started studying the affected men, he found that they shared a marked inability 
to control their impulses. It appeared to be a distinctly male problem with 14 men 
fitting the profile and no women. The researchers analyzed blood samples and, after a 
decade, found that the men's problems appear to stem from a tiny defect in the gene that 
enables the body to produce an enzyme called Monoamine Oxidase A (MAOA). It has 
already been established that affected men fail to break down such substances. Again, 
studies have linked transmitters called serotonin and noradrenaline to aggressive 
behavior. 
It is w1likely that antisocial behavior could be considered simply a matter of 
heredity. Even within this affected family , inheriting the gene doesn't automatically 
guarantee a life of violent crime. In this particular family at least one carrier managed to 
keep a job and family amidst a brother who raped his sister and subsequently stabbed a 
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warden in the chest with a pitchfork while in a mental institution for criminally insane. 
One relative tried to run a person down with his car, two others were known arsonists 
and one would creep into his sisters' bedrooms and force them at knife point to undress. 
Delinquent behavior is a complex and multifaceted problem in which 
exploration of the etiology has centered on the following groups of determinants: social 
or experiential and the biological (Needleman, Riess, Tobin, Gretchen and Greenhouse, 
1 996). The current research seems to provide some support for Wilson and Herrnstein's 
(1986) arguments that criminality is primarily constitutional in origin: that criminality 
is more common in males, higher in those offenders with lower verbal IQ scores and 
with relatively extensive histories of hyperactivity. 
Such evidence, however, may have important implications for treatment 
including pharmacological interventions to directly manipulate the suspected biologic 
substrate of conduct disorder and preventive strategies based on suggested 
environmental causes of biological abnormalities (Reite and Field, 1985). For example, 
preventing forms of atypical infant-mother interaction. Rutter and Garmezy (1983) 
found that (irrespective of the etiology) a child's misbehavior could promote marital 
discord which consequently increases conduct disorder. McCord (1990), however, 
tested this hypothesis and found no evidence that prior misbehavior of a child produced 
parental conflict. Before disregarding such a theory it is interesting to note the causal 
sequence referred to by researchers. There a variety of ways that differences among 
neonates might affect their social environments. For example, crying can make it 
difficult for a mother to sleep thereby influencing her child-rearing behavior. The poor 
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ability to communicate might produce failure of parental responsiveness. 
Similarly, Maccoby and Jacklin (1983) showed that during infancy mothers 
respond to difficult behavior with reductions in pressure to conform and low levels to 
conform increase difficult behavior. Even more striking, Barkly and Cunningham 
(1979) showed that methylphenidate-induced changes in the behavior of hyperactive 
children produced changes in the mother's behavior. Bugental, Caporeal and Shennum 
( 1980) used boys trained to act cooperatively and uncooperatively in an experimental 
situation to study these differences. Mothers and female undergraduates interacted with 
a responsive and a nonresponsive boy. Differences in the adult's locus of control 
produced opposite reactions or uncooperative behavior of the children. Adults labeled 
as "internals" reduced assertiveness while those labeled "externals" increased 
assertiveness when conveying neutral messages to the uncooperative child. Bugental 
and Shennum ( 1984) extended their studies of the interactive effects of mother's and 
child's personality and found: "Our results suggest that the mother who questions her 
own caregiving ability behaves in such a way as to maintain or exacerbate child 
uncontrollability" (p. 52). 
From a comparison of monozygotic, same sex dizygotic, and opposite sex 
dizygotic twins it appears that environment accounts for most of the known variance for 
the neonatal temperament variables. Similarly, the degree to which children care about 
their own pleasures and pains and what they perceive as pleasurable and painful is 
primarily a function of experience. 
McCord ( 1 991 ) notes that many use rewards and punishments to teach children 
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and yet ignore the role of their use in teaching children what to value. The mistaken 
belief that by manipulating rewards and punishments one can generate social interest 
has potentially dangerous consequences (Id. at 16). His manipulations create the 
impression that children ought to consider only their own interests (supra, p.16). 
Desires for reward and avoidance of punishment are, in reality, selfish motivations. 
Their use by parents increases the salience of egocentric motives (Id. at 16). As 
McCord ( 1991) argues, punishments and rewards teach children to focus on their own 
pains and pleasures in deciding how to act. 
Virtuous behavior is increased by exposure to nurturing adults modeling such 
behavior attributing altruistic explanations for their actions (Radke-Yarrow, Scott and 
Waxler, 1973). As was so eloquently put by Goldstein, Freud and Solnit (1973), "A 
child needs help in understanding and organizing his/her sensations and perceptions. A 
child needs people to love, receive affection from and to serve as safe targets for 
infantile anger and aggression; to curb and modify primitive drives. A child needs 
patterns for identification to build up a functioning moral conscience." 
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III: Sociomoral Issues 
A. Conscience and Morality 
Before exploring morality and conscience from a developmental perspective, 
this section will operationalize these concepts. 
Kohlberg believed that conscience is organized around the dominant moral 
principle on which a person bases his or her moral reasoning. He postulates that 
conscience goes through developmental stages. Conscience is a term which has 
traditionally referred to the cognitive and affective processes which constitute an 
internalized moral governor over an individual's conduct. The first and most elementary 
state of conscience is organized around the principle of obedience from a fear of 
punishment. The second "reasons" on the basis of self-interest, while the third is most 
concerned with getting praise and approval. The fourth believes in law and order, while 
the fifth thinks in terms of a mutually beneficial social contract. The sixth and final 
stage reasons on the basis of a commitment to universal and ethical principles (Coles, 
1986). 
Kohl berg believed that children's orientation is a consequence of their cognitive 
development (Stantrock and Yussen, 1992). As such, children construct moral thoughts 
as they progress from one stage to the next versus passively accepting a cultural "norm 
of morality" "(Id. at 588-589). Tests of moral reasoning have been used by Kohlberg to 
identify the type of conscience a person has developed. Attempts have been made to 
move people up the scale by learning about these principles and their application. The 
viewpoint appears to be reflective of the general consensus of opinion that integration of 
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the self and world is a primary determinant of conscience. Conscience appears to 
become more stable, consistent and moral as a person's W1derstanding of his/her own 
worth deepens, his/her competence with others increases, his/her W1derstanding of the 
world is more insightful and his/her awareness of what constitutes "self' and "other" 
frees him/her from being controlled by external events and social pressures (Snyder, 
Snyder and Snyder, 1980). 
The dysfunctional conscience is built on a different integration of self and world 
with different relational goals (Id. at 80). A critical component of this development is 
the reality that adults create for children. This includes the methods they use to handle 
feelings and solve interpersonal problems. As such, avoidance of pW1ishment becomes 
the central concern of a child's conscience when he is subjected to humiliation, 
degradation and threats . The child's experiential comprehension of justice is then 
construed as punishment and revenge (supra, p. 82). Understanding and insight cannot 
be superimposed on those who have not developed such through the "conscience 
developing process" (supra, p. 84). A child's "world" cannot be given to him/her by 
someone else. It must be constructed from his/her experiences, intentions and the 
meanings attributed to these experiences and intentions. Lawrence Kohl berg ( 1972) 
explains "Moral development is ... the result of an increasing ability to perceive social 
reality or to organize and to integrate social experience." 
There are unavoidable semantic problems as to what constitutes moral judgment. 
Even the broadest definition of the standards of value included within conscience must 
be constrained by certain critical boundaries. In order to describe conscience broadly, 
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one could argue that it subsumes those evaluative standards applicable to conduct 
(Sullivan, 1977). Conduct per se designates a broad set of behavioral dispositions 
which have been molded by the child's interchange with a social environment. 
Irrespective of the evaluative cognition which children inevitably acquire during the 
socialization 17 of their conduct, the intensity of affectivity will vary in relation to the 
social experience through which certain values have been transmitted. Even the 
behavior of parents and other agents of social transmission of values will establish 
different degrees of intensity of value for the child in different areas of conduct. Thus, 
the belief that "The main experiential determinants of moral development [are] ... 
amount and variety of social experience, the opportunity to take a number of roles and 
to encounter other perspectives. Thus, [it is alleged] middle-class and popular children 
progress further and faster than do lower-class children and social isolates. Similarly, 
development is slower in the semiliterate village cultures that have been studied" 
(Coles, 1986). It is clear that other studies discussed in the forthcoming section support 
this argument. 
Before exploring socialization as it pertains to the development of conscience it 
is necessary to distinguish the process of socialization from education. Specifically, 
socialization is the process by which an individual acquires the knowledge, skills and 
behavior that will make him or her an adequate member of society. The power and 
durability of the effects of early learning on a child's later social behavior are critical to 
socialization (Aronfreed, 1968). The external contingencies of the child's immediate 
social environment manifest a profound control over his/her behavior throughout the 
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course of socialization (Id. at 16). Of course, the most significant consequences of 
social experience is that it gives the child's "acquired behavioral disposition strength 
demonstrated through an increased independence of external control" (Id. at 16). By 
contrast, education refers to an intentional process that has objectives, content and 
outcomes and takes place in educational institutions as well as informal settings. Moral 
education refers to instruction in moral rules of conduct for the purpose of developing 
good character traits and ethical behavior. 
There are a multitude of illustrations regarding how the term conscience is 
currently used far beyond the traditional perimeter of moral judgment. It is used to refer 
to value orientations which support the self-denial of pleasure identified in concepts of 
the "Protestant Ethic." Even surveys which attempt to uncover the child-rearing 
antecedents of conscience examine the socialization of domains such as aggression 
which lends itself directly to moral evaluation and more indirectly to the socialization of 
the child's dependence on the mother and his/her manipulative exploratory inclination 
(Aronfreed, 1968). Moral judgment is only one example of multiple value systems 
which are commonly regarded as the substance of the conscience (Id. at 5). 
From a developmental perspective, moral thought is neither "wired-in" to the 
individual nor a copy of reality. The development of moral thought involves 
assimilating and integrating the external world to the structure of the individual (Coles, 
1986). As such, thought is more a result of the individual's attempts to organize reality 
than an unfolding of innate patterns or internalization of environmental patterns. Moral 
development refers to growth of the individual's ability to distinguish right from wrong, 
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to develop a system of ethical values, and to learn to act morally. Moral development 
occurs through socialization, education as well as maturation (Kohlberg, 1972). The 
issue of maturation is critical. 
Both Piaget and Kohl berg, leading figures in the field of sociocognitive moral 
development, have maintained that the organization of a child's thought is qualitatively 
different from that of an adult. As such, the study of moral development must include a 
sequential stage analysis of developmental changes. Current research being conducted 
in the field is primarily a derivative of Kohl berg's relatively complex system, it will be 
used as a basis of analysis. Kohlberg has developed an interdisciplinary approach with 
his own unique stage theory of moral development combining philosophy, psychology, 
education and political science. Both Piaget and Kohlberg adopt a theoretical position 
known as structuralism. Kohl berg postulates a series of six stages and three levels in 
the development and articulation of moral judgment from childhood into adulthood 
(Kohlberg, 1972). As the individual moves through moral levels, argues Kohlberg, 
more sophisticated forms of moral reassessing are apparent (Lambert and Turiel, 1986). 
B. Moral Development 
Regardless of the reliance on Kohl berg's theory of moral development, there 
have been several criticisms. They are based on the link between moral thought and 
moral behavior. Kohlberg's theory places too much emphasis on how people morally 
think and not enough on how they morally behave (Santrock and Yussen, 1992). 
Additonal criticism involves an overemphasis on the cognitive and underemphasis on 
behavior; the quality of research, inadequate consideration of the care perspective 18 and 
76 
underestimation of the role of culture (Id. at 599). Strong developmentalists argue that 
more attention should be paid to the way in which moral development is assessed (Id. at 
591 ). Researchers have found that hypothetical moral dilemmas presented in Kohlberg's 
stories do not correspond with the moral dilemmas children and adults face in their 
everyday lives. 
Another criticism of Kohlberg's theory is that it is culturally and sexually biased. 
As such, examples of higher-level moral reasoning that would not be similarly 
recognized by Kohlberg's system are values related to the unity and sacredness of all life 
forms in India, and communal equity/collective happiness in Israel (supra, p. 526). 
These examples of moral reasoning would not be scored at the highest level under 
Kohlberg because they fail to emphasize the individual ' s rights and abstract principles 
of justice. Although the sexual inequality of morality is beyond this paper, an 
acknowledgment of its existence is important. A major criticism of Kohl berg's view is 
that it fails to reflect relationships and concern for others ( care perspective). 
Carol Gilligan believes that Kohlberg's theory does not place enough emphasis 
on the importance of caring and relationships in development. Her argument is that 
American culture has promoted the so-called care perspective in the socialization of 
females but not of males. Gilligan argues that Kohlberg reflects a basic moral 
inequality for both sexes which necessitates a search for moral equality between self and 
others. Gilligan argues that traditional Kohlbergian measures of moral development are 
biased against females . The rebuttal evidence indicates that research studies using 
Kohlberg's stories and corresponding scoring system do not find gender differences. 
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It appears that moral reasoning has a lot more to do with values and beliefs of a 
culture than is recognized by Kohlberg. In spite of criticisms, Kohlberg's theory appears 
to provide the most thorough explanation of moral development. His theory most 
efficiently represents the interdisciplinary approach with roots in maturation, education, 
and socialization. These components are all critical to a developmental exploration of 
morality. 
The general consensus among theorists is that moral judgment emerges through 
the maturation process as a result of cognitive and emotional growth and a child's 
interaction with his/her environment. Both Piaget and Kohlberg believed that peer 
relations are critical to advancement of their moral reasoning via social stimulation 
(Santrock and Yussen, 1992). This mutual give-and-take in peer interaction provides 
children with an oppo1tunity to take another person's perspective (Id. at 590). It is 
argued that a juvenile lacks a fully formed value system against which to evaluate his or 
her behavior and decisions. Kohl berg (1963) explains " ... moral concepts and ways of 
thoughts only attain meaning at successively advanced ages and require the extensive 
background of social experiences and cognitive growth." 
This paper adopts the basic assumption that the development of rational or 
mature morality is a process different from the learning of various irrational or arbitrary 
cultural rules and values. As such, intellectual maturity may be necessary for moral 
maturity but not sufficient for adequate moral development. It is clear that certain 
individuals may experience impediments in moral development and maintain a lesser 
stage of maturity unrelated to their age. As such, an adult may function at a moral 
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developmental stage equivalent to the norm for a juvenile. The adult, however, has had 
far more opportunity through life experiences to develop and act upon an acceptable 
system of values. 
The cognitive theory of morality focuses on a distinction between a child's moral 
competence ( construed as the ability to produce moral behaviors) and moral 
performance (construed as those behaviors in specific situations) (Santrock and Yussen, 
1992). Moral competence (acquisition of moral knowledge) is briefly examined in the 
context of cognitive-sensory processes as an outgrowth of such processes. 
Kohl berg argued that moral judgment is an important determinant of moral 
behavior stressing that an individuals's interpretation of both the moral and factual 
aspects of a situation leads to moral decision. Kohl berg argued that "extra-moral" 
factors (e.g., desire to avoid embarrassment) caused children to avoid doing what they 
believe is morally right. In sum, Kohlberg like Piaget stressed that moral action is 
influenced by complex factors. 
Kohlberg's use of "moral stage" does not refer simply to an application of 
cognitive reasoning to the moral realm. Moral reasoning, according to Kohlberg, 
involves structural development which is specific to its own domain even though 
cognitive operations constitute a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for moral 
development (Sullivan, 1977). A moral stage per se does not automatically signify 
anything about behavior. The stage concept is utilized by Kohlberg to denote a moral 
judgment. It is prescriptive or normative in that it deals with what a subject thinks is 




on the form (and not the content) of individual's reasoning (de Vries and Walker, 1986). 
Content refers to attitudes, beliefs, judgments and behavioral choices and form refers to 
reasoning that underlies this content. Kohlberg argued that each new stage represents a 
more complex organization of thought because it is more adequately differentiated and 
integrated (supra, p. 40). Integration refers to the development of complex connections 
among differential perspectives (right being initially defined by one's own interest and 
later by universal principles) (de Vries and Walker, 1986). 
The stage approach, used by Piaget as well as Kohlberg, assumes each individual 
must pass through stages in a prescribed sequence. This implies that the child cannot 
skip stages and that he cannot proceed in a different order. Others have argued that it is 
really the order of the stages that is constant while the age at which a stage appears is 
variable (Cole, 1986). 
Many researchers have misinterpreted the issue of the variability of progression 
through the stages and the corresponding significance. Dr. LeeAnn Iovanni in her 1990 
dissertation entitled "Age Cohort and Period Differences in the Effect of Social Control, 
Social Leaming and Strain Variables on Self-Reported Delinquency," University of 
Maryland, argued that neither Piaget nor Kohlberg focus their concern on age levels of 
moral development. Rather, their focus is on the "inevitability of these stages" (p. 28). 
On the contrary, Kohl berg specifically states that "passage through all six stages is not 
likely ... in the United States among urban middle-class people the dominant mode of 
moral reasoning is at stage 4" (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 67). Importantly, both Piaget and 
Kohlberg repeatedly emphasize the importance of age as it relates to moral 
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development. The problem lies in the lack of definitive evidence to support an absolute 
margin for age relative to moral development. There is no guarantee that all individuals 
will reach all stages. Kohlberg claims that cognitive development establishes the broad 
limits of the individual's progress through moral stages. As cognitive structures become 
more and more complex, a corresponding complexity of moral reasoning is possible but 
not guaranteed. 
Piaget and Kohlberg submit that young children comprehend reality in ways that 
are qualitatively different from those in later childhood who comprehend reality 
different from adolescents. The child's cognitive developmental level confers meaning 
upon experience while at the same time limiting the scope and the depth of that meaning 
(Rosen, 1980). Although cognitive structural development is progresses in an 
unvarying sequence, the demands of the environment and the nature of personal 
experience undergone by the interacting organism within it will greatly effect the rate of 
cognitive development (Id. at 141 ). 
Kohlberg's moral stage model makes three claims consistent with cognitive 
developmental theory: (1) The order of acquisition of the stages in invariant, (2) Each 
successive stage represents a hierarchical integration of the preceding, (3) Each stage 
represents a holistic structure (Sullivan, 1977). Kohlberg argues that individuals are 
either at a stage or in transition between stages. 
C. Kohlberg's Cognitive-Developmental Structuralism 
Kohl berg has developed a philosophically sophisticated stage theory of moral 
development rooted in behavioral (individual level) moral psychology. He postulates a 
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series of 6 stages and 3 levels in the development of moral judgment from childhood to 
adulthood. These stages will be described using by Sullivan ( 1977) whose review of 
Kohl berg's structural theory of moral development provides analysis of structural 
weaknesses in Kohl berg's theory regarding separations of thought from action and is 
from ought. 
I. Preconventional Level 
The child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right or 
wrong. The child, however, interprets these concepts in terms of either physical or 
hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors) or in terms 
of the physical power of those who communicate the rules and labels. This level 
comprises the following two stages. 
Stage 1 : Punishment and Obedience Orientation 
The physical consequences of action determine its goodness/badness regardless 
of the interpretive meaning or value of the consequences. Avoidance of punishment and 
unconditional deference to power are inherently valued but not for any underlying moral 
order supported by punishment and authority. The desire to avoid punishment due to an 
underlying moral order is stage 4. 
Stage 2: Instrumental Relativist Orientation 
Here elements of fairness of reciprocity and equal sharing are present, but they 
are always interpreted in a physical pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you 
scratch my back and I'll scratch yours" not of loyalty, gratitude or justice. 
II. Conventional Level 
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The expectations of the individual's family, group is perceived as valuable in its 
own right, regardless of mediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is not only of 
cont; · 
ormity to personal expectations and social order but of loyalty to it, of actively 
supporting and justifying the order and of identifying with the persons or group involved 
in it. This level comprises two stages: 
Stage 3: Interpersonal Concordance 
This is also know as a "Good Boy" "Nice Girl" Orientation. Good behavior is 
that Which l · · c. 'ty t P eases others and is approved by them. Emphasis 1s on con1orm1 o 
stereoty · 1 . . pica Images of that is majority or "natural" behavior. One earns approval by 
being nice. 
Stage 4: "Law and Order" Orientation. 
Orientation is toward authority, fixed rules and the maintenance of social 0rder. 
Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority and 
maintaining the given social order for its own sake. 
Ill. Postconventional, Autonomous, Principled Level 
Moral values and principles have validity and application apart from the 
authority f . . 1 d rt from the individual's 0 the group or persons holding these prmc1p es an apa 
OWn id t'fi t en 1 ication with these groups. This level has twos ages: 
Stage 5: Social Contract Legalistic Orientation 
R.gh . . d' 'd I 'ghts and in terms of 1 t action defined in terms of general m 1v1 ua n 
standard d by the whole society. 
s that have been critically examined and agree upon 
This is considered the official morality of the United States government and 
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Constitution. 
Stage 6: Universal Ethical and Principle Orientation 
Right is defined by the decision of the conscience in accord with self-chosen 
ethical principles appealing to logical universality and consistency. These principles are 
abstract and ethical. "At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the 
reciprocity and equality of human rights and ofrespect for the dignity of human beings 
as individual persons" (Kohlberg, 1971 , pp. 86-88). 
Again, the implication is that the child cannot skip stages and cannot proceed in 
a different order (supra, p. 97). It is the order of the stage that is constant, while the age 
at which a stage appears is not fixed. The age of the emergence of a structure is 
primarily dependent on the environment which can provide or impede development. 
The ages related to the stages varies from culture to culture as well as from individual to 
individual (supra, p. 97). In no way does Kohlberg imply that all persons of a certain 
age will have reached a certain moral level. In fact, children at one age level could be 
functioning at different moral developmental stages. However, the more likely 
proposition is that children at certain age levels operate in relatively consistent stage 
levels. That, in fact, there is a correlation between age and moral development. 19 
Arbuthnot and Gordon ( 1986) systematically tested the utility of interventions to 
develop moral reasoning among high risk predelinquents. Kohlberg (1972) argued that 
the acquisition of higher stages of moral development is related to intelligence. 
Arbuthnot and Gordon ( 1986)were the first to actually link the enhancement of 
cognitive and moral structures with changes in antisocial behavior. That is, to test the 
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hypothesis that delinquents function at lower stages of moral reasoning than 
nondelinquents. Their study hypothesized that adolescents at risk for juvenile 
delinquency would benefit cognitively and behaviorally from an intervention designed 
to accelerate moral reasoning development. Herein, forty-eight seventh to tenth graders 
identified by teachers at high risk for delinquency participated in a cognitively based 
moral reasoning development program for 16 to 20 weekly 45-minute sessions. A one 
year follow-up found significant increases in moral reasoning, grades, and attendance 
with corresponding decreases in behavioral referrals for the treated group in comparison 
to a matched ( according to the rated severity of behavior problems) randomly assigned 
nontreatment group of students. In an older and less detailed study, Campagna and 
Harter (1974) found that "sociopathic" children when compared to IQ matched "normal" 
children have a lower stage of moral development because they lack opportunities for 
role-taking in their families . Other comparisons suggest that parents of delinquent 
children may actually discourage mature moral reasoning. 
The relationship which exists between a person's moral judgment and actions is 
critical. In Kohl berg's theory, the moral aspect is interpreted by the nature of the moral 
judgment. Most people identify morality with a moral commitment of action. 
Kohlberg uses several studies to support his two-tier claim of consistency between 
moral judgment and action. The first addresses the level of the structure/stage per se. 
One example involved cheating in sixth graders where it was found that 75 percent of 
subjects below principled level in moral development and only 20 percent of principled 
subjects ( construed as at stages 5 and 6) were involved in cheating (Sullivan, 1977). 
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The second "tier" addresses nonmoral factors identified as attention, will and 
ego-strength. Kohlberg cites a study which found children with an amoral philosophy 
(stage 2) are more likely to cheat if they are high on ego strength. Whereas those with a 
conventional morality (stage 4) are more likely to cheat if they are high on measure of 
ego strength. At the post conventional level ( 5 or 6), high ego strength is less necessary 
as it appears even principled children measuring low in ego strength do not cheat. 
Kohl berg's conclusion is that this basic virtue is representative of "autonomy" as well as 
"justice" and the higher the stage, the greater the consistency between thought and 
action. 
Some researchers argue that this is an oversimplification of moral consistency. 
There are more sophisticated arguments which focus on the idiosyncratic problems 
regarding the theoretical position of structuralism. In a somewhat humorous light, 
Sullivan ( 1977) even suggests Kohl berg's stage 6 ideal-principled person is a moral 
entity with "flesh and bones" analogous to the Beatles "nowhere man." Autonomy as a 
singular ideal, however, can contribute to the development of a moral agent who lacks 
sociability and might very well be anti-conforming and autocratic (Id. at 14 ). That is, 
autonomy separated from other dimensions of the moral may actually be an aberrant 
process. 
A well-developed conscience does not necessarily translate into a morally 
courageous life. Similarly, powers of philosophical thinking and moral analysis in no 
way automatically translate into a willingness to confront the various evils of the world. 
The discrepancy between ideas and everyday conduct has disturbed many people. As 
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Kohlberg notes: 
"To act in a morally high way requires a high stage of moral reasoning. One 
cannot follow moral principles (stage 5 and 6) if one does not understand or 
believe in them. One can, however, reason in terms of such principles and not 
live up to them. A variety of factors determine whether a particular person will 
live up to his stage of moral reasoning in a particular situation though moral 
stage is a good predictor of action in various experimental and naturalistic 
settings" (1976, p. 32). 
Moral development refers to growth of the individuals's ability to distinguish 
right from wrong, to develop a system of ethical values and to learn to act morally. 
Kohlberg argues the age emergence of a structure/stage is largely dependent on the 
environment which can provoke or impede development. Kohlberg recognizes the 
significance of the human's interaction with the environment over time from birth 
onward and his/her progression from egocentricity to objectivity with objectivity 
presupposing a "decentering" process. Continuing to act upon the environment, the 
growing child constructs complex interrelated mental action systems for processing 
information and cognitive structures for more adaptive knowledge (Rosen, 1980). 
Importantly, the external world does not impose meaning on the person but rather the 
person confers meaning upon the environment through assimilation relative to their 
developmental level. As such, development can be thought of as a formation of the 
child's interaction with his/her environment. 
Adolescents undergo many significant changes before adulthood. Before these 
developmental changes are completed, adolescents are vulnerable in many ways. Most 
significantly, they have difficulty appreciating the future consequences of their acts, lack 
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mature judgment and are easily influenced by family members and peers engaging in 
experimentation and risk-taking behavior. Adolescents are, for the most part, guided by 
emotions rather than reason. Accordingly, minors lack a fully formed identity or 
character and generally do not have the capacity for principled moral judgment. 
In summary, age 18 remains the common dividing line between status as a 
juvenile and as an adult. Regardless of a child's advanced or retarded developmental 
stage, there are fixed ages for voting, joining the military, marrying, entering into a 
contract, attending school and driving. The most common age of majority established in 
American law for noncriminal purposes is age eighteen. This is based on the belief that 
juveniles are not fully responsible for their actions and society should share 
responsibility for the actions of its children. It is particularly disturbing that we 
continue to maintain a double standard for criminal purposes. It appears that society 
rationalizes use of the most severe adult sanction on juveniles with the mitigating factor 
approach which assumes individualized consideration. As will be demonstrated, 
consideration of mitigating factors are as diverse as the corresponding judge, jury and 
jurisdiction where they are considered. Far beyond providing individualized treatment, 
this judicial discretion has provided the means for serious legal abuses. 
In the preceding chapters, a review of the literature provided definitive 
biomedical data as well as the more abstract conceptualizations of Lawrence Kohl berg 
and the application of Kohl berg's theory to delinquent populations by Arbuthnot and 
Gordon. The biomedical data demonstrate that a correlation exists between dissocial ( or 
maladaptive) behavior and psychological, emotional, biological, genetic (familial) and 
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environmental factors. The correlation is much more loosely established with 
sociomoral (including cognitive) variables but appears to exist to some degree. The 
weak sociomoral correlational evidence is most likely due to the obscure nature of these 
concepts and the difficulty in testing related theories. Current research continues to find 
support for the founding sociomoral theorists. 
Similar vulnerabilities are shared, to some degree, by the majority of violent 
youthful offenders. The small group of the most violent of these offenders are at issue 
in this paper. As will be demonstrated, all of these youthful offenders share the most 
serious risk factors. It is inequitable and immoral to treat them as if they are fully 






A. Study Design 
A retrospective descriptive cohort design along with a substantive case analysis 
was used to collect information on death row inmates sentenced for crimes committed 
as juveniles. The sample collection was completed between May l, 1997-June 1, 1998. 
It was limited to offenders who were under the age of 18 when the crime was committed 
and were on death row or sentenced to death row during the study period. The study 
included the following two phases. The preliminary phase, began with by the United 
States Supreme Court case of Thompson v Oklahoma in 1987. This involved general 
data collection related to capital punishment issues, current news and events, juvenile 
death row cases and factors associated with capital punishment. The data collection 
phase involved a multistep process to identify juvenile offenders on death row. The 
data analysis included univariate, bivariate and multivariate analyses including Fisher's 
Exact Test for small samples, X2 analysis with odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals 
for the 2 by 2 analyses. 
B. Preliminary Phase 
The preliminary phase of this study involved a two month analysis of academic 
and nonacademic material related to the pending Thompson v Oklahoma case in the 
United States Supreme Court. This phase was conducted in Spring, 1987. Initial data 
was collected on all juvenile death penalty cases heard before the Supreme Court at that 
time including Thompson v. Oklahoma, 56 LW 4892 (1988), Stanford v. Kentucky, No. 
87-5765 (1988), Wilkins v. Missouri, 57 LW 7793 (1989) and High v. Zant, No. 
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87-5666 ( 1987). Although High v. Zant was dismissed due to the petitioners 
misrepresentation of his age, the amici curiae briefs filed on the petitioner's behalf 
generalize to the population at large and were used in the study. All identified cases 
were researched by obtaining amici curiae briefs and petitioner's briefs from the U.S. 
Supreme Court. The data collected included extensive references to clinical studies on 
juvenile murders, clinical psychological/medical exams and general theoretical 
discussions on capital punishment (Appendix A, Chart 4.1 ). 
C. Data Collection Phase 
1. Overall Plan 
Data collection began by contacting experts and organizations focused on the 
death penalty and death row inmates (Appendix A, Chart 4.2). There were an estimated 
58 juveniles on death row at the beginning of the study. A multistep process was 
conducted which involved completion of the following: case identification, validation, 
substantive analysis of each case, verification of death row inmates, identification of 
new juveniles on death row and final confirmation and validation of information from 
attorneys, court house personnel, correctional staff and researchers. 
2. Case Identification and Validation 
All of the cases initially identified by Dr. Victor Strieb in 1996 were verified by 
phone calls to the individual Department of Corrections in each state where the death 
rows were located. Death rows were located using the National Directory of Law 
Enforcement Administrators, Correctional Institutions and Related Agencies, 1996-1997 
editions. Census sheets or death row rosters from each death row were obtained and 
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cross-validated. A correctional officer from of the each death rows was contacted and 
verified that all inmates listed on the census sheets were housed in that facility's death 
row. Several correctional officers provided additional relevant demographic victim and 
inmate information. The respective courthouse were contacted to provide an additional 
cross-check and to identify attorneys involved in each case. This process was repeated 
periodically throughout the data collection period. Frequencies of contacts in all 
activities varied; some involved weekly and others monthly or bimonthly contact. 
3. Substantive Analysis of Cases 
Once inmates were verified, a search of LEXIS/NEXIS was conducted to gather 
information on each case, including articles and case citations. All available trial and 
appellate level cases were pulled and the cases which were not located were shepardized 
for further information. The data collected on each case included demographic 
information, date of the crime, victim information, statutory/nonstatutory mitigating 
factors, aggravating factors and evidentiary facts. The NEXIS information also 
provided links to other cases and subjects who had not been included in the original list. 
Mr. Watt Espy, Director, Capital Punishment Research Project, Alabama, was 
contracted to research his database of over 19,200 cases for possible identification of 
unpublished cases where no information was available. Dr. Victor Streib, Dean, Petit 
College of Law, Ohio Northern University and noted expert on the juvenile death 
penalty, was contacted throughout the study for consultation. 
The LEXIS/NEXIS searches were conducted daily to obtain updated 




including the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS) database, 
PSYCIDNFO, MEDLINE were conducted periodically. A large number ofresearch 
articles provided additional secondary information on juveniles sentenced to death row. 
All of the new cases were verified using the same validation methods which are 
described. A WESTLA W search was conducted in the final stages of the data collection 
to target any missing information. 
Attempts were made to contact all attorneys who participated at varying levels of 
the case from trial level to appellate review. Approximately 75% of the involved 
attorneys were contacted on at least one occasion. Data was obtained including 
presentence reports, writs of habeas corpus and other pertinent legal documents as well 
as the information provided verbally by the attorneys. 
There were two family members of death row inmates contacted for more 
detailed information on the mitigators (i.e. the type of family problems, history of sexual 
abuse, etc.). This provided minimal additional information. 
Several organizations with special interest in the death penalty were contacted to 
obtain information, to verify cases and to identify new cases. Some of these 
organizations include the following: Southern Center for Human Rights, Amnesty 
International, Texas Resource Center and NAACP Legal Defense and Educational 
Fund, Inc. Additional referrals from these organizations included experts who had 
examined the death row inmates. The identified medical experts were contacted and 
interviewed to obtain any additional information. 




During the week of June 1, 1998 a final call to each of the state's Department of 
Corrections and death rows was conducted to obtain the most current census sheet and 
corresponding verification. Any missing data was obtained and data collection was 
closed. 
5. Variables 
Data was collected on both the perpetrator and the victim(s) as follows: 
Perpetrator 
Age: The age when the crime was committed (years) 
Date of Birth: As listed by the Department of Corrections in each state 
Race: Race of the inmate (White, Black, Hispanic) 
Date of Crime: The date the crime was committed 
State: State of the death row to which the inmate was sentenced 
Statutory mitigating circumstances: Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 536 (1978) 
(Identified as present or absent): 
Troubled family history ( or "poor family history") 
Psychologic/emotional disturbances 
Mental Retardation/Low IQ(< 70) 
Medical history 
Indigent Status 
Documented substance abuse ( confirmed cases) 
Nonstatutory mitigating circumstances varied too widely to provide a valuable 
companson. 







Murder of a police officer 
Carjacking 
Multiple murder 
(Data was included for up to three victims) 
Age: (years) 
Race: (White, Black, Hispanic) 
There was extensive additional qualitative information on the circumstances 
surrounding many of the cases collected but this was not included in the quantitative 
analysis. 
D. Data Analysis Phase 
The data were analyzed using SAS statistical software (SAS Institute Inc, 1990). 
The frequencies for each variable were calculated along with bivariate analyses by race 
and state. Univariate analyses of the age of the victim was conducted. Cross-tabulations 
with Fisher' s Exact Test and X2 analysis was conducted to test the relationships between 
variables. 
Fisher's Exact Test was included in the analyses due to the small numbers 
included in the sample. This test yields the probability of a table that provides at least 
as much evidence of association as the observed table. The probability of every possible 
table is computed and a p-value is calculated (Mehta & Patel, 1983, SAS Institute Inc, 
1990). This is useful in small numbers analysis where there are less than five 
observations per cell and x2 analysis may not provide stable estimates. 
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V: Findings 
A. Univariate and Bivariate Analyses 
Currently there are 71 cases on death rows throughout the United States for 
crimes committed as juveniles. This analysis included 68 (95.8%) of those juveniles 
and an additional four cases that were on death row or sentenced to death row during the 
data collection including two sentence reversals and two executions. All the juveniles 
were male and had committed murder along with one or more aggravating 
circumstances. Three out of four juveniles were 17-years-old, the remainder were 
sixteen. Over four out of ten juveniles sentenced to death row were housed in Texas 
(Huntsville). Slightly more juveniles were Black (44.4%)( Appendix B, Table 5.1.). 
Up to three victims for each juvenile were included in this analysis. All were 
more likely to be 20-69, White, and about equally as likely to be male or female 
(Appendix B, Tables 5.2-5.5). 
Mitigating circumstances were evaluated by age of juvenile and by race of 
juvenile and with aggravating circumstances. Over eight out often juveniles used 
troubled family history as a mitigating circumstance. Slightly more 17-year-olds used 
this mitigator compared to 16-year-olds (87.3% v.75.0%). A very similarpattem was 
noted for psychological/emotional problems. Less than half of all the juveniles used 
medical problems as a mitigating circumstance. Slightly more 16-year-olds used this 
mitigator (43.8% v.36.4%). Two out of five juveniles used low IQ/mental retardation as 
a mitigator. This was slightly more common among 17-year-olds (43.6% v.37.5%). 
Only 12.7% of all juveniles (9 out of71) reported no prior criminal history as a 
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mitigator. The number was much higher among 17-year-olds (8 v.l). Three out of four 
juveniles used indigent status as a mitigator. This mitigator was more prevalent among 
17-year-olds (83.6% v.56.3%). There were very few juveniles who reported 
documented substance abuse as a mitigator. The proportion was the same for both age 
groups (12.5-12.7%) (Appendix B, Table 5.6). 
Among all mitigating factors, slightly more Blacks were noted in each category. 
Two out of five Black juveniles used troubled family history and psychological/ 
emotional problems as mitigators. The proportion was similar in Whites (36.7% for 
troubled family history and 40.4% for psychological/emotional problems). The 
proportion for these mitigators was much lower in Hispanics (21. 7% for family history 
and 15.8% for psychological/emotional problems). Over half of Black juveniles used 
medical problems and mental retardation/low IQ as mitigators (51.9% and 53.5% 
respectively). These proportions were higher when compared to Whites and 
significantly higher when compared to Hispanics. In fact, medical problems was used 
among only 3. 7% of all Hispanics juveniles. Overall, Hispanics used less mitigators 
than Blacks or Whites. Black juveniles were more likely to report no prior criminal 
history as a mitigator (44.4% v.22.2% for Whites and 33.3% for Hispanics) as well as 
indigent status (47.3% v.32.7% for Whites and 20.0% for Hispanics). Significantly 
more Black juveniles (55.6%) reported known substance abuse as a mitigator, compared 
to Whites (11. 1 %) or Hispanics (33.3%) (Appendix B, Table 5.7). 
Among aggravating circumstances included in the court cases, almost half of the 
juveniles committed robbery. One 16-year-old committed carjacking and one 17-year 
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old committed arson. More 16-year-olds committed multiple murders and murder of 
children compared to 17-year-olds. Rape was committed about equally among both age 
groups (Appendix B, Table 5.8). 
White juveniles were significantly more likely to commit burglary, carjacking, 
murder of a police officer and arson compared to the other race groups. One-half of the 
Black juveniles committed rape and 45.5% of them committed murder of a child and 
l OOo/c f k' . 0 0 idnappmgs were done by Black juveniles. Hispanics were almost twice as 
likely as th 0 er race groups to commit multiple murder. Hispanics were also less likely 
to com ·t b 
mi ro bery (Appendix B, Table 5.9). 
When robbery was an aggravating factor, psychologicaVemotional disorders 
Were 80% less likely to be used as a mitigator (0.2, 0.01-0.8, Fisher's Exact Test 
p===O.O)l). Juveniles who had rape as an aggravating factor were 5.1 (l.1-23.1, Fisher's 
Exact T t . · · · · · · t es p===0.045) times more likely to use no pnor cnmmal history as a m1tiga or. 
When the offender committed burglary, they were 90% less likely to use indigent status 
as a mitigator (0.12, 0.03-0.6, Fisher's Exact Test p=0.010). Although it did not reach 
sta
tiStical significance, all offenders who had committed a child murder used 
psychological/emotional disorders as a mitigator. No other relationships among 
mitigators and aggravators were noted (Appendix B, Table 5. IO). 
B. Multivariate Analyses 
Cross-tabulations with X2 analyses and Fisher's Exact Test were used to evaluate 
the relationships among variables. Race was analyzed in a dichotomous fashion using 
dununy coding as follows: White v. non-White, Black v. non-Black, Hispanic v. non-
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Hispanic. This method was employed because calculations indicated that analyses of 
the 3 by N tables required for all race categories would be computer memory intensive 
and require more memory than is available. 
Significant relationships were noted among state and race. White juveniles were 
significantly more likely to be housed in Florida and Oklahoma and significantly less 
likely to be housed in Texas (Appendix B, Table 5.11). 
Whites were 16.33 (1.81-142.6) times more likely to commit burglary than non-
Whites. None of the victims of white juveniles were Hispanic and only one victim was 
under age twenty. This was statistically significant (Appendix B, Table 5 .12). 
Black juveniles were significantly more likely to have Black victims which held 
true for the first and second victims. The numbers were too small to attain significance 
in the third victim. Blacks were significantly more likely to have victims under 10 years 
of age, 100% of the victims under 10 were murdered by Black juveniles. There was no 
significant effect for young Black victims and Black offenders. Blacks were 
significantly unlikely to commit burglary with the murder. In fact, none of the 
burglaries in this population were committed by Black offenders. There were no 
significant relationships noted for mitigators when comparing Black and non-Black 
offenders (Appendix B, Table 5 .13 ). Further analysis of the age-race relationship 
revealed that Black juvenile offenders were 6 (1.5-24.2, Fisher' s Exact Test, p=0.00095) 
times more likely to have a victim under age 19. These victims were 9 (l.7-46.8, 
Fisher's Exact Test, p=0.000996) times more likely to be non-Black (Appendix B, 
Table 5.14). 
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Hispanic offenders were 4.7 (1 .3-16.4, Fisher's Exact Test, p=0.31) times more 
likely to commit multiple murders. Second and third victims were more likely to be 
male and Hispanic or Asian. None of the victims among this group of Hispanic 
offenders were Black regardless of whether it was a single or multiple murder. There 
were no significant differences in age among first victims but significantly more second 
victims were likely to be 10-19 years old and second likely to be less than 10-years-old. 
Hispanics were 90% less likely (0.9, 0.01-0.8, Fisher's Exact Test p=0.00063) to use 
medical problems as a mitigator (Appendix B, Table 5.15). 
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VI: Constitutional Analysis 
While the moral propriety of executing children may constitute an issue for 
legislators, the constitutional propriety of sentencing minors is an issue for the courts 
(Gwin, 1981). The imposition of the death penalty on minors involves a consideration 
of many constitutional issues. Such issues include age as a suspect classification, the 
right to life and other concerns regarding the disparate treatment of adults and juveniles 
(White, 1983). 
The constitutionality of capital punishment for minors may be challenged on 
many grounds. The basis primarily relied upon is that sentencing minors to death 
violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment and the 
Fourteenth Amendment. For the most part, these challenges have been dismissed with 
little comment [State v. Valencia, 124 Ariz. 139, 602 P. 2d 807 (1979); Eddings v. 
State, 616 P. 2d 1159 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980), 455 U.S. 104 (1982)]. 
The Eighth Amendment provides that "excessive bail should not be required nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted" (U.S. Const. 
Amend. VIII). The principle which has direct relevance in analyzing the 
constitutionality of imposing the death penalty on minors is that a punishment must not 
be excessive [Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 3372 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 
at 392 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 173 (1976)]. A punishment is excessive if 
it is disproportionate to the crime or if it makes no measurable contribution to 
acceptable goals of punishment (Greenwald, 1982). Although, in general, the death 
penalty has passed both tests; when minors are considered it appears to fail. The 
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following section will explore just how it fails to make a measurable contribution to the 
acceptable goals of punishment and the extent of its disproportionality. 
A . Disproportionality 
The Supreme Court has a step-by-step process for determining whether a 
punishment is disproportionate. First, an examination of the history of the punishment, 
current legislation and jury sentences is completed to determine whether imposition is 
acceptable to contemporary society [Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 33 72 (1982); 
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 592 (1977)]. An examination of these factors, although 
limited, is infom1ative. 
An analysis of Supreme Court rulings indicates Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 
(1976) clearly launched the present era (Streib, 1987). Although the issue of age per se 
was not before the Court in Gregg, the concern for age of the offender was apparent. 
The Court approved of the Georgia statute's guided discretion for consideration of 
aggravating and mitigating factors in the sentencing portion of the hearing. In fact, the 
Court specifically inquired, while endorsing the requirement that the jury consider 
characteristics of the offender: "Are there any special facts about this defendant that 
mitigate against imposing capital punishment ( e.g., his youth .. . ?) (Id .. at 197). In 
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 273 (1976), the Court approved of a Texas statute that 
provided the sentencing jury "could further look to the age of the defendant" in deciding 
between life imprisonment and the death sentence (Streib, 1987). Subsequent cases 
provided for continued guided discretion statutes in lieu of mandatory death penalty 
statutes (Liebman and Shepard, 1978; Galbo, 1985). 
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Another major holding where the Court expressly mentioned the youthfulness of 
the offender as an appropriate factor for consideration was Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 
U.S. 633 (1977). In 1978, it became quite clear with Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 536 
(1978) and Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978) that sentencingjuries andjudges must 
consider all relevant mitigating factors proffered by the defendant. A few years later, 
the well-known Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) case provided no help in 
deciding the constitutionality issue (Hill, 1984); however, the language of the Supreme 
Court in Eddings did reflect an understanding of the nature of mitigating factors. 
At the sentencing hearing following the conviction, Edding's attorney offered 
substantial evidence of a turbulent family history including beatings by a harsh father 
and serious emotional disturbances. The judge refused, as a matter oflaw, to consider 
the petitioner's unhappy upbringing and emotional disturbance as mitigating factors. In 
fact, the judge found the only mitigating circumstance was the petitioner's youth which 
was held to be insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. Referring to 
Lockett v. Ohio, the Supreme Court in a 5-4 opinion in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 
455 U.S. l 04 (1982), ordered the sentence vacated because nothing should be precluded 
from consideration as a mitigating factor as a matter oflaw. This did not mean that, 
upon consideration, such factors could not be dismissed as insufficient. 
The Eddings court stated: 
"Eddings was not a normal 16-year-old; he had been deprived of the 
care, concern and paternal attention that children deserve ... [I]t is not 
disputed that he was a juvenile with serious emotional problems ... All 
of this does not suggest an absence of responsibility for the crime of 
murder, deliberately committed in the case. Rather, it is to say that just 
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as the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant mitigating factor of 
great weight, so must the background and mental and emotional 
development of a youthful defendant be duly considered in sentencing" 
(455 U.S. at 116 [emphasis added]) [Thompson v. Oklahoma, 
No . 86-6169 (1987)]. 
Although the Court did not directly rule on the question of minors being 
sentenced to death, the sense of was that it would uphold such a sentence. The 
dissenting opinion led by Chief Justice Burger and joined by Justices White, Blackmun 
and Rehnquist indicated that "there comes a time in every case when a court must 'bite 
the bullet'." Chief Justice Burger noted: 
"The court stops far short of suggesting that there is any 
constitutional proscription against imposition of the death 
penalty on a person who was under age 18 when the murder 
was committed" [455 U.S. 104 (1982)]. 
Since the Eddings decision, the Supreme Court has heard several cases 
primarily on the basis of the unconstitutionality of the execution of juveniles. These 
cases - Thompson v. Oklahoma, 56 L W 4892 (1988), Stanford v. Kentucky and 
Wilkins v. Missouri, 5 7 L W 4973 ( 1989) - will be discussed in the next section. The 
determination of the legality of the death penalty for juveniles continues to be left to 
each individual jurisdiction. Even though Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority in 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 56 L W 4892 (1988), that juveniles less than 16 years of age 
shall be barred from execution, she argued: 
"Although I believe that a national consensus forbidding the execution of 
any person for a crime committed before the age of 16 very likely does exist, 
I am reluctant to adopt this conclusion as a matter of constitutional law 
without better evidence than we now possess" [56 LW 4901]. 




consideration of youth of the offender as a mitigating factor (Streib, 1987). As per 
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S . at 115-116 "[G]reat weight must be given to "the 
special mitigating factor of youth," [Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. at 2698 
(plurality opinion)]. More specifically, the trial judge discussed mitigating 
circumstances during the penalty phase stating in Instruction No. 7 [JA 22]: 
"Mitigating circumstances are those which, in fairness and mercy, may be 
considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability or 
blame. The determination of what are mitigating circumstances is for you as 
jurors to resolve under the facts and circumstances of this case" 
[Thompson v. Oklahoma, No. 86-6169 (1986)]. 
The primary safeguard against arbitrary imposition of the death penalty is the 
accused's ability to present such mitigating evidence. In reality, this mitigating 
circumstance is a hollow safeguard because a juvenile is not statutorily given any more 
consideration than any other young person [Stanford v. Kentucky, No. 87-5765 (1988)]. 
By and large, the special status of youth as a mitigating circumstance is lost in the plain 
language of most death penalty statues. "Youth" as it is used herein is in no way an 
absolute term. It operates on a sliding scale where it applies with equal force to a 
16-year-old as it does to a 30-year-old [Stanford v. Kentucky, No. 87-5765 ( 1988)]. 
Jurisdictions which specify youth as a mitigating circumstance do not afford 
juveniles adequate due process protections warranted by their age (Id. at 34 ). In fact, 
these statutes in many ways undermine the significance of a juvenile's age as a 
mitigating factor. Case in point, of the states which list youth as a mitigating 
circumstance, only Indiana, Montana, and South Carolina stipulate consideration of a 
defendant's age if he/she was less than 18 at the time of the crime (Id. at 34) 
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(Appendix A, Chart 1.4). 
Stanford noted in Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W. 2d at 680 (1984), a 
defendant's young age "is not a constitutional distinction" between juvenile and adult 
status. This ruling is directly inconsistent with the Edding's requirement that a 
juvenile's age carry "great weight." In Stanford v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W. 2d at 792 
(1987), the Kentucky Supreme Court failed to afford the petitioner's age any more 
weight than any other mitigating factor. As such, "[The petitioner's] age and the 
possibility that he might be rehabilitated were mitigating factors appropriately left to the 
consideration of the jury that tried him" (Id. at 792). This case is reflective of statutes 
which fail to provide for due consideration of the "great weight" which a juvenile's age 
should carry as a mitigating factor. 
As mentioned, youths who are excluded or cast out of the sanctity of the 
juvenile court face adult criminal punishments (Solway, Hays, Schreiner, and Cansler, 
1980). As such, 36 states provide the death penalty an option even though minors may 
be given special protection w1der death penalty statutes. The following states expressly 
exclude minors under age 16, 17 or 18 from the death penalty: 18 - California - Cal. 
Penal Code§ 190.5 (West Supp. 1985); Colorado - Colo. Rev. Stat.§ 16-11-103 
(l)(a)(1985); Connecticut- Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.§ 53a-46a [h] (West Sup. 1985); 
Illinois - Ill. Ann. Stat. Ch. 38 § 9-l[b] (Smith-Hurd Sup. 1985); Nebraska - Neb. Rev. 
Stat.§ 28-105.-1 (1984); New Jersey- NJ. Stat. Ann.§ 2 c:I1-3f(West 1986); New 
Mexico - N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-14 (1979); Ohio - Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.02 
[E] (Page 1984); Oregon - Oregon Stat.§ 161.615 (1985); Tennessee - Tenn. Code Ann. 
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§ 37-1- 134 [l] (1 984); 17 - Georgia - Ga. Code Ann. § 17-9-3 (1982); New Hampshire -
N.H. Stat. Ann. § 63:05 (l x)(l986); Texas-Tex. Penal Code Ann.§ 8.07 [d] (Vernon 
Supp. 1985). 
The death penalty for juveniles clearly violates the Eighth Amendment' s ban 
on cruel and unusual punishment under the "evolving standards of decency." As noted 
in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), "the amendment must draw its meaning from the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" (Id. at l O 1 ). 
Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W. 2d 374 (Ky 1968), construed this standard to 
mean that a punishment does not comply with the "evolving standards of decency" in a 
society when "in view of all the circumstances, the punishment in question is of such 
character as to shock the general conscience and to violate the principles of fundamental 
fairness" (Id. at 101). 
Certainly, the mental torture that accompanies a death sentence proceeding 
may, in and of itself, violate "the evolving standards of decency" in society. As Robert 
Johnson stated in "Under Sentence of Death: The Psychology of Death Row 
Confinement" ( 1979): 
"[T]he image of confinement on death row as living death was used by many 
inmates to capture the essential or cumulative experience of the condemned 
prisoner. Living death is here intended to convey the zombie-like, 
mechanical existence of an isolated physical organism - a fragile twilight 
creature that emerges when men are systematically denied their humanity. 
The image spontaneously and forcefully rendered by prisoners themselves, 
serves as a dramatic summary statement of the death row experience, 
encompassing its central psychological feature, powerlessness, fear and 
emotional emptiness" (p. 141 ). 
With death row appearing like "living death" to inmates and with the suicide 
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rate among death row prisoners exceeding the number of executions, little doubt exists 
that great mental stress plagues even an adult, much less a child, incarcerated on death 
row. The infliction of mental torment on a prisoner violates the Eighth Amendment. 
As such, the Court must recognize that submitting a child to the obvious stress suffered 
by death row inmates "shocks the conscience" and "violates the evolving standards of 
decency" in American society. 
B. Case Law 
The persuasive evidence of public opinion reflected via legislation in no way 
comprises all the authority in support of the proposition that a juvenile death penalty 
fails to comport with the "evolving standards of decency." The execution of minors for 
crimes committed while still children offends fundamental standards of decency and 
humanity. The courts, traditionally the branch of government most cautious about 
conforming to societal norms, have reflected the discord regarding imposition of the 
death penalty on juveniles. Case law has developed in a strikingly inconsistent manner. 
Prior to the decision in Eddings, the issue of severe criminal prmishments for juveniles 
was addressed primarily by state supreme courts (White, 1983; Wilson, 1983). For 
example, in Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W. 2d 374 (Ky, 1968), the Kentucky 
Supreme Court determined life in prison without possibility of parole for a 14-year-old 
rapist was cruel and rmusual prmishment. State v. Stewart, 197 Neb. 497,250 N.W. 2d 
849 ( 1977), construed a statutory provision allowing for consideration of mitigating 
factors to apply to a 16-year-old who had no significant criminal record. Lewis v. State, 
246 Ga. 101,268 S.E. 2d 915 (1980), involved another 16-year-old who was sentenced 
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to death before Georgia amended its statute to prohibit the death penalty for crimes 
committed while under age seventeen [Ga. Code Ann.§ 17-9-3 (1982)]. 
The conclusion was that "the death penalty has been so rarely imposed on 
persons under 1 7 as to make the death sentence in this case excessive and 
disproportionate and hence unconstitutional" (Id. at 107, Hill, J., concurring opinion). 
The justification for this opinion was that only one 16-year-old had been sentenced to 
death under Georgia's 1973 statute, a case which was subsequently reversed on grounds 
of jury instruction errors. 
Although Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), has been relied on by 
many lower courts, its interpretation has been misconstrued. The Court herein strictly 
avoided any holding on the constitutionality of the death penalty. It simply reaffirmed 
that the youthfulness of the offender is a mitigating factor demanding great weight. 
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, stated: 
" ... youth is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life 
when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological 
damage. Our history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that 
minors, especially in their earlier years are less mature and responsible than 
adults. Particularly during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, 
minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment expected of 
adults [Bellotti v. Baird 443 U.S. 622 (1979)]. Even the normal 16-year-old 
customarily lacks the maturity of an adult. In this case Eddings was not a 
normal 16-year-old, he had been deprived of the care, concern and paternal 
attention that children deserve ... All of this does not suggest an absence of 
responsibility for the crime of murder ... Rather it is to say that just as the 
chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant mitigating factor of great 
weight, so must the background and mental and emotional development of a 
youthful defendant be duly considered in sentencing" [Eddings v. Oklahoma, 
455 U.S. 104, 102 S. Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed. 2d (1982) at p. 11-12]. 
Despite its limitations, Eddings v. Oklahoma remains ones of the most well-
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defined rulings against the imposition of the death penalty upon an emotionally 
disturbed and socially deprived juvenile offender. The principles set forth in Eddings, 
however, appear not to have been followed in several cases. 
Although youth of a juvenile defendant tends to be given weight, the 
mitigating effect of youth can and sometimes is outweighed by aggravating 
circumstances. Case in point, the trial judge in a Florida case sentenced a 16-year-old 
offender to death arguing that two aggravating circumstances outweighed one mitigating 
circumstance (Amnesty International, 1991 ). The judge specifically rejected the 
defendant 's age as a mitigating circumstance stating that age is a factor only "when it is 
relevant to the defendant ' s mental and emotional maturity and his ability to take 
responsibility for his own acts and to appreciate the consequences following from there" 
(Id. at 5). The judge determined that age was not relevant in this case because the 
defendant knew what he was doing, knew it was wrong and tried to cover up his crime 
(Case of James A. Morgan, Circuit Court, Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Florida, Feb. 
1990). 
Similarly, in the Wilkins case, this 16-year-old offender with an extensive 
history of mental disturbance (already discussed at length) refused to be represented by a 
lawyer, pled guilty and requested that the death penalty be imposed. The judge gave no 
indication in his sentencing order that the defendant's youth or history of turmoil had 
been considered as mitigating factors (Amnesty International, 1991 ). 
In several of the other recent Supreme Court cases,jurors failed to receive 
instructions that the defendant' s age must be considered as a mitigating factor when 
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deliberating between a life or death sentence. 1n the Thompson case, the court gave no 
specific instructions to the jury concerning the defendant's youth ( 15 years of age) but 
advised them that "the determination of what are mitigating factors is for you as jurors 
to resolve" [Thompson v. Oklahoma, No. 86-6169 (1988)]. As mentioned, the 
Thompson death sentence was vacated on other grounds and similar instructions 
continued to be given in subsequent cases. 
Equally disturbing is Prejean v. Blackburn, 570 F. Supp 985 (W.D. La, 
1983), in which the defendant ' s age was not even mentioned as a mitigating factor by 
the trial counsel. The jury was not informed of Prejean's childhood neglect, abuse or 
documented history of mental illness and brain damage. In another case involving a 17-
year-old offender in Florida, the trial judge overruled the jury's recommendation of a 
life sentence and imposed the death penalty (Case of Bernell Hegwood, Circuit Court, 
Seventeenth Judicial Court, Florida, March 1988). The sentencing order explicitly 
rejected evidence of the defendant ' s "impoverished, deprived and disturbed childhood" 
as a mitigating circumstance arguing that "[t]he mother and others who may have 
contributed to his childhood were not, however, on trial here" (Id. at 1 ). 
Prejean v. Blackburn, 570 F. Supp. 985 (W.D. La. 1983), 743 F. 2d 1091 
(5th Cir. 1984) and Trimble v. State, 300 Md. 387,478 A. 2d 1143 (Md. 1984) both 
made relatively daring attempts to decide the constitutionality issue (Streib, 1991 ). The 
Prejean court interpreted the Eighth Amendment to focus on the kind of punishment and 
not the characteristics of the offender, barring prejudice or bias. The constitutionality 
claim of Dalton Prejean ( 1 7 at the time of crime) was determined to be "without merit" 
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[Prejean v. Blackbum, 570 F. Supp. at 999 (1983)]. Dalton Prejean was executed in 
May, 1990. 
The case of Trimble involved a 17 (almost 18) -year-old who brutally 
kidnaped, raped and murdered his victim. [Trimble v. State, 300 Md. 387,478 A. 2d 
1143 (Md. 1984)). He based his appeal to the Maryland Court of Appeals on the 
constitutionality of the death penalty for crimes committed while under age eighteen. 
The Trimble analysis of collateral lower court cases observed that no court had found a 
constitutional bar to the death penalty for juveniles (Id. at 420, 4 78 A. 2d at 1160). 
Thus, the court concluded that indicators of society's evolving standards of legislature 
as one of "29 states that permit the execution of juveniles in some circumstances" 
(Id. at 421, 4 78 A. 2d at 1161 ). The Trimble court also concluded that the penological 
goals of retribution and deterrence would be served by execution of juveniles and, 
therefore, it was not excessive or disproportionate. Furthermore, it held that it would 
take a case-by-case approach to future challenges. This is, of course, consistent with the 
approach taken in the subsequent cases of Thompson v. Oklahoma, Stanford v. 
Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri. 
In Thompson v. Oklahoma ( 1988), the court addressed the question of 
whether or not the death penalty was cruel and unusual when imposed on a 15-year-old 
offender. As mentioned, in a 5-4 decision in June 1988 the court vacated Thompson's 
death sentence. Only four of the judges found that execution of a 15-year-old offender 
would be cruel and unusual in all circumstances. A fifth judge concurred in the decision 
to vacate Thompson's death sentence but did so on the narrower ground that 
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Oklahoma 's death penalty statute set no minimum age at which the death penalty could 
be imposed. Justice O'Connor found that the sentencing of a 15-year-old to death under 
this type of statute failed to meet the standard for special care and deliberation required 
in capital cases. Once again, the Court did not reach a majority decision on whether the 
constitution forbids capital punishment for all offenders under sixteen. Thompson v. 
Oklahoma is not the final decision from the Supreme Court regarding the 
constitutionality of juvenile executions (Paternoster, 1991 ). In fact, the Thompson 
ruling does not bar states from legislating in the future to introduce ages of 15 or less in 
their capital punishment statutes. Since the Thompson ruling, a trial court in Alabama 
has sentenced a 15-year-old offender to death (Clayton Flowers in February 1990) under 
a capital punishment statute which, like Oklahoma, sets no minimum age. 
The term following Thompson v. Oklahoma, the United States Supreme 
Court decided on the constitutionality of death sentences for defendants in Stanford v. 
Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri, I 09 S. Ct. 2969 (1989) (Id. at 99). In both Stanford 
v. Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri (1989), the Court held in a 5-4 decision that 
execution of offenders aged 16 and 1 7 was permissible under the Constitution. 
Justice Antonin Scalia, in a majority opinion, said that society had not 
formed a consensus that executions constitute "cruel and unusual punishment" 
[Stanford v. Kentucky, Wilkins v. Missouri ( 1989)]. Scalia also rejected evidence 
which argued that the death penalty was not a deterrent for juveniles because of their 
"less developed fear of death." In a rather ironic explanation, Scalia emphasized that 
the Court looked to U.S. conceptions of decency and not the sentencing practices of 
113 
other countries in determining what constitutes "evolving standards of decency" 
[Stanford v. Kentucky, Wilkins v. Missouri, (1989)]. Furthermore, Scalia construed the 
absence oflegislative rejection of the death penalty for 16 and 17-year-olds as evidence 
that contemporary standards of decency would fail to find these juvenile executions as 
"abhorrent" (Id. at 100). 
In a dissenting opinion, Justice William Brennan argued that the majority 
had not taken into account the reality that in addition to the 12 states which had imposed 
an age limit of 18 in their death penalty statutes, an additional 15 states (including the 
District of Columbia) did not authorize executions under any circumstances. In 
Brennan's words "[t]hus it appears that the governments in fully 27 of the states have 
concluded that no one under 18 should face the death penalty." Moreover, Justice 
Brennan stated "within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for 
juvenile crimes appears to be overwhelmingly disapproved." The execution of 
juveniles, Brennan argued, was disproportionate to the offender' s blameworthiness and 
made no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment. 
Two researchers explored the issue of proportionality analysis as a reflection 
of subjective preferences. There is an inherent contradiction in allowing states to 
engage in individualized treatment but not in proportionality analysis. As represented in 
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 106 L. Ed. 2d 256 (1989) where the 
mitigators of mental retardation and an abusive childhood were argued by the Court as 
aggravators because they suggested future dangerousness. 
The Court states: 
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"P enry 's mental retardation and history of abuse is a two-edged sword: it 
may diminish his blameworthiness for his crime even as it indicates that 
there is a possibility that he will be dangerous in the future ... " 109 S. Ct. at 
2949. 
Theoretically, one could argue that this focus on individualized consideration is good. 
Practically, one could argue this allows for an arbitrariness in the decision-making 
Process. 
C. International Standards 
The fact that the execution of juvenile offenders conflicts with 
llltemationa11y recognized legal standards should be given particular weight in the 
Court's constitutional analysis [Brief of Amicus Curiae, Amnesty International, 
.Th.mnpson v. Oklahoma, No. 86-6169 (1986)]. The guarantees under the United States 
Constitution should not provide significantly less protection than the protection afforded 
by international norms on the basic issues of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
(.kl. at 10). 
The Court has looked to various indicia of contemporary values and attitudes 
[~, 433 U.S. at 592 n. 1 O (1977)] to determine whether a particular 
Punishment once tolerated is consistent with our advancing standards of decency. The 
U.S. Supreme Court has looked to internationally recognized legal standards and the 
Practices of other nations to determine the meaning of"cruel and unusual punishment" 
llnder the Eighth Amendment. Even the ABA Juvenile Death Penalty Report 
considered international as well as legislative norms in concluding that civilized society 
should 1 · · · d b · no onger allow execut10n for cnmes conumtte Y mmors. 
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The almost total absence of incidents of juvenile executions indicates state 
pra f · 
c ice Is of sufficient consistency and universality to satisfy the criteria of customary 
norm per Draft Restatement [Chisholm v. Georgia, U.S. 419 (1793)]. There are three 
major international human rights documents which explicitly prohibit the execution of 
Persons who c ·t · · · 1 d. th In · 1 onum cnmes while under age 18 me u mg e ternat10na Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
and the American Convention on Hwnan Rights which serves to codify the established 
cu
st
omary international law norm. 20 The only way a state may prevent itself from 
becoming bound by a customary international law is to maintain: (l) explicit and 
disciplined · · d (2) · d · oppos1t10n to the coalescing norm; an persistent an consistent 
opposition since the rule's formation [Brief of Amicus Curiae, International Hwnan 
Ri 
ghts Law Group, Thompson v. Oklahoma, No. 86-6169 (1986)]. The United States 
has never affirmatively or openly opposed the formation of the customary international 
norm Prohibiting execution of juveniles and, therefore, is bound by that rule (Id. at 29). 
Article (6) (5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
Prohibits imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by those under age I 8; 
ratified by 81 nations of the world including most of the Western European countries 
and Canada and signed by another nine nations including the United States. GA. Res. 
2200A, 21 V.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. AI6316 (1966) [Brief of Amicus 
Curiae, The American Bar Association, Thompson v. Oklahoma, No. 86-6l 69 0 988)]. 
Article 4(5) of the American Convention on Hwnan Rights, with a similar stipulation, 
Was ratified by 19 American states and signed by an additional three [OAS T.S. No. 36, 
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OAS, OEEA/Ser.A/16/1969 (Id. at 11)]. The provision specifically states: 
"Capital punishment shall not be imposed upon persons who, at the time the 
crime was committed, were under 18 years of age or over 70 years of age . . 
. " (Amnesty International, 1991, p. 78). Similarly, on September 1, 1989, 
the UN Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities adopted Resolution 1989/33, urging Member states which still 
applied the death penalty to juvenile offenders to take the necessary 
legislative and administrative measures with a view to stopping forthwith 
this practice." 
The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted 1989, stipulates in 
Article 37(a): 
"No child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhumane or degrading 
treatment or punishment. Neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment 
without possibility of release shall be imposed for offenses committed by 
persons below 18 years of age ... " 
This Convention has yet to be signed or ratified by the United States. In fact, a 
compliance report released by the State Department and prepared to conform with the 
1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights simply reiterated the U.S. 
refusal to accept a prohibition against the execution of juvenile offenders. 
According to human rights information compiled by the State Department, 
the United Nations and Amnesty International, 42 out of 164 countries have abolished 
the death penalty although 19 reserve the right to invoke it for "extraordinary crimes": 
Austria, Belgium, Bhutan, Brazil, Canada, Cape Verde, Columbia, Costa Rica, 
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Federal Republic of 
Germany, Finland, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, 
Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, San Marino, Seychelles, Solomon 
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Islands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Upper Volta, Uruguay and 
Venezuela. 
Forty-one retentionist countries have statutory provisions recognizing youth 
as an exempting factor from the death sentence: 18 - Afghanistan, 18 - Albania; 
Minors - Algeria, 16 - Argentina, 18 - Australia, 18 - Bahrain, 18 - Barbados; 
Minors - Botswana, 20 - Bulgaria, 18 - Chile, 16 - Cyprus, 18 - Czechoslovakia, 
18 - Ethiopia, 16 - France, 16 - Gambia, 18 - German Democratic Republic, 
21 - Greece; Minors - Guatemala, 18 - Guyana, 20 - Hungary; Minors - India, 20 - Iraq, 
18 - Jamaica, 18 - Japan, 18; Young People - Kenya, 18 - Lebanon, 18 - Lesotho, 
18 - Libya, 18 - Madagascar, 18 - Malawi; Minors - Morocco; Young People - Nigeria, 
18 - Poland, 18 - Romania, 18 - Singapore, 18 - South Africa, 18 - Sudan, 
18 - Tanzania, 18 - U.S.S.R., 18 - United Arab Emirates, 18 - Zambia (Hartman, 1983; 
Brief of Amicus Curiae, Kentucky and Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, 
Florida, Indiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia and Wyoming, Wilkins v. Missouri, No. 87-6026, 
High v. Zant, No. 87-5666 (1987)]. 
Four "abolitionist" nations retain the death penalty for extraordinary crimes 
but exemptjuveniles: 18 - Canada, 26-Indonesia, 18 - Netherlands, 18 - New Zealand 
(Hartman, 1983). There are 65 retentionist states for which complete information 
regarding attitudes towards execution of juveniles is not readily available, according to 
the Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1982, Report 
Submitted to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and House Committee on 
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Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong. 1st Session 1 ( 1983 ). 
The execution of juvenile offenders on a worldwide basis is a rarity. As 
mentioned, the U.S. is one of only eight countries worldwide known to have executed 
juvenile offenders in the last decade (Amnesty International, 1991). The consensus of 
values is apparent in the "climate of international opinion" [Enmund v. Florida, 
458 U.S. 796 n. 22 (1982)]. 
The United States and treaty obligations and the rules of customary 
international law clearly prohibit execution of offenders under age eighteen [Brief for 
Amicus Curiae, International Human Rights Law, High v. Zant, No. 87-5666; 
Wilkins v. Missouri, No. 87-6026 (1988); Skovron, Scott and Cullen (1989)]. It is clear 
from that the imposition of death sentences on persons under 18 at the time of the crime 
constitutes a violation of customary international law. Ironically, customary 
international law is firmly embedded in "our law," and human rights are a fundamental 
aspect of international law [Hartman, 1983; Brief of Amicus Curiae, International 
Human Rights Law Group, Thompson v. Oklahoma, No. 86-6169 (1988)]. 
The data available indicate that there is almost universal adherence to 
international norms prohibiting executions of juveniles. Moreover, the Gallup polls 
reveal a national consensus as well as international consensus in opposition to executing 
juveniles. The social science research provides further support for this argument. Case 
in point, a survey of 509 adult Connecticut residents revealed that while 68 percent of 
the respondents favored the death penalty, only 31 percent supported its use on juveniles 
(Tuckel and Greenberg, 1986). Another survey of 900 Georgia residents reported that 
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only 48 c. 
percent 1avored the death penalty for persons 17 years or younger. When 600 
adult res id t f Oh. 
en s o 10 were asked if they would favor a state law allowing the 
execution of juveniles over 14 years of age convicted of murder only 31 percent 
responded · c. 
m 1avor (Skovron, Scott and Cullen, 1989). In Michigan, a survey of 400 
residents I 
revea ed 34.1 percent would favor such legislation (Scott and Edwards, 1991). 
In general, the state may punish offenders to achieve one or more of four 
objectives: 
"1. [T]o rehabilitate the offender; 2. [T]o incapacitate him from 
committing offenses in the future; 3. [T]o deter others from committing 
offenses; or 4. [T]o assuage the victim's or the community's desire for 
revenge or retribution." [Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. at 477-78 (1984); 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 183 (1976)]. 
The following will explore how the execution of minors fails to make a "measurable 
contributio " t h ffi · · · I 1 f · 1 · hm t n o t e o 1cially recogmzed penolog1ca goa s o capita pun1s en : 
retribution, general deterrence and specific deterrence. 
D. Penological Goals 
1. Retribution 
The underlying principle of retribution is based on the premise that the 
person being punished for committing a criminal act should be " ... hated, ridiculed, 
despised, scorned and receive his 'just deserts' for the wrongful act··.," explains Dr. 
Cecil Rhodes, an attorney and professor at California State University. The retribution 
PU.rpose of punishment has been criticized because it is based on a quasi-retaliatory 
concept rooted in vengeance (Id. at 11 ). 
Capital punishment fulfills its retributive purpose by providing an 
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institutional means for society to express its moral outrage at especially disturbing 
conduct and by satisfying the desire for punishment for those who engage in such 
behavior [Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 182 (1976)] . Capital punishment allegedly 
preserves the stability of society by providing an alternative to citizens taking the law 
into their own hands in an attempt to seek revenge (V anore, 1986). 
For society to seek retribution for a crime the criminal must possess a 
sufficient degree of culpability or responsibility for that criminal act. As Justice 
O'Connor noted in California v. Brown, 107 S. Ct. 837 (1987): 
"Defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a 
disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be 
less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse. This emphasis on 
culpability in sentencing decisions has long been reflected in Anglo-
American jurisprudence. As this Court observed in Eddings, the common 
law has struggled with the problem of developing a capital punishment 
system that is sensible to the uniqueness of the individual." 
As mentioned, both Lockett and Eddings reflect the belief that punishment 
should be directly related to the personal culpability of the .criminal defendant [Brief of 
Amici Curiae, National Legal Aid and Defender Association, National Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers, High v. Zant, No. 87-5666; Wilkins v. Missouri, No. 87-
6026 ( 1987)]. Thus, the sentence imposed at the penalty stage should reflect a 
reasonable moral response to the defendant's background, character and crime rather 
than mere sympathy or emotion (California v. Brown, Id. at 841). As Tison v. Arizona, 
I 09 S. Ct. at I 683 ( 1987), stated "[T]he heart of the retribution rationale is that criminal 
sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender." 
Retribution clearly requires an inquiry into a defendant's "personal responsibility and 
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moral guilt" [Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. 2533 (1987)]. 
The moral force of and thus the legal justification for taking human life in 
retribution is dependent on this degree of culpability of the offender and not just injury 
to the victim. In other words, retribution justifies an execution only if a defendant's 
culpability is of the highest degree [Thompson v. Oklahoma, Brief of the Petitioner, No. 
86-6169 ( 1987)]. "[I]n the final analysis, capital punislunent rests on not a legal but an 
ethical judgment - an assessment of what is called in Enmund the 'moral guilt' of the 
defendant" [Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. at 481 (citing Enmund, 458 U.S. at 800-801); 
Tison v. Arizona, 55 U.S.L.W. at 4499-50]. Due to our societal attitudes and well-
established legal presumptions regarding the status of minority, a minor cannot be held 
to the same degree of culpability and accountability as an adult. 
Although execution of an adult for retributive purposes is considered 
constitutional, this rationale appears to lose some legitimacy once juveniles become the 
object. As demonstrated, juveniles do not "deserve" the harshest punislunents in the 
same manner as mature, responsible adults [Thompson v. Oklahoma, Brief of Petitioner, 
No. 86-6169 at 17 (1987)]. Those who kill are not held personally responsible unless 
they are determined to have the capacity to function as moral beings. Only those 
persons who are able to act out of a fully developed moral awareness and who choose to 
act contrary are judged "deserving" of the full measure of punislunent allowed by law 
(Enmund, 458 U.S. at 800-01). 
The Supreme Court's analysis of the retributive foundations of capital 
punishment incorporates two models of retribution: an "institutional revenge model" 
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and a "just deserts model" [Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 183-84 (1976)]. The former 
ensures that citizens do not seek personal revenge. Ironically, the evidence seems to 
indicate there is more outrage when a minor is subjected to such penalties. Bedau 
( 1971) reported, that the youngest age group ( 15-19) had a significantly higher rate of 
commutations when compared to older age groups. In fact, only three people in the 
youngest age group were executed and four had their sentences commuted. By contrast, 
the next age group (20-24) had 34 executions with only two commutations. This 
research as well as other data seem to reflect a public outcry against juvenile executions. 
2. Institutional Revenge Model 
The evidence indicates it is unlikely members of society will seek personal 
vengeance if minors do not receive the death penalty for their crimes. Since minors are 
less responsible than adults for their crimes there should be less moral outrage toward a 
juvenile offense/offender which is reflected in the commutations as well as the trend of 
the Supreme Court and legislators to draw progressively older and older age limits for 
execution (Hertz and Weisberg, 1981 ). Even if there is moral outrage, the transfer to 
adult court and stiffer penalties should appease it. In other words, the fact that such 
juveniles are tried in criminal courts and eligible for life imprisonment provides an 
outlet for some societal vengeance. 
The notion that the purpose of retribution is to obviate personal revenge 
takes two forms: social contract notions or deterrence notions [Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U.S. at 183 (1976)]. Under the deterrence notion, "governmental revenge is 
necessary to deter those who commit private acts of violence in the name of revenge" 
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(Id. at 183). In both forms , the implicit idea is that the social costs of systematic 
revenge will be less than the social costs of random private revenge ( Greenwald, 1983 ). 
Many researchers have since argued that such utilitarian notions of retribution can never 
justify punishment because they fail to take the offender's culpability into account. 
A similar argument concerning the notion of retribution is rooted in the 
belief that criminals owe a debt to the community. This "debt" approach has critics who 
argue this notion of law abiders restraining themselves based on reliance of others doing 
likewise makes more sense for traffic offenders than for murderers or rapists. A variant 
of this "debt" view ofretribution assumes that some extent of the criminal's personal 
interests are forfeited to the community as payment for the personal interests of which 
he/she deprived the victim (Greenwald, 1983). Others submit that it is unfair for the 
criminal to "pay" the entire community when harm has been done to the individual 
victim. 
3. Just Deserts Model 
This model of retribution holds even less justification for executing minors. 
As pertains to adults, the Supreme Court held this type of retribution as not being a 
"forbidden objective" of punishment [Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 183-83 (1976)]. 
An entirely different conclusion is reached for minors using the following justifications: 
protection of society, deterrence, and inability of juvenile justice system to rehabilitate 
the offender with available resources. When minors are waived to adult court it may 
mean the facilities of the juvenile justice system are inadequate and unable to effectively 
handle their delinquent or dangerous tendencies (Browne, 1977). Therefore, it is clear 
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the criminal justice system is not justified in punishing those minors for retributive 
reasons when they are not always placed in the system for such reasons. 
One of the reasons for waiver of certain juvenile offenders is to subject the 
offenders to harsher ptmishments than they would receive in the juvenile justice system 
Greenwald, 1983). Once minors are in the adult system, however, every effort is made 
to ensure that they do not receive their "just deserts" [Santana v. Collazo, 114 F. 2d 
11 72 (1st Cir. 1983) J. The National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention found that many states allow for juveniles sentenced by criminal courts to be 
placed in juvenile facilities. A few states, Kentucky and Delaware, bar placement of 
minors in adult prisons. 
Numerous legislators have enacted programs for minors sentenced by 
criminal courts with the sole purpose of rehabilitation. Case in point, the 1976 Federal 
Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 obligated federal judges to consider the 
"special rehabilitative sentencing alternatives" created prior to sentencing any person 
between 16 and 22 years of age (Greenwald, 1983). This Act was expressly "designed 
to provide a better method for treating young offenders convicted in federal courts in 
that vulnerable age bracket, to rehabilitate them and to restore them to normal behavior 
patterns" [Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 432-33 (1974)]. Similarly, there 
have been several incidents of a reduction in sentence at the appellate level on the 
grounds that the retributive punishment imposed failed to reflect the young defendant ' s 
potential for rehabilitation (Ahvik v. State, 613 P. 2d 1252 (Alaska, 1980)]. 
Even if one accepts that one of the purposes of judicial and legislative waiver 
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is for juveniles to get their ''just deserts," capital punishment for minors can never make 
a "measurable contribution" to this goal (Greenwald, 1983). Such a model of 
retribution is based on desert and, therefore, the proportionality of the punishment is, 
contingent on the culpability (blameworthiness) of the offender and offense. As the 
Supreme Court stated in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800 (1982), "retribution as a 
justification for [the death penalty] ... very much depends upon the degree of [the 
defendant's] culpability." Tison v. Arizona, 55 U.S.L.W. 4496, 4501 (U.S., April 27, 
1987), observed that "the critical facet of the individualized determination of culpability 
required in capital cases is the mental state with which the defendant commits the 
crime." The ultimate sanction of death is reserved for those who engage in acts of 
" intentional wrongdoing" (Enmund, supra, p. 800) and "purposeful ... criminal 
conduct" (Tison, supra, p. 4501 ); those individuals who intentionally kill or who 
"knowingly engag[ e] in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death" (Id. at 
4502). 
Throughout the history of Anglo-American criminal law, less mentally 
competent persons (i.e., the mentally ill, the retarded and the young) have not been 
perceived as deserving the full force of criminal punishment [Ford v. Wainright, 
106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986); Pastroff, 1986]. Minors lack the independent ability to know 
the moral implications of their behavior and, therefore, cannot form the "highly culpable 
mental state[s]" that warrant the retributive imposition of the death penalty (Id. at 4502). 
The execution of a minor would in no way satisfy society's need for 
retribution (Wilson, 1983). As demonstrated, minors do not have the same capacity as 
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adults to function as moral beings, able to evaluate their behavior in light of socially 
accepted values [Brief of Amici Curiae, Child Welfare League of America, National 
Council on Crime and Delinquency, Children's Defense Fund, National Association of 
Social Workers, National Black Child Development Institute, National Network of 
Runaway and Youth Services National Youth Advocate Program and American Youth 
' 
Work Center, Thompson v. Oklahoma, No. 86-6169 (1986)]. They do not yet know the 
standards for appropriate behavior within the society in which they live and cannot 
evaluate the appropriateness of their own behavior. Instead, the majority of minors are 
profoundly dependent on their parents and their family (or surrogate family) to define 
the appropriate boundaries for them (Id. at 15). Families which often do a sadly 
substandard job. 
Children are, for the most part, barely more than what they will become as 
adults [Brief of Amici Curiae, Child Welfare League of America, National Parents and 
Teachers Association, National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Children's Defense 
Fund, National Association of Social Workers, National Black Child Development 
Institute, National Network of Runaway and Youth Services, National Youth Advocate 
Program, American Youth Work Center, High v. Zant, No. 87-5666; Wilkins v. 
Missouri, No. 87-6026 (1988)]. Their potential to develop into morally responsible 
productive adults is unlimited (Id. at 14 ). In fact, "the spectacle of our society seeking 
legal vengeance through the execution of children" is horrifying (American Bar 
Association, 1998). 
As is argued in Thompson and the multitude of supporting evidence, 
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adolescents are not yet fully operational moral beings in spite of the fact that the 
capacity to form moral standards to guide behavior allegedly emerges in adolescence. 
Kohlberg explains, "[L]arge groups of moral concepts and ways of thought only attain 
meaning at successively advanced ages and require the extensive background of social 
experience and cognitive growth represented by the age factor" (Kohlberg, 1963). 
E. Deterrence 
1. General Deterrence 
One of the most complex and hotly debated issues is whether capital 
punishment is more effective than life imprisonment as a deterrent to crime (American 
Bar Association, Report to the House of Delegates, 1983). A critical issue is whether 
adolescent's perception of death acts as a more significant deterrent than life 
imprisonment. Once again, less is known about death as a deterrent for adolescents than 
about death as a deterrent for adults. The meager research on the issue leads to the 
conclusion that threatening a child with death does not have the same impact as 
threatening an adult. 21 Even if one were to assume there exists for adults a significant 
deterrent effect of the death penalty; this deterrent effect appears to lose its power once 
it is translated into the adolescent's world. 
Deterrence is defined as the restraining influence that the threat of 
punishment has on potential offenders (Andenaes, 1966). Traditionally, a distinction 
has been made between what is normally termed general deterrence or prevention and 
specific, special or individual deterrence (Chappel, Geis and Hardt, 1972). "[By] 
general prevention we mean the ability of criminal law and its enforcement to make 
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citizens law b .d. 
-a 1 mg. If general prevention were 100 percent effective, there would be 
no crime at 11" 
a (Andenaes, 1952, p. 179). 
The degree to which a penalty actually achieves deterrent objectives depends 
on two factors: ( 1) There must be a probability that an individual would commit a 
Particular er. "f . 
ime 1 that cnme were not punished in a prescribed manner; and (2) The 
certainty of . hm 
pums ent must be sufficiently communicated to the potential offender 
(Wilson 1983) 
' · The Supreme Court has admitted proof of the death penalty's deterrent 
effect is inc 1 . 
one us1ve [Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 183 (1976)]. 
Even proponents of deterrence have found that an individual must have the 
JnteI1ectua1 . . 
capacity to understand the threat of punishment and the control mechanisms 
~~nfu . 
rm to that understanding for a deterrent effect. (Andenaes, 1966). Mmors 
appear to la k d In · d" 
c any meaningful concept of death or the threat of death (Haas an ciar 1, 
1988). 
The prospect of death is so often a vague and distant notion to adolescents that 
they are d d · k un eterred by the existence of a death penalty. The defiant attitudes an ns -
taking b h . fi b t 
e avior of adolescents are related to their developmental state of de iance a ou 
dang 
er and death. In fact, they often seem attracted to behavior which could result in 
their death. 
Adolescents are infamous for their involvement in dangerous driving, 
ingestion f d &. th t for an 0 rugs, suicide attempts and so on. They Jive ior e momen , 
,,. 
Jntens h · f 
e present," with little thought of the future consequences oft eir ac ions. 
Eve1Ything important or valuable lie either. in the immediate life situation or close 
future. Ad 1 . d fi f danger and death is 0 escents are m a developmental stage when e iance 0 
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often not controlled by a sense of m011ality. They have little fear of death because they 
have a "profound conviction of their own omnipotence and immortality" [Brief of 
Amici Curiae, American Society for Adolescent Psychiatry and American 
Orthopsychiatric Association, Thompson v. Oklahoma, No. 86-6169 (1987)]. It seems 
clear that teenagers would be much more deterred by the threat of long-term 
imprisonment (resulting in no girlfriends, no parties, etc.) than by their fantasized 
romantic perception of death (Id. at 250). 
Gibbs ( 1975) found that the certainty of receiving a particular punishment is 
critical to its preventive effect. It is uncertain that even an adult will receive a death 
sentence. In fact, the Supreme Com1 held that mandatory death penalty statutes which 
provide that the death penalty must be imposed on all offenders convicted of certain 
crimes is unconstitutional [Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 330 (1976); Woodson v. 
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293, 304 (1976)]. The certainty of a juvenile receiving 
the death penalty is less than 0.5 percent chance (Streib, 1998). That is, of 
approximately 300 total death sentences imposed each year, juveniles receive only five 
of them (Id. at 4). 
Judicial discretion 22 is a keystone in the treatment of minors in the juvenile 
and adult system. The "insidious frailty" of most statutes in which juvenile judges 
decide to retain jurisdiction or waive to criminal court is reflective of the pervasive lack 
of legislative standards dealing with juvenile offenders (Browne, 1977). Each state has 
transfer criteria exclusive of age and instant offense that stipulate such factors as 
amenability to treatment, dangerousness and appropriateness for criminal court 
130 
processing (Rudman, Hartstone, Fagan and Moore, 1986). Ironically, legal scholars 
have argued th t . d' . 1 . . 
a JU 1cia waiver has contributed to the eros10n of deterrence due to the 
lack of rt · . 
ce amty m such a discretionary certification system. 
Regardless of the evidence, the deterrence doctrine assumes that punishment 
can be an effective means of control (Bridges and Stone, 1986). The theory asserts that 
Punishment assists in deterring criminal recidivism by heightening the perceived threat 
of Punishment. As such, the more certain and severe the experience of punishment, the 
higher the perceived threat which is supposed to then reduce criminal activity (Parker 
and Grasnick, 1979). This is not reflective of the reality which exists. 
The issue of perceptual deterrence has been extensively researched and 
em·· 
Pincally tested by experts in the field such as Dr. Raymond Paternoster, professor of 
criminology at University of Maryland. Paternoster, Saltzman, Waldo and Chircos 
0 9S3), explain in one study that perceptions can be influenced not only by one's own 
experience in criminal behavior ( or experience with "formal sanctions") but may also be 
affected vicariously through other's experience. Paternoster and Iovanni (1986) found 
evidence in support of the allegation that "peer behavior, moral beliefs, and social 
disapproval [ are J more strongly related to criminal behavior than fear of formal 
sanctions" (p. 769). This is similarly supported by Tittle (1980), Meier and Johnson 
0 977), and Meier, Burkett and Hickman (1984 ). 
Researchers found that actual levels of certainty of arrest influence 
involvement in illegal behavior after a minimum threshold effect has been reached 
(Green, 1989). In a cross-sectional deterrence study, Grasmick and Bryjak 0 980) 
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found that per t · 
cep 10ns of both certainty and severity of sanctions must be "high" in 
order for . 
perceived threats of legal punishment to have a deterrent effect. Professor 
Donald Gree (1989 . 
n ) explams that, " . .. an interaction effect between perceptions of 
certainty a d . 
n seventy must exist before threat of sanction affects behavior" (p. 800). 
Green suggests future studies should focus on select offenses for which the 
threat of le 1 . 
ga pumshment has reached a minimum "threshold" effect in order to assess 
the import . . . 
ance of both perceptions of certainty and seventy of legal pun1shlnent. One 
Interesting d 
eparture from earlier panel deterrence studies is the lack of support in 
Green's w kc. . 
or ior the so-called experiential effect between perceptions and behav10r. 
The fmdings from Paternoster's work primarily support a conclusion that 
earlier per . 
ceptuaJ research provides us with inconclusive evidence of actual deterrent 
effects Th . . 
· at Is, he notes that regardless of extensive research efforts which conclude 
that indi . d . . . . 
vi uaJs who view the threat of punishment for crime as high typically commit 
few offenses th 1· c. · · · Th 1 t·onshi"p wh1'ch e rea ity iatls to support such a propositwn. e re a i 
actually . . . . I.-
exists between "peoples estimates of the certamty and seventy ofpumsrnuent 
anct th · . 
eir behav10r" is probably insignificant. The Supreme Court agrees with this 
argl!ment [.Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 183 (1976)]. 
Importantly, Paternoster ( 1989) and others have pointed out the assumption 
of ration 1· . Th. t· I rly a tty which exists within the concept of deterrence. 1s assump IOn c ea 
does not reflect the adolescent state of mind. As noted in Thompson, "the likelihood 
that the teenage offender has made the kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any 
Weight t th JI · t nt " With 0 e possibility of execution is so remote as to be virtua Y nonexis e · 
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all of these issues considered, it is unlikely that capital punishment for minors would be 
justified w1der the general deterrence doctrine. 
2. Specific Deterrence 
Under specific deterrence, the purpose of capital punishment is to protect 
society from the threat of future crimes by the particular capital offender. In Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 183 ( 1976), the Supreme Court noted that specific deterrence may be 
one of the purposes of capital punishment (Id. at 183 n. 28). The Court, however, did 
not rely solely on this justification in finding that the death penalty served acceptable 
goals of punishment. Some have argued incarceration is equally effective in preventing 
future crime by criminals. 
Even if capital punishment makes some necessary contribution to the goal of 
specific deterrence in regard to adult offenders, it is completely unnecessary in order to 
prevent juvenile offenders from engaging in future criminal conduct. The simple fact 
that a minor is found to be "dangerous" or incapable of being rehabilitated by the 
resources available in the juvenile justice system does not mean that he will not reform 
as he grows older. As has been noted "It is impossible to make a judgment that a 
14-year-old, no matter how bad, will remain incorrigible for the rest of his life" 
[Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W. 2d 374,378 (Ky. 1968)]. 
Most juvenile crime (including violent crime) abates with age. Wolfgang, 
Figlio and Sellin ( 1972) note that juveniles who repeat violent crimes tend to persist in 
criminal activity in their twenties until gradual reduction results in cessation. In fact, the 
possibility of significant character and behavioral changes in young adults aged 18 to 25 
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is a recognized phenomenon and the evidence shows that juvenile murderers are low-
rate recidivists. 
In fact, juveniles convicted of murder and incarcerated are considered model 
prisoners and rarely commit further crimes after incarceration As adolescents mature 
into adults they mature out of criminality. The statistics reveal that as minors move 
from the turbulence of adolescence to a calmer period of early twenties they commit 
fewer crimes regardless of whether or not they are apprehended or participated in an 
extensive rehabilitation program [Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention, 1982; Thompson v. Oklahoma, Brief of Petitioner, No. 86-6169 (1986)]. 
The goal of incapacitation or specific deterrence does not justify capital 
punishment of juvenile offenders. Unlike deterrence and retribution, "[I]ncapacitation 
has never been embraced as a sufficient justification for the death penalty" [Spaziano v. 
Florida, 468 U.S. at 461 (1984)]. 
In conclusion, one of the chief justifications for the death penalty has been its 
alleged unique power to deter crime. The deterrence theory postulates that offenders 
weigh the consequences of crime and act according to the relative certainty of 
punishment. Experts have found no credible evidence exists to support the contention 
that the death penalty is an effective deterrent among either adult or juvenile offenders. 
As Paternoster and others have noted, the necessity of recognizing rationality 
as an underlying premise in the deterrence theory provides additional support for the 
argument against use of the death penalty on juveniles. Social scientists almost 
universally reject the concept of free will and rational calculation as the major 
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motivating factors behind juvenile crime and delinquency. 
The empirical evidence suggests that deterrence can be achieved only when 
potential offenders know the commission of a particular crime will result in a particular 
punishment (Bedau, 1977). The death penalty is so infrequently imposed on minors 
that capital punishment fails to have a deterrent effect on juveniles. A deterrent that does 
not deter juveniles should not be applied against them as it furthers no constitutionally 
valid societal interest and would be "nothing more than the purposeless and needless 
imposition of pain and suffering" [Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 592 (1976)]. As stated 
in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554-555 (1966), " ... reformers generally 
rejected deterrence and retribution as adequate notions to justify criminal sanctions ... 
Children were considered educable and reformable." 
Youths are particularly impressionable and, therefore, crimes may not be 
exclusively their fault but symptomatic of the conglomerate failure of family, school and 
the social system (Id. at 1539). Juveniles deserve leniency due to their early stage of 
development as well as amenability to rehabilitation. 
F. Rehabilitation 
The death penalty totally rejects the one sentencing goal considered most 
appropriate for young offenders - rehabilitation [People v. Hiermel, 49 A.D. 2d 769, 
770,372 NYS 2d 730, 731 (1975); Thompson v. Oklahoma, No. 86-6169 (1988)]. The 
U.S. Supreme Court recognized in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), and again in 
Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986), the determination of the suitability of the 
use of the ultimate death penalty inevitably involves a "predict[ion] ... [of the] 
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convicted person ' s probable future conduct" [Brief of Amici Curiae, Child Welfare 
League of America, National Parents and Teachers Association, National Council on 
Crime and Delinquency, Children' s Defense Fund, National Association of Social 
Workers, National Black Child Development Institute, National Network of Runaway 
and Youth Services, National Youth Advocate Program and American Youth Work 
Center, High v. Zant, No. 87-5666 (1988); Wilkins v. Missouri, No. 87-6026 (1 988)]. 
There is substantial evidence in the social scientific literature that even the 
most violent adolescents are capable of dramatic change and rehabilitation (Goldstein, 
Freud, Solnit, 1973; Braithwaite and Shore, 1981). A two-year follow-up study entitled 
" Offender Based Institutional Tracking System" (1987) found that 76.7 percent of 
homicide offenders paroled from the California Youth Authority (CYA) successfully 
completed their period of parole versus those CY A parolees convicted of non-homicide 
offenses which had a success rate of only 41.9 percent (Wenk, Robinson and Smith, 
1972). The Capital Offender Program in Giddings, Texas, has been quite successful 
with as few as 1 7 percent of offenders recidivating versus 50 to 60 percent in other 
programs (Capital Offender Program, personal communication, October 12, 1997). 
It appears that the more risk factors present, the greater the probability that 
the child will develop violent behavior patterns. As such, early programs that decrease 
the number of risk factors have the potential to reduce later violent crime. Long-tenn 
follow-up studies on programs providing a variety of services including housing and 
food, prenatal and child care, preschool education, and parent training have been 
completed. The outcome demonstrates that children in such programs later engaged in 
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less aggressive, acting-out behavior. Dr. Edward Zigler described the High Scope 
Foundations preschool project in Michigan which provided an intensive, high-quality 
preschool which children attended for two years. The follow-up data on the preschool 
graduates of up to 27 years have been very positive (Id. At 1). In fact, less than 60 
percent were arrested one to four times and only 12 percent were arrested more than 
four times. These outcomes were by far better than the control groups (Id. at 3). During 
the early developmental years, programs such as Head Start preschool and early tutoring 
for the purpose of reducing the risk of school failure are critical as school failure is a 
well known precursor to violent behavior. 
Clearly, rehabilitation via resocialization is less ideal than initial efforts of 
positive developmental socialization. As Magid and McKelvey ( 1987) state, "The time 
to teach obedience is in the playpen and not the state pen" (p. 27). 
Special treatment of juvenile offenders is a reflection of the belief that the 
young must have time and opportunity to escape from the disadvantages, deprivations 
and abuse that may be responsible for their behavior California v. Brown, 107 S. Ct. 
83 7, 841 ( 1987) . This special treatment, including the availability of rehabilitation 
programs, derives from a prevalent, compassionate and decent sense that government 
must be restrained from adding additional undue punishment to the existing pain and 
handicaps attributed to fate and circumstance (supra, p. 24 ). This restraint, of course, 
parallels the "belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts 
that are attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental 
problems, may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse" 
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[California v. Brown, 107 S. Ct. 837, 841 (1987); cf. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. at 
115 n. 11 (1982)]. 
Rehabilitation constitutes an essential function of "punishment" in juvenile 
cases. Fryear v. Commonwealth, 507 S.W. 2d 144 (Ky. 1974) stated: 
"Juvenile offenders have historically been within the exceptions to the 
regular mode of procedure in dealing with criminal offenders. This came 
about as a result of society's desire to rehabilitate rather than punish. 
Juveniles were looked upon as being essentially good not evil." 
The Illinois Constitution even mandates that "[a] proper objective in determining the 
extent and nature of a criminal penalty is the restoration of the offender to useful 
citizenship" [Ill. Const. 1970 art. I§§ II, cited in People v. Horton, 356 N.E. 2d 1044, 
1049 (Ill. 1976)]. It is clear that Illinois maintains a commitment, especially in juvenile 
cases, to emphasize rehabilitation as a penal function even though Illinois no longer 
imposes the death penalty upon juveniles [Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38 s 9-l(b) (1979)]. The 
U.S. Supreme Court stated in Dorszynski v. U.S., 418 U.S. 424 (1974), that the Federal 
Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 5005 et. seq (West, 1950) "was ... designed to 
provide a better method for treating young offenders convicted in federal courts in the 
vulnerable age bracket ( 16-22) to rehabilitate them and restore normal behavior 
patterns" [H.R. Rept. No. 2979, 81st Cong. 2d SESS, 2-3 (1950) cited in Dorszynski v. 
!,LS., 418 U.S. at 433]. 
As can be observed throughout history, "children have a very special place in 
life which the law should reflect" (May v. Anderson, 1953). In cases which present 
crucial questions involving minors one cannot ignore the significance of the status of 
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minority. It has been proven that minors are in the early stages of their emotional 
growth; their intellectual development is incomplete; they have only limited practical 
experience d h · 
, an t eu value systems are not yet clearly identified and firmly adopted 
(~, 1984; Waybum v. Schupf, 1976). Unlike adults, minors are always in 
some form of custody and subject to the control of their parents or the state upon whom 
the resp 'b'l· ons1 1 1ty of making decisions rests. 
While adults may have widely varying degrees of potential for rehabilitation, 
th
e class of children/adolescents share a common trait of their potential for 
rehabTt · 1 1 ation. Execution abandons and denies the promise of adolescence: that the 
impulsive, antisocial acts of teenagers will naturally moderate as they become adults. 
Rilling ch 'ld · · 1 · f 1 ren and adolescents for theu cnmes offends the fundamenta premise o 
Juvenile justice. Dr. Victor Streib (1987) explains, "Capital punishment of our children 
inherently rejects humanity 's future which rests with the habilitation and rehabilitation 
of today's youth." The special place in society occupied by minors should not include 
death row (Vanore, 1986). 
G. Prediction 
In Thompson v. Oklahoma, No. 86-6169 (1987), the state relied on evidence 
of his reputation in the community, his arrest record, his failure in one juvenile 
rehabilitation program, and the opinion of Dr. Helen Klein, a clinical psychologist, to 
demonstrate that Thompson would likely commit more violent acts. After summarizing 
tbe boy's arrest record Klein characterized him as "physically aggressive" and "a bully, 
' 
an antisocial person" [Tr. 783-84]. She expressed her view that the boy "will· · · 
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become a hardened criminal" and "will become more violent" if he goes to prison [Tr. 
783-84] . The petitioner notes that a different description of Thompson evolved from 
Dr. Klein's psychological report which was used by the District Court during 
certification proceedings [JA 6,7]. 23 The trial judge attached it to his sentencing report 
[R. 487-91]. Dr. Klein explained: 
"During the initial stage of the interview, he attempted to portray himself as 
macho, tough and cavalier. This facade tended to dissipate as his anxiety 
abated. 
********** 
Individuals who obtain MMPI (Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory) profiles similar to Wayne's typically are described as hyperactive, 
restless and indecisive, and as persons who may keep people at a distance 
( emotional alienation) and show poor social judgment. A profile such as that 
obtained by Wayne must be interpreted with caution as it suggests the 
possible effect of a response set which may have led to exaggeration or 
distortion of his current status. Such a profile reveals the possible presence 
of a desire to appear independent of social ties and to "fake bad," i.e., to 
exaggerate symptomatology. 
Rorschach test data support the MMPI data in that test results are 
indicative of a person whose entire focus is external. He is excitable, hostile, 
and is responsive to the external world to the extent he cannot organize his 
inner experience. He has a stereotypical, concrete view of the world and 
demonstrates little ability to organize or to conceptualize his experience 
beyond that. Wayne does not have enough ego to handle or to control his 
impulses and therefore tends to act them out" [R. 487-91]. 
Although the form and level of an individual's aggression varies considerably, it has 
been argued that an individual 's relative level of aggression among age-mates 
demonstrates continuity and predictability over time. 24 By contrast, the "maturing-out" 
of many antisocial behaviors is common knowledge. There appear to be a number of 
factors which contribute to keeping a pattern of violence consistent. These factors are 
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alterable at th 
e early stages of child development. The identification of protective 
factors in ch· 1d . . 1 ren at high nsk for violent behavior can cushion the impact of 
constitutional 1n b" .. 
vu era 1hties, poverty, family distress and the occurrence of deviant 
behavior. 
Prediction of future conduct in the very best of circumstances is an inexact 
science th . . 
' e uncertamties of which trigger moral questions. When one establishes the 
expected rates at which a given event occurs, this is known as the base expectancy rate 
(.Monahan, 1992). Base expectancy rates reflect the current level of violent behavior by 
ap . 
articular group. Only by comparing the base expectancy rate of violence for 
individual . h ' . . 
s wit m relevant groups can the decision be made about the use of explicit 
Predictions (Id . . . . . . 
-· at 5). There 1s a vast array of d1scret10nary dec1s10ns made which are 
based on . 1· . 
imp 1c1t assessments of future violence by violent offenders. The two 
Principal m th d · d ' · 'th e O s for anticipating behavior are clinical and actuanal pre 1ct10n w1 a 
definite c: 
Preierence for use of the actuarial (Monahan, 1992). For juveniles, such 
Illethods are unreliable. 
Some of the predictive statistics related to familial factors have already been 
discussed. 1· 
First, Drs. Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck (1970) developed a de mquency 
Prediction scale which is based on five social factors: 1) affection of the father for the 
Child 2) d' · · · 
' iscipline by the father, 3) affection of the mother for the child, 4) superviswn 
and disci 1· · h s:. ·1 S e of their P me by the mother, and 5) overaII cohesiveness mt e 1am1 Y· om 
research · t d th 
mcluded traits of juvenile temperament and character. As expec e , e 
Giuecks fo d . . fr homes of little un delmquents far more than nondelmquents come om 
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affection, stability, moral fiber or understanding of parent-child responsibilities. They 
found that delinquents temperamentally tended to be more restless, impulsive, 
aggressive and self-destructive; 25 in attitude, more defiant, hostile, resentful and 
nonsubmissive to authority. Characteristics which enable some degree of predictability. 
Consistent with the Gluecks' theory regarding the predictive risk factors, the 
American Psychological Association (1993) identified factors contributing to the child' s 
risk profile. These factors include: biological factors, childbearing conditions, 
ineffective parenting, emotional and cognitive development, gender differences, sex role 
socialization, relations to peers, cultural milieu, social factors (economic inequality, lack 
of opportunity, media influences) (Id. at 17). 
Such youth tend to have experienced weak bonding to caretakers in infancy 
and ineffective parenting techniques including but not limited to lack of supervision, 
inconsistent discipline, highly punitive/abusive treatment and failing to reinforce 
positive, prosocial behavior (supra, p. 21 ). These developmental deficits lead to poor 
peer relations and high levels of aggressiveness (Id. at 21 ). Of equal importance, such 
youth have learned attitudes accepting aggressive behavior as normative and as an 
effective way to solve interpersonal problems (Id. at 21 ). They frequently do poorly in 
school. 
Drs. Huizinga, Loeber and Thornberry (Denver Youth Survey, Pittsburgh 
Youth Survey and Rochester Youth Development Study, respectively, in press) are 
examining delinquency as part of a broader context of nonconforming behavior, 
including drug use and school failure, to establish whether a single path or multiple 
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paths exist toward different serious delinquent and antisocial outcomes. From these 
three prospective studies 26 under the title Program of Research on the Causes and 
Correlates of Delinquency, data collected for five years will permit the interpretation of 
the causal sequencing of key events in childhood and adolescence (Office of Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice, Program Summary, 
undated). The goal of this research is to benefit from the experiences of high risk 
juveniles who are able to overcome the odds and allow for identification of pathways 
that might prevent other high risk youth from entering delinquent careers (Id. at l ). 
The past research indicates that many variables correlate with delinquency 
and many factors tend to increase the risk of later delinquent behavior. Many such risk 
factors which have been discussed include: "birth trauma, child abuse and neglect, 
ineffective parental discipline, family disruptions, conduct disorder in children, school 
failure, learning disabilities, negative peer influences, limited employment 
opportunities, inadequate housing and residence in a high crime area" (OJJDP, U.S. 
Department of Justice, Program Summary, p. 1). It is important to note that neither 
correlates nor risk factors are synonymous with causal factors. 27 
Current ability to predict long-term violent behavior is no better than one 
accurate prediction out of every three (Monahan, 1992). Many argue this one-in-three 
accuracy rate is most likely the best social scientists will achieve. However, predictions 
may be improved by focusing on situational and environmental factors, random 
elements in behavior and other factors which address the places and people with whom 
the targeted individuals interact (Id. at 7). 
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The importance of improving accuracy of predictions of violence is in part 
based on th S . 
e upreme Court ruimg in a 1983 death penalty case that estimations of a 
person's future d 
angerousness does not violate constitutional guarantees. At the same 
time 1· · 
' imits on current ability to predict are widely recognized in the legal and 
psychiatric professions as stipulated in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983). 
Society must determine the point at which data become adequate as a 
guidepost "- d . . 10r ec1s10n-making. Although some argue that basing decisions on 
Predictions of dan · J · · h 1· d" th gerousness 1s a ways mappropnate, t e po icy regar mg e 
appropriateness of using predictions relies on a risk-benefit analysis. Specifically, 
Weighing the level of risk and harm expected against the intrusions on individual liberty. 
In a legal system founded on notions of justice and mercy and faced with limited 
resources p d · · · ·fy · I f , re 1ct10ns of "nondangerousness" may JUStl except10na uses o 
Pred· · 
Ichons to lessen sentences. 
Regardless of the accuracy of predictions of future violence, it remains the 
Primary . · d d Purpose of punishment today. The principles of retributwn an eterrence are 
the primary purposes for punishment defended politically, socially and judicially for and 
in support of capital punishment. When considering juveniles such legal and moral 
issues tak · · · · th · t ·ve work with e on particular significance. The am1c1 curiae m eir ex ens1 
adolescents and children concur that children have "boundless capability for change" 
since the personality that the individual will have as an adult is still in the process of 
being formed. 
It is precisely this malleability and ability to develop very different 
144 
personalities and values as they mature with experience and perspective which makes it 
impossible to conclude definitively that a particular youth must be executed in order to 
incapacitate him or her from committing future crimes. Children and adolescents 
deserve understanding and treatment instead ofrevenge by an outraged society. 
H. Recidivism 
Risk assessment, in spite of its many problems, is becoming increasingly 
important in the decision-making process. Recidivism has been the traditional measure 
for assessing the effectiveness of rehabilitation efforts. As an outcome measure, 
however, recidivism is unreliable. Although a reduction in criminal activity is a 
fundamental consequence of a successful program of offender rehabilitation, alternative 
ways of assessing the effectiveness of rehabilitation programs are needed. The 
treatment paradigm itself has operated on the premise that an offender's progress is a 
good indicator of whether an inmate is able to function in society. Recidivism data 
differ depending on how terms are operationalized (in particular, the concept violent 
predator). Experts argue that some samples of violent youth were no more "violent" 
than those included in other studies such as in high risk probation studies. Undeniably, 
violent youthful predators exist, the small population on death row are a testament to 
such a reality. 
Society has recognized the qualitative difference between juveniles and 
adults (Rudman, Hartstone, Fagan and Moore, 1986). The difference is reflected in an 
endless array of laws which restrict the rights and conduct of juveniles. The underlying 
premise of those laws is that juveniles lack the maturity, social and emotional 
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development as well as cognitive skills to assume the same responsibilities of 
adulthood. "Children, by definition, are not assumed to have the capacity to take care of 
themselves" [Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253,265 (1984)] . The dominant tradition of 
American law provides that people are not fully responsible until 18 years of age. This 
is the most common age of majority established in American law for noncriminal 
purposes [Streib, 1983; Brief of Amicus Curiae, Office of State Appellate Defender of 
Illinois, Thompson v. Oklahoma, No. 86-6169 (1986)]. 
Consistent with society's regulation and supervision of juveniles, the 
"evolving standards of decency" prohibits the imposition of capital punishment on a 
person under 18 years of age during the commission of a crime. Due process compels 
the state to provide the treatment to which a juvenile offender is amenable, regardless of 
the adequacy of treatment programs available in that particular state's juvenile justice 
system. 
The underlying belief is that responsibility for juvenile crime must be shared 
by social and educational systems as well as the adolescent's home and family. Peer 
pressure and chaotic dysfunctional family environment subject adolescents to significant 
psychological and emotional stress and they respond by acting impulsively and without 
the mature judgment expected of adults. A disproportionate number of violent 
youngsters grow up in families that experience adversities such as marital conflict, 
parental illness, poverty and low socioeconomic status 28 (Loeber and Stouthamer-
Loeber, 1986). It has been demonstrated repeatedly that these indicators of family 
disruption or inadequacy are correlated with delinquent behavior. 
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The emotional and psychological immaturity of adolescents preclude them 
from fully understanding the nature of their actions and appreciating their consequences. 
Adolescence is a stage of life symbolized by an invincible sense of self and absence of 
fear (Kastenbaum and Aisenberg, l 972). Death provides not only a remote possibility 
but a macabre challenge. 
The perception of execution is contingent on many extraneous variables 
which appears to have little deterrent effect. Upon examination of the goals of 
retribution and deterrence in light of the lessened moral culpability of juveniles as a 
class, the Eighth Amendment proscribes execution of persons under the age of 18 at the 
time of crime. The extent ofretribution depends on one ' s culpability which depends on 
one ' s capability. Society holds juveniles less morally culpable for their acts than adults 
because juveniles are subjected to internal and external pressures over which they have 
no control. 
The various legal disabilities are based on the common sense and empirically 
supportable assumption that minors lack the maturity, experience, sophistication and 
judgment necessary to make significant decisions. Society treats juveniles as a class 
(not as individuals) and governs their rights and conduct with inflexible laws. The 
death penalty jurisprudence focuses on "individualized consideration" of the accused 
and the harm done. As such, there is a fundamental inconsistency in the two approaches 
which is inadequate to protect juveniles from the arbitrary imposition of the death 
penalty. 
International standards on the death penalty are also unanimous in 
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prohibiting imposition of death sentences on persons under the age of 18 at the time of 
offense. Treaties and instruments containing such a prohibition include the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the American 
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) and the United Nations (UN) Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. The United States is one of only eight countries known to have 
executedjuveniles in the last decade. As late as June, 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruled that the execution of offenders as young as 16 years of age was permissible under 
the Constitution. Innumerable professional organizations including but not limited to 
the American Bar Association oppose the death penalty in such cases. 
Our juvenile justice system recognizes the emotional and intellectual 
immaturity of juveniles holding them less culpable than adults. However, juveniles are 
tried and punished in the criminal justice system for certain kinds of serious offenses as 
though they were as culpable as adults. This inherent lack of consistency precludes 
equity and fairness in our special treatment of the juvenile. As such, the mitigating 
factor approach fails to achieve its goal within the context of individualized 
consideration. Juveniles, as defined by the law as age eighteen, should be 




The data reflect the inherent unreliability of our discretionary approach to 
justice. The mandate to provide individualized consideration has resulted in a highly 
disparate system of justice. As such, the race of the offender as well as the victim, and 
jurisdiction all impact what kind of individualized consideration a youth receives In fact, 
the findings appear to support the research which has historically provided evidence of 
the existence of racial disparity in sentencing (Gross and Mauro, 1989; Radelet, 1981; 
Baldus, Woodworth and Pulaski, 1970). Over alljurisdictions, offenders are 
significantly more likely to have killed white victims (70%). Texas, as one of the three 
identified states in the "death belt" (along with Florida and Georgia), has significantly 
less white offenders on death row ( 17%). Overall, 60% of the offenders were nonwhite. 
In addition to these important but incidental findings, the analysis of the 71 
youths on death rows throughout the United States provides an offender profile. This 
included the predicted correlation between family trouble and psychological/emotional 
disturbance. The majority of subjects used both of these statutory mitigators at trial 
level. The evidentiary support ranged from minimal to substantial. In fact, :if the 
offender was included in the study completed in 1988 by Drs. Dorothy Otnow Lewis and 
others, the scope of tests completed was impressive. The findings from this study clearly 
support the existence of familial, psychological, emotional and medical problems. 
Unfortunately, this evidence did not prevent the final outcome with approximately 25% 
of their original sample now executed. 
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Due to the lack oflegitimate testing to determine if there were medical 
problems or subnormal IQs, these categories were less reliable as actual indicators of 
their presence or absence. Along with known substance abuse, medical problems and 
subnormal IQ were used less often as mitigators and more difficult to interpret. The 
explanation for this appears to be the limited finances available to attorneys to test for 
organic problems and psychometric deficiencies. The two categories of mental 
retardation and low IQ were collapsed into one category because of the wide range of 
use (or misuse). Interestingly, Hispanics were 90% (0.09, 0.01-0.75) less likely to use 
medical as a mitigator. The use of no prior criminal history as well as known substance 
abuse as mitigators was also less frequent due to the potential backfire effect. In fact, 
both issues were presented in at least three cases as mitigators and construed as 
aggravators by the respective comts. 
As mentioned, the nonstatutory mitigating factors proved far too diverse and 
ambiguous to be used as a basis of comparison. One of the unexpected outcomes of the 
analysis herein was the ability to establish a profile using not just the mitigators but the 
aggravators. As such, associations between several of the mitigators and aggravators 
were demonstrated as well as interactions between race and age of the victim. There 
was a significant association between race and bmglarywith whites 16.33 (1.9-142.9) 
times more likely to engage in bmglary than nonwhites. Among victims who were not 
black, if the offender was black, they were 9. 0 ( 1. 73-46. 8) times more likely to kill a 
youth under 19 year of age. Blacks were also more likely to kill blacks. Tue Hispanic 
offender was significantly more likely to kill another Hispanic or Asian victim. In this 
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population on the death rows throughout the United States, none of the Hispanic 
offenders killed blacks. For Hispanics, the age of the victim was most likely to be 10-19 
years old and next likely to be less than 10 years of age. Hispanics were 4. 7 (1.4-16.4) 
times more likely to commit multiple murders. 1bis might be due to the offenders on 
death row in Texas and their alleged involvement gang-related offenses. 
Upon further analysis of mitigators by aggravators, it is clear that family 
trouble is not often used as a mitigator when the offender has committed a robbery. In 
fact , among offenders who commit robbery they are 80 percent less likely to use 
psychological or emotional disturbance as a mitigator. Importantly, when rape is the 
aggravator the offender is 5.1 ( 1.3-23.2) times more likely to have no prior criminal 
behavior. This is consistent with the research on sexual offenders which finds that these 
individuals do not test high on other criminal behavior. One could theorize that at least 
some of the youths on death row committed the murder to cover up for the sexual 
offense. Upon review of some of the relevant presentence investigation reports it 
appears that at least two of the offenders had engaged in possible sexual offending 
behavior but no other identified criminal activity prior to the offense. 
Offenders who commit burglary as an aggravator are over 80 percent (0.12, 
0.3-0.59) less likely to use indigent status as a mitigator. These offenders are 
predominantly white. All child murderers used psychological/emotional disturbance as a 
mitigator along with troubled family history. The other aggravators including carjacking, 
arson, kidnaping, and murder of a police officer proved to be too small in number to 
achieve statistical significance. 
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B. Limitations 
There are limitations in a study which involves reliance on legal cases for 
data. There is a significant degree of variation in what is reported and in how it is 
repo1ted. Additionally, different concepts may be construed similarly or similar concepts 
differently. The fact that many different jurisdictions, correctional facilities and people 
were involved increases the risk of error. This problem became apparent at the initial 
data collecting phase. When the simple process of collecting and confirming who was on 
death row was complicated by incorrect spelling of names, dates of birth, etc. 
Ironically, a limitation to this study is also a strength of the theory behind the 
study. The diverse statutes represent diverse mandates for mitigating and aggravating 
factors. Moreover, these inherently diverse factors are construed by different courts 
( including judges, juries and attorneys) in even more varied ways. Case in point, there 
were many examples of mitigating factors being interpreted and used by the court as 
aggravating factors often as justification for use of the death penalty. There were 
instances when an offense in one jurisdiction was charged as a carjacking or armed 
burglary yet an almost identical crime in another jurisdiction was charged under a 
different offense. 
The strategic decision not to use a mitigator in spite of its presence appeared 
often with substance abuse and criminal background. Somewhat less intentional was the 
lack of use or lack of documentation regarding indigent status. An even more 
ambiguous mitigating factor was subnormal intelligence level. When it was derived from 
formal testing the interpretation ranged from identifying an IQ of 78 as "profoundly 
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ded" to an IQ of 80 as "relatively withln the range of normal II M ft retar . ore o en, 
intelligence level and medical testing was not done and not used as a mitigator in spite of 
clear evidence that serious problems existed in this area. 
Equally disturbing were the reports by attorneys who described the difficulty 
in getting families to corroborate well documented family abuse and psychological or 
emotional problems. At one point during the data collection phase ofthis project a 
mother of an offender was contacted to provide additional information on these two 
documented mitigators. Tue mother denied the existence of any family problems in spite 
of her admission that the juvenile was a victim of extensive physical abuse. 
From an analytic standpoint, the limitations include the lack of a comparison 
group to establish the actual differences due to race, state, mitigating factors and 
aggravating factors. A sample of juveniles with similar characteristics who were not 
sentenced to death row would have provided the ability to compare across groups. The 
small sample size with even smaller cell sizes may have produced nonsignificant results 
due to small numbers when an effect may have been present. Small sample sizes also 
made significant results unstable, as noted by wide confidence intervals in some of the 
findings. Although Fisher's Exact Test was used to account for the small samples, some 
nonsignificant associations may have proved to be significant if larger numbers were 
available. 
Information, if available, was gathered on all the offenders. Tue total number 
including names, date of birth, race, race of victims, date of crime, and other 
demographic inf01mation is reasonably reliable allowing for the unexpected analysis 
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concern.in . 
g race disparities to be calculated. The 71 juveniles identified in this study 
represent the full . . . 
population of Juveniles currently on death rows throughout the United 
States Which 
' adds to the relative strength of the relationships and increases the 
generalizability of findings. 
C. Future Research 
Future research should explore within jurisdiction differences and then 
compare across1· · d" · Th · · · d f imil" f uns 1ct1on. e add1t10n of a companson stu y o a s ar group o 
You
thful 
offenders who did not receive the death penalty would provide valuable 
information b 
a out sentencing practices. 
Of particular interest, are those mitigators which are considered credible by 
Jurors and th . Il 
ose which are considered unreliable. Further exploration of the sma group 
of offend h . . 
ers W o were convicted of rape as part oftherr offense as this group appears to 
Present a fil . . d h 
pro e different from the rest of the populat10n of offenders on eat row. 
They uniformly have no criminal history and a significant troubled family history and 
Psychological or emotional disturbance. 
During data collection, extensive detailed information on each juvenile was 
Collect d thr · 1 This data e ough interviews with attorneys, court and correct10ns personne · 
should b . . 
e carefully analyzed to determme if other patterns may emerge. 
D. Tn-.-
~lications 
. . . · · ifi d t support the age The existing research on b1ophys1cal and soc1osc1ent c a a 
of lllajority being drawn at eighteen. At this age juveniles appear to become capable of 
llnderstancfin . . d ble to make choices accordingly. g the consequences oftherr act10ns an a 
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There are studies which dispute even this capability in a relatively small proportion of 
high risk youth. As such, these disadvantaged youths appear less able than the 
population at large to make reasoned moral judgments. There are a multitude of 
explanations for this distinction including family dysfunction, organic disease process, 
head trauma, subnormal intelligence levels, psychological, emotional and ethological 
deprivations. 
Just as the legal definition of juvenile is in conflict with the biophysical and 
socioscientific evidence, it is in direct conflict with its own demarcation between the 
period of childhood and adulthood. As such, the individual under the age of 18 by virtue 
of his or her status as a minor can be deprived of the rights and privileges of adults. The 
necessity for parental consent, the denial of the right to drink or buy liquor, vote and 
compulsory school attendance laws are all justified on the basis of being in the best 
interest of the child. 29 The same criminal justice system holds such an identified "child" 
responsible as if an adult. The rationale for such a system is rooted in the concept of 
individualized consideration, namely, the mitigating factor approach. 
This analysis indicates that our judicial system varies considerably in the 
definition and corresponding treatment of the so-called youthful super-predator. One of 
the most disturbing differences appears to be in the use of mitigators and aggravators. A 
substantial factor in the judicial decision-making process is clearly based on the 
availability of funds and time. Even when the evidence exists in favor of the juvenile, it 
can and often is widely construed by various judges, juries and legislators. 
E. Recommendations 
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The individual difference factor has emerged as critical to an analysis of the 
Iegitiznac . 
y of capital Punishment for juveniles. Unfortunately, this individual difference 
factor has resuJ d . 
te Ill a system that is plagued with flaws. As the criminal justice system 
e . 
Xlsts today th . 
' ere Is no way to impose a sentence of death on a person under 18 years of 
age in a f.. 
arr and equitable manner. 
Under Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586. 98 S. Ct. 2954 (1978), a sentence is 
supposed to be structur d .thin . . . th . divi"d 1 :ffi d d th e WJ statutory limits to smt e m ua o en er an e 
Particular c. . . . 
lfcumstances of the offense. The judges are given broad discret10n regarding 
the typ 
e and source of information which can be considered for such a determination. As 
this Paper demonst . t . . h . div"d liz d "d t· . the 1a es, 1t 1st every nature of m I ua e cons1 era 10n, usmg 
znitigatin f. . . 
g actor approach, which requires the broad use of discret10n. 
There are changes underway in our criminal justice system which allow for 
OJ.ore just t · 
reatment of serious juvenile offenders. The trend to use blended sentencmg 
allows for a b .d 
n ge between the adult and juvenile system Its increasing popularity 
allows the c . . 
0 urts to Impose juvenile and/or adult sanct10ns on offenders. These state 
st
atutes p · · :ffi d d 
rovide flexibility in dealing with the more problematic of our O en ers an 
satisfy h . 
t e need for treatment, confinement and accountability. Moreover, the restorat1Ve 
JUstice hil · t 
p osophy behind these sentencing schemes encourages the use of sanctwns 0 
lllclud ffi d 
e accountability to victims, community safety and the development of o en er 
Colllp 
etency. 
BI . din the inherent inequities ended sentencing is one of many solut10ns regar g 
Whi 
ch eXist in the present system. Graduated sanctions which include a broad range of 
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intermediate correctional programs, such as secure care and progressive aftercare, all 
allow for a balance between the interests of community, victims and offenders. The use 
of a multisystemic and restorative justice approach to alter life circumstances and 
behavioral patterns allows for consideration of every element of the juvenile's pathology. 
This paper has demonstrated the wide variability in use of both mitigators and 
aggravators and the corresponding failure to provide an equitable imposition of the death 
penalty on juvenile offenders. The socio scientific literature demonstrates that prior to age 
18, youths are biologically, psychologically and morally more immature than adults. Our 
legal system represents a dichotomy: treating these individuals as immature in the civil 
system, but mature in the criminal system. An analysis of the population of juveniles 
cwTently on death rows throughout the United States demonstrates patterns that reflect 
the confusion and ambiguity in the management of kids who kill. This paper 
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South Carolina ** 






** l\ K• rvunimum . Thom age reqmred by U.S. Constitution per U.S. Supreme Court 
~ ( 1988) 
[Thirteen A . . . . . 
Columb. mencan Junsd1ctions without the Death Penalty: Alaska, D1stnct of 
Rhode I 1~' Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, 
sand, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin] 
Source: Dr. Victor Streib, Dean, Petit College of Law, Ohio Northern University 
Ada, Ohio 45810 
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Chart 1.2 Minimum Age at Which Children Can Be Tried As An Adult By 
Jurisdiction in the United States 
Age 15 No Age Minimum 
Louisiana Alaska 
Arizona 












New Jersey New Hampshire 
New Mexico Ohio 
North Dakota Oklahoma 
Texas Oregon 
Utah Pe1msylvania 
Virginia Rhode Island 
Wisconsin South Carolina 
South Dakota 
Age 13 Tennessee 
Illinois Washington 
North Carolina Washington D.C. 
West Virginia 






Source: National Center for Juvenile Justice: National Conference of State 









































Chart 1.3: Death Penalty Statutes in the United States 
Ala. Code Ann. l 3A-5-45 (1975) 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 13-703 (1989) 
Ark. Code Ann., sec. 5-4-602 (Michie 1987) 
Cal. (Penal) Code. Sec. 190.1 (West 1988) 
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann., sec. 16-11-103 (West 1990) 
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann., sec 53a-46a (West 1985) 
Del Code Ann., tit. 11 , sec 4209 (Michie 1974) 
Fla. Stat. Ann. 921.141 ( 1985) 
Ga. Code Ann. , sec 17-10-30 (West 1985) 
Idaho Code sec. 19-2515 (Michie 1987) 
Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, para. 9-1 (Smith-Hurd 1979) 
Ind. Code, sec. 35-50-2-9 (Michie, Bobbs-Merrill 1985) 
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann, sec. 532.025 (Michie 1990) 
La. Code Crim. Pro. Ann, art. 905.3 (West 1984) 
Md. Code Aim., (Crim. Law.), art. 27, sec 413 (Michie 1992) 
Miss. Code Ann. 99-19-101 ( 1972) 
Mo. Ann. Stat. 565.032 (Vernon's 1979) 
Mont. Code Ann., sec. 46-18-301 (Leg. Council 1991) 
Neb. Rev. Stat. sec. 29-2520 (1943) 
Nev. Rev. Stat. sec. 175.552 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann., sec. 630:5 (1987) 
N.J. Stat. Ann., sec 2C:11-3 (West 1987) 
N.M. Stat. Ann. , sec 3I-20A-1 (Michie 1978) 
N.Y. (Penal) Law, sec. 125.27 (McKinney 1987) (ruled 
unconstitutional) 
N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-2000 (Michie 1991) 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann., sec. 2929.04 (Anderson 1987) 
Okla. Stat. Ann., tit. 21 , sec. 701.10 (West 1983) 
Or. Rev. Stat., sec. 163.150 (Butterworths 1990) 
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 42, sec. 9711 (Purdon's 1987) 
S.C. Code Ann., sec. 16-3-20 (Law.Co-op 1976) 
S.D. Codified Laws Ann., sec. 23A-27 A-1 (1987) 
Tenn. Code Ann., sec. 39-13-204 (Michie 1987) 
Tex. (Penal) Code Ann., sec. 37.071 (Vernon's 1989) 
Utah Code Ann. , sec. 76-3-207 (Michie 1953) 
Vt. Stat. Ann., tit. 13, sec. 2303 (1973) 
Va. Code , Ann., sec. 53.1-232 (Michie 1950) 
Wash. Rev. Code Ann., sec. 10.95.050 (7)(West 1990) 
Wyo. Stat., 6-2- 102 (Michie 1977) 
Source: Dr. Victor Streib, Dean, Petit College of Law, Ohio Northern University 
Ada, Ohio 45810 
161 
--
= Chart 1.4· St t S . . . Alabama · a e tatutes Specifically L1stmg Youth as a Mitigating Factor 
Arizona Ala. Code Ann. 13A-5-51(7) (1982) 
Arkansas Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 13-703G.5 (Supp.1986) 
California Ark. Code Ann. , 41-1304( 4) (Repl 1977) 
Colorado Cal. (Penal) Code. Sec. 190.05(h)(9) (Supp. 1985) 
Florida Colo. Rev. Stat. 16-11-I03(5)(a)(Supp. 1985) 
Indiana Fla. Stat. Ann. 921.141(6)(g) (Supp. 1985) 
Kentucky Ind. Code Ann. 35-50-2-9(c)(7) (H.B.1022, 1987) 
Louisiana Ky. Rev. Stat. 532.025(2)(b )(8) (1984) 
Maryland La. Code Crim. Pro. Ann, art. 905.5(f) (1984) 
Mississi"p . Md. Code art. 27, sec 413(g)(5) (Supp. 1986) 
PI M" Missouri iss. Code Ann. 99-19-101 ( 6)(g) (Supp. 1986) 
Montana Mo. Ann. Stat. 565.032(3)(7) (Supp. 1987) 
Nebraska Mont. Code Ann., sec. 46-18-304(7) (1984) 
Nevada Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-2523(2)( d) (1985) 
New Ham . Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.035(6) (1985) 
New Jersepshire N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 630.5(II)(b)(5) (1986) 
New 1\,.-e _Y N.J. Stat. Ann., sec 2C:11-3(c)5© (Supp. 1986) 
lVl XICO N 
North Carol" .M. Stat. Ann. 31-20A-6(I) (Supp. 1986) 
Ohio ma N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-2000(f)(7) (1983) 
Pennsylv . Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2929.04(B)(4) (1982) 
South C an
1
i_a Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. art. 42, 971 l(e)(4) (1982) 
aroma S Tennes .C. Code Ann. 16-3-20(c)(b)(7 & 9) (1985) 
see Dtah Tenn. Code Ann., sec. 39-2-2030)(7) (Repl. 1982) 
Virginia Utah Code Ann. 76-3-207(2)(e) (Supp. 1982) 
Washingt Va. Code 19.-364.4(B)(v)(Repl. 1983) 
~on Wash. Rev. Code 10.95.070 (7)(Supp. 1987) 
Wyo. Stat., 6-2-102(j) (Repl. 1983) 
ce. Dr. Victor Streib, Dean, Petit College of Law, Ohio Northern University 
Ada, Ohio 45810 
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Chart 4.1: Amici Curiae Briefs filed on Behalf of Thompson v. Oklahoma, 
Stanford v. Kentucky, Wilkins v. Missouri, High v. Zant 
The American Bar Association 
The American Jewish Committee 
The American Orthopsychiatric Association 
The American Society for Adolescent Psychiatry 
American Youth Work Center 
Amnesty International 
Child Welfare League of America 
Children's Defense Fund 
Defense for Children International - USA 
International Human Rights Law Group 
Kentucky and Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, 
Indiana, Mississippi, Nevada, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia and Wyoming [In support of 
Respondents Missouri and Georgia in Wilkins v. Missouri and 
High v. Zant, Nos. 87-6026 & 87-5666 (1987)] 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 
National Association of Social Workers 
National Black Child Development Institute 
National Council on Crime and Delinquency 
National Legal Aid and Defender Association 
National Network of Runaway and Youth Services 
National Parents and Teachers Association 
National Youth Advocate Program 
Office of the Capital Collateral Representative for State of Florida 
Office of State Appellate Defender of Illinois 
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Chart 4.2: Inmates under Juvenile Death Sentence bv State, United States, June 1998 
Age Date Victim I Victim2 
at of Gender Gender 
State Inmate Crime Crime Race Race Race 
Alabama Burgess, Willie Roy, 16 8-12-93 White Male-Unk. None-None 
Jr. 
Davis, Timothy 17 7-20-78 White Female-White None-None 
Charles 
Hart, Gary Davis II 16 8-1 2-89 White Male-White None-None 
Hyde, James 17 1-?-95 White Male-White None-None 
Matthew 
Knotts, William 17 10-18-89 Black Female-Black None-None 
Thomas 
Pressley, Marcus 16 7-25-96 White Male-White Female-White 
Dewayne 
Slaton, Nathan D. 17 6-4-87 White Male-White None-None 
Arizona Fong, Martin Paul 17 6-24-92 Asian Male-Asian Male-Asian 
(aka Soto-Fong) 1 •1 
Jackson, Levi James 16 12-7-92 White Female-White None-None 
Laird, Kenneth 17 9-3-92 White Female-White None-None 
Jeremy 
Arkansas Sanford, Damien 16 1-1 -95 Black Female-Black None-None 
Florida Bonifay, James 17 9-2-91 White Male-White None-None 
Brennan, Keith M. 16 3-1-95 White Male-White None-None 
LeCroy, Cleo 17 1-4-8 1 White Female-White Male-White 
Douglas 
Ramirez, Nathan 17 3-7-95 White Female-White None-None 
Snipes, David 17 2-9-95 White Unk.-Unk. None-None 
Urbin, Ryan 17 9-1-95 White Male-Unk. None-None 
Georgia High, Jose Martinez 17 7-2-76 White Male-White None-None 
Williams, Alexander 17 3-4-86 White Female-White None-None 
Edmund IV 
Kentucky Stanford, Kevin N. 17 1-7-81 White Female-White None-None 
Louisiana Cousin, Shareef 16 3-2-95 White Male-White None-None 
Mississippi Blue, David 17 6-6-92 Black Female-Black None-None 
Foster, Ronald Chris 17 6-10-89 White Male-White None-None 
Holly, William 17 7-12-92 Black Male-Black None-None 
McGilberry, 16 10-13-94 White Male-White Male-White 
Stephen·' 
Missouri Richardson, Antonio 16 4-4-91 White Female-White Female-White 
Simmons, 17 9-9-93 White Female-White None-None 
Christopher 
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Chart 4.2: Inmates under Juvenile Death Sentence by State, United States, June 1998 
Age Date Victim 1 Victim 2 
at of Gender Gender 
State Inmate Crime Crime Race Race Race 
Nevada Domingues, Miguel 16 8-?-93 Asian Female-Asian Male-Asian 
(aka Michael) 
North Womble. Curtis Ray 17 3- 1-93 Black Male-Black None-None 
Carolina 
Oklahoma Hain, Scott Allen 17 I 0-6-87 White Male-White Female-White 
Mooney. Jerry 16 5- 11-93 White Male-White None-None 
DuWanc 
Sellers, Sean 16 9-8-85 White Male-White Female-Unk. 
Richard 
Pennsyl- Hughes, Kevin 16 3-1-79 Black Male-Black None-None 
vania Lee, Percy 17 2-26-86 Black Female-Black Female-Black 
South Conyers, Robert 16 11-24-91 White Female-White None-None 
Carolina Lewis 
Hudgins, Joseph 17 12-7-92 White Male-White None-None 
Hughes, Herman 17 3-18-94 Black Male-Unk. None-None 
Lee Jr. 
Powers, Ted 16 9-8-90 White Male-White None-None 
Benjamin 
Texas Alvarado. Steven 17 9-22-9 1 Hispanic Male-Hispanic Female-
Hispanic 
Arthur. Mark Sam 17 12-21-96 Hispanic Male-Hispanic None-None 
Barraza, Mauro 17 6- 14-89 White Female-White None-None 
Morris 
Beazley, Napoleon 17 4-19-94 White Male-White None-None 
Bernal, Johnnie 17 1-19-93 Hispanic Male-Unk. None-None 
Cannon, Joseph 17 9-30-77 White Female-White None-None 
John2 
Capetillo. Edward 17 1-16-95 White Female-White Male-White 
Carter. Robert 17 6-24-81 Hispanic Female- None-None 
Anthony2 Hispanic 
Cobb, Raymond 17 12-27-93 White Female-White Female-White 
Levi 
Dewbury, John 17 12-23-94 White Male-White None-None 
Curtis 
Dickens, Justin 17 3-12-94 White Female-White None-None 
Wiley 
Dixon. Anthony 17 5-15-94 White Female-White None-None 
Jerome 
Graham. Gary L. 17 5- 13-81 White Male-White None-None 
Johnson. Eddie C. 17 1-6-96 White Male-White None-None 
Jones, Anzel 17 5-2-95 White Female-White None-None 
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Chart 4 .2: Inmates under Juvenile Death Sentence by State, United States, June 1998 
Age 
at 
State Inmate Crime 
Texas Jones, T. J. 17 
( continued) Martinez. Miguel 17 
Angel" 
McGinnis, Glen 17 
Charles 
Miles. Laquan 3 17 
Mitchell, Gerald L. 17 
Monterrubio, Jose 17 
Ignacio 
Ortiz. Oscar III 17 
Patterson. Toronto'' 17 
Perez, Efrain 17 
Rey. Johnny3 17 
Soriano , Oswaldo 17 
Regaldo 
Villareal, Raul 17 
Williams. Nanon 17 
McKewn 
Wills, Robert James 17 
Virginia Jackson, Chauncey 16 
Roach, Steve E . 17 
Thomas, Douglas 17 
Christopher 
Wright, Dwayne 17 
Allen 
1 Race recorded as Hispanic/Asian 
2 Executed during sample collection 
3 Sentence reversed during sample collection 
4 Denotes multiple victims 
Date Victim 1 
of Gender 
Crime Race Race 
2-2-94 Black Male-White 
1-18-91 Hispanic Male-Hispanic 
8-1-90 White Female-White 
8-24-91 Black Male-Black 
6-4-85 White Male-White 
9-5-93 Hispanic Female-
Hispanic 
1-1 9-94 Hispanic Male-Hispanic 
6-6-95 Black Female-Black 
6-24-93 White Female-White 
5-1 2-91 White Male-White 
11-17-92 Hispanic Male-White 
6-24-93 White Female-White 
5-4-92 White Male-White 
1-17-85 White Female-White 
8-31-94 Black Male-Black 
12-3-93 White Female-White 
11 -10-90 White Male-White 
10-1 3-89 Black Female-Black 
The list does not include fo ur additional unpublished cases from January, 1998-June, 1998: 
Carroll , Taurus, 17, Black Male, Alabama 
Ferrell , Roderick Justin, 16, White Male, Florida 
Golphin, Kevin , 17, Black Male, North Carolina 





























Table 5.1: Juveniles on Death Row--Demographic Characteristics by Age t 
Characteristic Age of Juvenile at Commission of Crime 
(N=7 1) 16 years old 17 years old Total 
(Col Percent) (Col Percent) 
State Jailed 
Alabama 3 (18.8%) 4 (7.1 %) 7 (9.7%) 
Arizona I (6.3%) 2 (3 .6%) 3 (4.2%) 
Arkansas 1 (6.3%) 0 (0.0%) I (1.4%) 
Florida 1 (6.3%) 5 (9.1%) 6 (8.5%) 
Georgia 0 (0.0%) 2 (3.6%) 2 (2.8%) 
Kentucky 0 (0.0%) 1 (1.8%) I (1.4%) 
Louisiana I (6.3%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (1.4%) 
Mississippi 1 (6.3%) 3 (5.5%) 4 (5.6%) 
Missouri 1 (6.3%) 1 (1.8%) 2 (2.8%) 
Nevada 1 (6.3%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (1.4%) 
North Carolina 0 (0.0%) 1 (1.8%) 1 (1.4%) 
Oklahoma 2 (12.5%) 1 (1.8%) 3 (4.2%) 
Pennsylvania I (6.3%) I (1 .8%) 2 (2.8%) 
South Carolina 2 (12.5%) 2 (3.6%) 4 (5.6%) 
Texas 0 (0.0%) 29 (52.7%) 30 ( 4.9%) 
Virginia I (6.3%) 3 (5.4%) 4 (5.6%) 
Race of Juvenile 
White 6 (37.5%) 20 (35.7%) 26 (36.1%) 
Black 9 (56.3%) 23 (41.l %) 32 (44.4%) 
Hispanic,i I (6.3%) 13 (23.2%) 14 (19.4%) 
t Includes two j uveniles who have been executed and two juveniles who have been reversed 
iJOne Hispanic was Hispanic/Asian 
168 
Table 5.2: First Victim--Age, Race and Gender by Age of Juvenile (N=71 )t 
Characteristi c Age of Juvenile 
16 years old 17 years old Total 
(Col Percent) (Col Percent) (Percent)) 
Age 
< 10 2 (13.3%) I (2.9%) 3 (6.0%) 
l 0- 19 2 (20.0%) 7 (20.0%) 10 (20.0%) 
20-69 8 (53.3%) 23 (65.7%) 31 (62.0%) 
> 69 2( 13.3%) 4 (11.4%) 6 (12.0%) 
Unknown - - 22 
Race 
White 12 (75 .0%) 33 (68.8%) 45 (70.7%) 
Black 3 (18.8%) 8 (16.7%) 11 (17.2%) 
Hispanic 0 (0.0%) 6 (12.5%) 6 (9.4%) 
Asian l (6 .3%) 1 (2.1 %) 2 (3.1%) 
Unknown - - 7 
Gender 
Female 5 (31.3%) 25 (47.2%) 30 (43 .5%) 
Male 11 (68.8%) 28 (52.8%) 40 (56.5%) 
Unknown - - 1 
t Includes two juveniles who have been executed and two juveniles who have been reversed 
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Table 5.3: Second Victim--Age, Race and Gender by Age of Juvenilet 
Characteristic Age of Juvenile 
I 6 years old I 7 years old Total 
(Col % in Parentheses) (Col% in Parentheses) 
Age 
None I I (68.8%) 42 (82.4%) 53 (79.1 %) 
< JO 2 (12.5%) 2 (3 .9%) 4 (6.0%) 
10-19 0 (0.0%) 2 (3 .9%) 2 (3.0%) 
20-69 3(18.8%) 5 (9.8%) 8 (1 1.9%) 
> 69 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
Unknown - - 4 
Race of 2nd Victim 
None 11 (68.8%) 41(75 .9%) 52 (74.3%) 
White 4 (25 .0%) 6(11.1 %) 10 (14.2%) 
Black 0 (0.0%) 3 (5.6%) 3 (4.3%) 
Hispanic 0 (0.0%) 3 (5.6%) 3 (4.3%) 
Asian I (6.3%) I (1.9%) 2 (2.9%) 
Unknown - - I 
Gender of 2nd Victim 
None 11 (68.8%) 41 (75 .9%) 52 (74.3%) 
Male 3(18.8%) 8 (14.8%) 11 (15.7%) 
Female 2 (12.5%) 5 (9.3%) 7 (10.0%) 
Unknown - - 1 
t Includes two juveniles who have been executed and two juveniles who have been reversed 
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Table 5.4: Third Victim--Age. Race and Gender by Age of Juvenilet 
Characteristic Age of Juvenile 
16 years old 17 years old Total 
(Col % in Parentheses) (Col% in Parentheses) 
Age of 3rd Victim 
None 14 (87.5%) 51 (94.4%) 65 (92.9%) 
< 10 0 (0.0%) 1 (1.9%) 1 (1.4%) 
10-1 9 0 (0.0%) 1 (1.9%) 3 (4.3%) 
20-69 2 (12 .5%) 1 (1.9%) 1 (1.4%) 
> 69 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
Unknown - - 1 
Race of 3rd Victim 
None 15 (93 .8%) 51 (94.4%) 66 (94.3%) 
White 1 (6.3%) 1 (1.9%) 2 (2.9%) 
Black 0 (0.0%) 1 (1.9%) I (1.4%) 
Hispanic 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
Asian 0 (0.0%) 1 (1 .9%) 1 (1.4%) 
Gender of 3rd Victim 
None 15(93 .8%) 52 (94.6%) 67 (94.4%) 
Female 1 (6.3%) 1 (1.8%) 2 (2.8%) 
Male 0 (0.0%) 2 (3.6%) 2 (2.8%) 
Unknown - - 1 
t Includes two juveniles who have been executed and two juveniles who have been reversed 
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Table 5.5: Race of Victim by Race of Juvenilet 
Race Race of Juvenile 
of Victim 
White Black Hispanicif Total 
(Col Percent) (Col Percent) (Col Percent) (Percent) 
Victim #I 
White 21 (91.3%) 18 (62 .1 %) 6 (50.0%) 46 (70.8%) 
Black 2 (8.7%) 9 (3 1.0%) 0 (0.0%) 11 (17.2%) 
Hispanic 0 (0.0%) 2 (6.9%) 4 (33.3%) 6 9.4%) 
Asian 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (16.7%) 2 (3 .1 %) 
Unknown - - - 7 
Victim #2 
None 20 (76.9%) 25 (83 .3%) 7 (50.0%) 53 (74.7%) 
White 6 (23 .1 %) 2 (6.5%) 2 (14.3%) 10 (14.3%) 
Black 0 (0.0%) 3 (10.0%) 0 (0.0%) 3 (4.3%) 
Hispanic 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 3 (21.4%) 3 (4.3%) 
Asian 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (14.3%) 2 (2.9%) 
Unknown - - - l 
Victim #3 
None 25 (96.2%) 29 (96.7%) 12 (85.7%) 66 (94.3%) 
White 1 (3 .9%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (7.1 %) 2 (2.9%) 
Black 0 (0.0%) I (3.3%) 0 (0.0%) l (1.4%) 
Hispanic 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
Asian 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (1.7%) I (1.4%) 
Unknown - - - 1 
t Includes two juveniles who have been executed and two juveniles who have been reversed 
,r Includes one Hispanic/Asian juvenile 
*Unknown race not included in percentages 
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Table 5.6 Juveniles on Death Row--Statutory Mitigating Circumstances by Aget 
Statutory Age of Juvenile at Commission of Crime 
Mitigating 
Circumstance 16 years old 17 years old Total 
(N=7 1) (Col Percent) (Col Percent) 
Troubled Family History 12 (75.0%) 48 (87.3%) 60 (84.5%) 
Psychological/Emotional Problems 12 (75.0%) 45 (81.2%) 57 (80.3%) 
Medical Problems 7 (43.8%) 20 (36.4%) 27 (38.0%) 
Low IQ/Mental Retardation 6 (37.5%) 24 (43.6%) 30 (42.3%) 
No Prior Criminal History 1 (6.3%) 8 (14.5%) 9 (12.7%) 
Indigent Status 9 (56.3%) 46 (83.6%) 56 (77.5%) 
Documented Substance Abuse 2 (12.5%) 7 (12.7%) 9 (12.7%) 
t Includes two juveniles who have been executed and two juveniles who have been reversed 
Table 5.7: Statutory Mitigating Circumstances by Race of Juvenilet 
Statutory Race of Juvenile 
Mitigating 
Circumstance White Black Hispanic,i Total 
(N=71) 
Troubled Family 22 (36.7%) 25 (41.7%) 13 (21.7%) 60 (84.5%) 
Psychological/Emotional 23 (40.4%) 25 (43 .9%) 9 (15.8%) 57 (80.3%) 
Problems 
Medical Problems 12 (44.4%) 14 (5 1.9%) 1 (3 .7%) 27 (38.0%) 
Mental Retardation/Low IQ 9 (30.0%) 16 (53.3%) 5 (16.7%) 30 (42.3%) 
No Prior Criminal History 2 (22.2%) 4 (44.4%) 3 (33.3%) 9 (12.5%) 
Indigent 18 (32.7%) 26 (47.3%) 11 (20.0%) 55 (77.5%) 
Documented Substance Use 1(11.1 %) 5 (55.6%) 3 (33.3%) 9 (12.5%) 
t Includes two juveniles who have been executed and two juveniles who have been reversed 
,i Includes one Hispanic/ Asian juvenile 
*Unknown race not included in percentages 
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Table 5.8 Statutory Aggravating Circwnstances by Aget 
Statutory Age of Juvenile at Commission of Crime 
Aggravating 
Circwnstance 16 years old 17 years old Total 
(N=71) (Col Percent) (Col Percent) 
Robbery 7 (46.7%) 22 (41.5%) 29 (42.7%) 
Rape 2 (13.3%) 10 (18.9%) 12 (17.7%) 
Burglary 3 (20.0%) 5 (9.4%) 8 (11.8%) 
Carjacking I (6.7%) 0 (0.0%) I (1.5%) 
Murder of Police Officer 0 (0.0%) 2 (3.8%) 2 (2.9%) 
Kidnaping 0 (0.0%) 2 (3.8%) 2 (2.9%) 
Arson 0 (0.0%) I (1.9%) 1 (1.5%) 
Multiple Murder 5 (31.3%) 12 (21.4%) 17 (23.6%) 
Murder of a Child 4 (26.7%) 7 (13.2%) 11 (16.2%) 
t Includes two juveniles who have been executed and two juveniles who have been reversed 
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Table 5.9: Statutory Aggravating Circumstances by Race of Juvenilet 
Stan1tory Race of Juvenile 
Aggravating 
Circumstance White Black Hispanic, Total 
Robbery 11 (37.9%) 13 (44.8%) 5 (17.2%) 29 (42.7%) 
Rape 2(16.7%) 6 (50.0%) 4 (33.3%) 12(17.7%) 
Bmglary 7 (87 .5%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (12.5%) 8 (11.8%) 
Carjacking 1 (100%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (1.5%) 
Mmdered Police Officer 2 (100%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (2.9%) 
Kidnaping 0 (0.0%) 2 (100%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (2.9%) 
Arson 1 (100%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (1.5%) 
Multiple Murder 5 (29.4%) 5 (29.4%) 7 (48.2%) 17 (23.6%) 
Child Murder 3 (27 .3 %) 5 (45.5%) 3 (27.3%) 11 (16.2%) 
t Includes two juveniles who have been executed and two juveniles who have been reversed 
, Includes one Hispanic/Asian juvenile 
*Unknown race not included in percentages 
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Table 5.1 0: Significant Relationships between Aggravating Circumstances and Statutory Mitigating 
Factors with Fisher ·s Exact Test for Significance and Odds Ratios with 95% CI 
Signifi cant Robbery Fisher's 
Statutory Mitigating Exact Odds Ratio 
Circwn stances Yes No Probability (95% CI) 
Psychological/Emotional 
Disorder 
p=0.031 0.22 (0.06-0.78) 
Used as a Mitigator I 9 (35.2%) 35 (64.8%) 
(0. 70) (0.52) 
Not used as a Mitigator 10(7 1.4%) 4 (28.6%) 
(2.72) (2.02) 
Significant Rape Fisher 's 
Statutory Mitigating Exact Odds Ratio 
Circumstances Yes No Probability (95% CI) 
No Prior Criminal History 
Used as a Mitigator 4 (44.4%) 5 (55.6%) 
(3.66) (0.78) p=0.045 5.1 (1.3-23.2) 
Not used as a mitigator 8 ( 13.6%) 51 (86.45) 
(0.56) (0.12) 
Significant Burglary Fisher's 
Statutory Mitigating Exact Odds Ratio 
Circumstances Yes No Probability (95% CI) 
Indigent Status 
Used as a Mitigator 3 (5.7%) 50 (94.3%) 
( 1.68) (0.22) p=0.010 0.12( 0.03-0.59) 
Not used as a Mitigator 5 (33.3%) 10 (66.7%) 
(5.9) (0.79) 
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Table 5.11: State Jailed by Race of Juvenile witl1 x2 Analysis and Fisher's Exact Test for Significance 
State Race of Juvenile 
Jailed 
White Black Hispanic,J Total ' x-
(Row%) (Row%) (Row%) (Column%) (Fisher's Exact) 
Alabama 4 (57.2%) 3 (43 .9%) 0 (0.0%) 7 (9.9%) NS 
Arizona 2 (66 .7%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (33 .3%) 3 (4.2%) NS 
Arkansas 0 (0.0%) I (1 00%) 0 (0.0%) I (1.4%) NS 
Florida 5 (83 .3%) 0 (0.0%) I (16.7%) 6 (8.5%) x2==3 .6 (p ==0.0 I 3) 
Georgia 0 (0.0%) 2 (100%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (2.8%) NS 
Kentucky 0 (0.0%) I (100%) 0 (0.0%) I (1.4%) NS 
Louisiana 0 (0.0%) I (100%) 0 (0.0%) I (1.4%) NS 
Mississippi 2 (50.0%) 2 (50.0%) 0 (0.0%) 4 (5.6%) NS 
Missouri I (50 .0%) I (50.0%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (2.8%) NS 
Nevada 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) I 100%) 1 (1.4%) NS 
North Carolina 0 (0.0%) I (100%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (1.4%) NS 
Oklahoma 3 (100%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 3 (4.2%) x2==3.3 (p ==.0009) 
Pennsylvania 0 (0.0%) 2 (100%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (2.8%) NS 
South Carolina 2 (50.0%) 2 (50.0%) 0 (0.0%) 4 (5.6%) NS 
Texas 5 (17.2%) 13(44.8%) 11 (37 .9%) 29 (40.8%) x2==2.9 (p ==.0009) 
Virginia 2 (50.0%) 2 (50.0%) 0 (0.0%) 4 (5.6%) NS 
i i Includes one Hispanic/ Asian juvenile 
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Table 5. I 2 : Significant Associations--White v. Non-White with Fisher's Exact Test for Significance 
and Odds Ratios with 95% Cl 
Race of Juvenile 
Factor Fisher' s Odds Ratio 
White (Percent) Non-White (Percent) Exact (95% CI) 
cx2) Cx2) Probability 
State 
Florida 5 (83.3%) 1 (16.7%) 
(3.70) (2.07) 
Oklahoma 3 (100%) 0 (0.0%) p=0.013 
(3.29) ( 1.92) 
Texas 5( 17.2%) 25 (82.8%) 
(2.97) (1.7 1) 
Burglary 7 (87.5%) 1 (12.5%) p=0.00029 16.33(1.9-142.6) 
(5.60) (3.26) 
Race of 1st Victim 
White 21 (46.7%) 24 (53 .3%) 
( 1.44) (0. 75) 
Black 2 (8.7%) 9 (81.8%) 
(0.97) (0.54) p=0.033 
Hispanic 0 (0.0%) 6 (100%) 
(2.16) (1.76) 
Asian 0 (0.0%) 2 (100%) 
(0.72) (0.40) 
Age of l st Yictimt 
< 10 0 (0.0%) 3 (100%) 
(1.26) (0.91) 
10-19 I {10.0%) 9 (90.0%) 
(2.44) (1.77) p=0.014 
20-69 18 (58.1 %) 13 (41.9%0 
(1.91) (1.38) 
> 69 2 (33 .3%) 4 (66.7%) 
(0.11 ) (0.08) 
t N=50, age was not available for 21 victims 
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Table 5.1 3: Significant Associations--Black v. Non-Black with Fisher' s Exact Test for Significance and 
Odds Ratios w'ith 95% CI 
Race of Juvenile Fisher's 
Factor Exact Odds Ratio 
Black (Percent) Non-Black (Percent) Probability (95% CI) 
(x2) (x2) 
Race of I st Victim 
White 18 (40.0%) 27 (60.0%) 
(0.28) (0.23) 
Black 9 (81.8%) 2 (18.2%) 
(3.24) (2.68) p=0.032 
Hispanic 2 (33.3%) 4 (66.7%) 
(0.19) (0. 16) 
Asian 0 (0.0%) 2 (100%) 
(0.91) (0. 75) 
Race of 2nd Victim 
None 25 (48.1%) 27 (5 1.9%) 
(0 .33) (0.25) 
White 2 (20.0%) 8 (80.0%) 
( 1.2) (0.9 1) p=0.022 
Black 3 (100%) 0 (0.0%) 
(2.29) (1.71) 
Hispanic 0 (0.0%) 3 (100%) 
( 1.29) (0.96) 
Asian 0 (0.0%) 2 (100%) 
(0.85) (0.64) 
Burglary 0 (0.0%) 8 (100%) p=0.00083 Zero Cell, not 
(3.4) (2.5) calculated 
Age of I st Victimt 
< 10 3 (100%) 0 (0.0%) 
(3.04) ( 1.86) 
10- 19 6 (60.0%) 4 (40.0%) 
(1.27) (0. 78) p=0.025 
20-69 9 (29.0%) 22 (71.0%) 
(0.66) (0.40) 
> 69 1 (16.7%) 5 (83 .3%) 
(0.71) (0.44) 
t N=50, age was not available for 21 victims 
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Table 5. 14: Age-Race lmeractions--Black v. Non-Black with Fisher's Exact Test for Significance and 
Odds Ratios with 95% Ci t 
Race of Juvenile Fisher' s 
Factor Exact Odds Ratio 
B lack (Percent) Non-Black (Percent) Probability (95% CI) 
cx2) Cx2) 
Age of I st Victim 
s 19 9 (69.2%) 4 (30.8%) 
(3.34) (2.05) p=0.00095 
6.1 ( J.52-24.2) 
> ]9 10 (27 .0%) 27 (73 .0%) 
~ 
( 1. 17) (0.72) 
~ 
Controlling for Race of 1st Victim 
1st Victim Black 
s 19 3 ( 100%) 0 (0.0%) 
(0.0 15) (0.6) 
p=0.467 (NS) 
> 19 5 (7 1.4%) 2 (28.6) 
I-- (0 .06) 
(0.26) 
1st Victim Non-Black 
4 (40.0%) s 19 6 (60.0%) 9.0 ( 1. 73-46.8) 
(4.3) 
(1.5) p=0.00096 
> 19 4 (14.3%) 
24 (84.7%) 
- (1.5) (0.54) 
t N 50, age was not avai lable for 21 victims 
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Table 5.15 : Significant Associations--Hispanic v. Non-Hispanic with Fisher's Exact Test for 
Significance and Odds Ratios with 95% CI 
Race of Juvenile Fisher's 
Factor Exact Odds Ratio 
Hispanic (Percent) Non-Hispanic (Percent) Probability (95% CI) 
ex-) (x2) 
Race of I st Victim 
White 6 (13.3%) 39 (86.7%) 
(0.70) (0.16) 
Black 0 (0.0%) 11 (100%) 
(2.06) (0.48) p=0.00038 
Hispanic 4 (66.7%) 2 (33.3%) 
(7.35~ ( 1.70) 
Asian 2 (100% 0 (0.0%) 
(7.04) (I . 7) 
Race of 2nd Victim 
None 7 (13.5%) 45 (86.5%) 
(1.11) (0.28) 
White 2 (20.0%) 8 (80.0%) 
(0) (0) 
Black 0 (0.0%) 3 (100%) p=0.00095 
(0.6) (0 .1 5) 
Hispanic 3 (100%) 0 (0.0%) 
Asian 
(9.6~ 




Age of 2nd Victim 
None 7( 13.2%) 46 (86.8%) 
(0.65) (0.14) 
< IO 2 (100%) 0 (0.0%) 
(2.3~ (0.50) 
10-19 2 (100% 0 (0.0.%) p=0.011 
(7.53) (1.64) 
20-69 1 (12.5%) 7 (87.5) 
(0. 13) (0.03) 
> 69 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
(0) (0) 
Gender of 2nd Victim 
None 7 (13.5%) 45 (86.5%) 
(1.11) (0.28) 
Female 3 (27.3%) 4 (72.7%) p=0.019 
(0.29) (0.07) 
Male 4 (59.l %) 3 (42.9%) 
(4.83) (1.20) 
Medical I (3.7%) 26 (96.3%) p=0.00063 0.09(0.01 -0. 75) 
(3.5) (0.86) 




1. Herein, profiling is indicative of a person who shares similar behavioral, 
personality, social and other characteristics. This psychosocial profiling should 
be distinguished from criminal profiling. 
2. Empirical data demonstrate that bright-line age requirements are quite arbitrary 
(Anders, 1986). State legislators have recognized this by making age "a factor to 
be considered" or a "mitigating circumstance" versus an absolute limit [cf. 
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 
( 1982)]. Similarly, the arbitrariness of age limits is demonstrated by the practice 
of state juvenile courts such that when aggravated crimes are involved youthful 
offenders are "waived" or "certified" to adult criminal court. 
3. Refer to Brief Amici Curiae, American Society for Adolescent Psychiatry and 
American Orthopsychiatric Association, Thompson v. Oklahoma, No. 86-6169 
( 1986) for a listing of scientific studies. 
4. Refers to subjects in a study completed by Lewis, Bard, Feldman, Prichep and 
Yeager in ( 1988) entitled "Neuropsychiatric, Psychoeducational and Family 
Characteristics of 14 Juveniles Condemned to Death in the United States." 
5. Bondless men, women and children constitute one of the largest aberrant 
populations. 
6. Research has made it painfully clear that the rate of child maltreatment in a 
neighborhood is tied to the quality of life in that neighborhood. Neighborhoods 
that are considered dangerous and frightening by its residents have higher rates 
of maltreatment than neighborhoods that residents regard more positively even 
when those neighborhoods have equivalent income levels and similar ethnic 
composition (supra, p. 9). Problems in neighborhoods are alleged to be both 
sociologic and economic. Case in point, studies have shown that children who 
live in overcrowded, dilapidated and under furnished housing are more 
vulnerable to abuse and neglect than those in safe and clean facilities. 
7. Bandura and Walters (1959) also found that delinquent boys experienced 
significantly higher rates of physical punishment by their fathers than 
nondelinquents. 
8. This study is distinguishable from previous studies on the intergenerational 
transmission of violence based on certain design features. Most significantly, by 
following a large number (1575) of cases from childhood through adolescence 
and into young adulthood long-term consequences of abuse and neglect could be 
examined. Additionally, clear operationalization of the concepts of abuse and 
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neglect allowed for a separate examination of physical abuse, sexual abuse and 
neglect (National Institute of Justice, Research in Brief, "The cycle of violence" 
by Widom, 1992). For additional information cf. Widom, C. "Child abuse, 
neglect and adult behavior: Research design and findings on criminality, 
violence and child abuse," American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 59 (1938):355-
367. 
9. It has been repeatedly demonstrated that boys, overall, are much more at risk for 
psychopathy than girls. This may, in fact, be attributed to the males apparent 
predisposition to be more aggressive than females. Case in point, Eleanor 
Maccoby, a professor of psychology at Stanford University and Carol Jacklin, a 
psychologist at University of Southern California, reviewed evidence on sex 
differences in aggression. Herefrom, they concluded that the average male is 
more aggressive than the average female in all cultures. That, in fact, boys are 
harder to socialize than girls. Some have even argued that civilization is an 
attempt to restrain male aggressiveness or at the very least, turn it into 
appropriate channels. 
10. The strength of the relationship between class and crime varies significantly 
depending on the measure of class used. Nearly all carefully designed studies 
find that social class is either very small or nonexistent correlate of self-reported 
delinquency (Tittle, Villimez and Smith, 1978). Nearly all studies of 
delinquency use the occupation or education of the father as the sole indicator of 
social class disregarding other possible measures. 
11. References preceded by "W.J.A." are to Wilkins Joint Appendix. References 
preceded by "W. Tr." are to Wilkins trial transcript. 
12. Dr. S.D. Parwatikar was the only court-appointed psychiatrist who examined 
Bobby Lewis Shaw on death row in Missouri after stabbing to death a guard and 
injuring another. At the time of his trial for the shooting death of Calvin Morris 
(Shaw's common-law brother-in-law) many allege he was prompted by auditory 
hallucinations. Irrespective of this fact, no psychiatric evaluation was performed 
before the first trial. In preparation for the second trial, Dr. Parwatikar testified 
that Shaw suffered from "mild depression" and was a "borderline mental 
defective" but not afflicted with mental disease or defect. Some years later after 
being presented with additional information by the Missouri Capital Punishment 
Resource Center in Kansas City, Parwatikar recanted his testimony. In an 
affidavit, Dr. Parwatikar reported that he new evidence created "a substantial 
probability that my previous diagnosis is incorrect. I now believe that at the time 
of my evaluation, he was suffering from the early stages of dementia, and 
possibly the early onset of schizophrenia" (Walsh, 1993). 
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13 . "The character development which continues to take place during adolescence, 
until eighteen years of age, can very well overcome features of an antisocial 
personality that appear during adolescence. For this reason, the diagnosis of 
Antisocial Personality cannot be made w1til a person has reached eighteen years 
of age" [Thompson v. Oklahoma, o. 86-6169 (1986) (pp.21-22)]. "Since [the 
typical childhood signs of Antisocial Personality Disorder] may terminate 
spontaneously ... a diagnosis of Antisocial Personality Disorder should not be 
made in children; it is reserved for adults ( 18 or over), who have had time to 
show the full longitudinal pattern" (American Psychiatric Association, 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder III, 319 ( 1980); Wilson 
and Hermstein, 1985). Updated: "The diagnosis of Antisocial Personality 
Disorder cannot be given to individuals under age 18 years." [American 
Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV (1994) (p. 90)]. 
An interesting sidenote, Dr. Ben Karpman who is renowned for his lifelong 
work in psychopathy, identified the "anethopath." A person whose personality 
has an irreducible unanalyzable core of antisociality. He distinguishes this youth 
(the true psychopath) from the youth who accidentally kills another during 
"careless play." The anethopath (or 'true psychopath"), Karpman explains, 
shows his difficulty in adjustment as early as the sixth year. This child's 
rebelliousness is deep-seated and pervasive (Bromberg, 1961 ). 
14. Many researchers have noted that while mental disorder does not seem to 
predispose people to criminality it is an unarguable reality that the amount of 
mental disorder among criminals and the amount of criminality among those 
who are mentally disordered is higher than in the population at large. Evidence 
indicates that young males with paranoid schizophrenia who do not reliably take 
anti psychotic medication, have a history of violence, substance abuse and 
experience command hallucinations instructing them to harm others are at 
highest risk. 
15. The term "bonding is frequently and incorrectly used synonymously with 
attachment. They are recognized as different phenomena in diagnostic 
classification systems [ e.g., "Synopsis of Psychiatry: Behavioral Sciences 
Clinical Psychiatry" by Kaplan, Sadock and Grebb 91994)] and will be 
distinguished in this document. There are, of course, many definitions of 
attachment but most refer to the "emotional tone" that exists between child and 
caretaker (traditionally referred to as the mother). Herein, when reference is 
made to maternal or mother it should be construed to mean caretaker, provider 
or significant other operating as the surrogate mother. Bonding, by contrast, 
refers to the mother's feelings for the child. The critical difference is that a 
mother does not (in normal circumstances should not) rely on her infant/child as 
a source of security (supra. p.161). The critical component of the attachment 
behavior with this interpretation is the reliance by developing infant on caretaker 
for a source of security. 
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16. An interesting point made by the authors is that it is possible for some 
adolescents, as the data suggest is the case for psychotic adolescents, to resist 
forming an attachment to maladaptive parental figures . They argue, this might 
be indicative of health versus pathology. The underlying theory herefrom is that 
even in a treatment setting, attachment to a pathologic family can be detrimental 
to the individual's well-being (Fritsch and Goodrich, 1990, p. 260). Noteworthy, 
not all the research supports this argument. 
1 7. According to Hirschi's popular social control theory, individuals conform to 
conventional norms and refrain from deviance because they are strongly bonded 
to the conventional moral order (Matsueda, 1989). This bond to society is an 
ongoing "stream of socialization" which consists of four interrelated elements: 
attachment, commitment, involvement and belief (Id. at 430). Attachment to 
others contains a moral element in which attached persons process the reactions 
of parents, peers and teachers with respect to their potential deviant acts. The 
theory follows that with the existence of only one moral order such reaction will 
inevitably be negative; consequently, attachment dissuades persons from 
deviance (supra, p. 430). 
18. The care perspective refers to a moral perspective developed by Carol Gilligan 
which views people in terms of their connectedness to others and focuses on 
interpersonal communication, relationships with others and concern for others 
(supra, p. 591 ). By contrast, Kohl berg's theory is thought to be a justice 
perspective. That is, a moral perspective that focuses on the rights of the 
individual which see individuals as standing alone and independently in moral 
decisions. 
19. In simplistic terms, moral development or moral reasoning refers to the ability to 
distinguish right and wrong based on value judgment. After reviewing the 
literature, it appears that children of the relative same age appear to share 
particular characteristics that differ from those of children of another age who 
may be at a different stage of development. As mentioned, intellectual maturity 
may be a necessary element for moral maturity but it is not sufficient for 
adequate moral development. Kohlberg as well as others agree the association 
between age and intellectual and moral development involves the interaction of 
many different factors . This would explain why certain individuals may 
experience impediments in moral development and maintain a lesser stage of 
maturity unrelated to their age. In addition to the cessation or regression in 
moral development, discontinuities in both mental and physical development 
may exist during childhood and adolescence for a variety of reasons. Thus, the 
impressive nature of studies (such as Arbuthnot and Gordon's) which actually 
tests such theories becomes evident. 
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20 . An international legal norn1 is binding on all members of the international 
community regardless of whether they consent to it [Brief of Amicus Curiae, 
Defense for Children international - USA, Thompson v. Oklahoma, No. 86-6169 
(l 986)). 
2 l. The widely respected Thorsten Sellin studies conducted on adults in the United 
States during 1962, 1967 and 1980 found no deterrent effect with the death 
penalty. 1n fact , Professor Sellin found that less than one-third of 1 percent - .31 
percent - of paroled murderers in the United States were subsequently convicted 
of another homicide (The 1988 Rep011 to the United Nations Committee). 
22. The length of commitment received by violent delinquents in juvenile court 
depends in large part on the jurisdiction in which they are adjudicated. 
Analogously, the length of sentence imposed at the criminal court level is 
mandated by statue contingent on the discretion of the sentencing judge 
(Rudman, Hartstone, Fagan and Moore, 1986). 
23. References to the Record on Appeal are designated [R . . .]. References to the 
Joint Appendix are designated {JA ... ]. 
24. There are many researchers who disagree with this claim. Case in point, 
Wolfgang, Figlio and Sellin (1972), argue that the reality is juveniles with a 
history of a serious violent act will seldom commit another violent act, yet 
research suggests that a record of past violent behavior is the best predictor of 
future violent behavior. 
25 . Such results are supported by Sherry Olson, associate professor of clinical 
psychology at the University of Michigan, who found in a study on impulse 
control , significant problems in boys four and a half to five years of age. That is, 
"delay of gratification" was found to be the strongest predictor of subsequent 
problems. She examined a group of 79 children in preschool and the following 
year in kindergarten. She tested them for a series of self-regulation skills, 
puzzles requiring sustained attention and teacher' s estimation of their aggression 
and anxiety. In the delay of gratification test subjects were given a very boring 
puzzle to do after a brightly wrapped present is brought out and the child is 
infonned it may be opened after the puzzle is completed. One child grabbed the 
gift and ran into a bathroom stall where he hid. Dr. Olson argues that the more 
patient children had a "clearer understanding of social rules and of implicit adult 
expectations" (Rovner, 1993). Interestingly, she argues that the impatience is 
not predictive in girls for whom this seems to be indicative of a developmental 
problem. 
26. Few prospective studies of future violence have been completed. Prospective 
studies, of course, have a much higher validity than retrospective studies because 
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they help determine causal relationships rather than simply identify correlations 
of specific factors and violent behavior. 
27 . Although social scientists have thus far been unable to identify the causal factors 
that produce criminal behavior; age, sex, race and *socioeconomic status appear 
to be the most obvious correlates with official delinquency (Huizinga, Loeber and 
Thornberry, 1972). There are, however, opponents to this theory (Tittle, 
Villimez and Smith, 1978). 
28 . Note the literature which argues against the existence of a correlation between 
low socioeconomic status and crime. For further discussion refer to Tittle, 
Villimez and Smith, 1978. 
29. One reviewer observed that the Supreme Court has traditionally allowed states to 
set certain limits regarding noncriminal behaviors. As such, it would be 
consistent to allow states to continue to set different ages for the death penalty. 
This paper argues against such a position due to the gravity of the death penalty. 
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